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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Elizabeth McManaman Grosz 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Philosophy 
 
June 2014 
 
Title: The Vulnerability of the Relational Self: G. W. F. Hegel, Simone de Beauvoir, and 
Nishida Kitarō Meet Patty Hearst 
 
This dissertation examines relational models of selfhood cross-culturally through 
the work of G. W. F. Hegel, Simone de Beauvoir, and Nishida Kitarō. In the master-slave 
section of the Phenomenology of  Spirit, Hegel states that the self becomes aware of itself 
only through the presence of the Other. In this encounter, consciousness discovers that 
the Other can be a source of recognition (Anerkennung). I turn to the work of Beauvoir 
and Nishida because they further develop Hegel’s notion of recognition through their 
insistence that the face-to-face relationship that incites self-knowledge is mediated by 
social-historical events and discourses. Fundamentally, they make Hegel’s notion of 
recognition more concrete, thus giving the reader of the master-slave dialectic an idea of 
the broader implications of Hegel’s view. While Nishida uses few examples to illustrate 
the determinacy of the historical field of relations, Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is full of 
such descriptions, thus offering the reader of Nishida an illustration of the “historical 
world” that includes dimensions of constituted and constituting forces. Nishida’s 
metaphor of the self as a place of interaction, or basho, in turn, is useful to the reader of 
Beauvoir who attempts to picture a self that is a project “toward the other.” Moreover, 
their discussions of agency are weighted toward the perspective of the self in the case of 
Beauvoir and toward the side of the world for Nishida. Ultimately, this difference can be 
 v 
 
viewed as grounding the distinct ways in which the authors conceive of ethics. Lastly, 
both authors attribute ethical action to self-surpassing. However, for Beauvoir, the 
surpassing of one’s individuality leads to the transformation of self-other relations 
through the mutual recognition of freedom, while Nishida’s self-surpassing entails 
seeking a new locus of ethical action, i.e. absolute nothingness. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On February 4, 1974, Patricia Hearst was kidnapped at gunpoint from the 
Berkeley apartment that she shared with her fiancé by three members of the Symbionese 
Liberation Army. She was held captive in a closet for over two months and given a new 
name, “Tania.” Ten weeks after her capture, she willfully participated in a bank robbery,1 
for which she later served twenty-two months in a federal prison.2 Hearst’s case is held 
up as an example of Stockholm Syndrome, in which the victim, isolated from all other 
human relations and forced to pledge utter allegiance to the captor, comes to 
traumatically bond with him or her. Cases of “traumatic bonding” are more easily 
identifiable in situations of extreme captivity, like Hearst’s, concentration camps, or 
prisons, but they also occur in religious cults, brothels, and relationships of intimate 
partner violence.3 Such behavior defies common understanding of the way that we react 
to violence through flight or fight responses. How could Hearst, held against her will, 
blindfolded in a closet and subjected to sexual abuse, come to sympathize with the cause 
of the perpetrators? The answer lies in the way that her sense of self was slowly worn 
away in captivity. Hearst describes how her initial resistance to the new name and beliefs 
that the SLA members presented her with eventually gave way to her assuming this 
entirely new identity:  
In time, although I was hardly aware of it, they turned me around 
completely, or almost completely. As a prisoner of war, kept blindfolded 
                                               
1 William Graebner, Patty's Got a Gun : Patricia Hearst in 1970s America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 1-4. 
 
2 Ibid., 102.  
 
3 Judith Lewis Herman, Trauma and Recovery (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 74-75. 
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in that closet for two long months, I had been bombarded incessantly with 
the SLA’s interpretation of life, politics, economics, social conditions, and 
current events. Upon my release from the closet, I had thought I was 
humoring them by parroting their clichés and buzz words without 
personally believing in them. Then. . . a sort of numbed shock set in. To 
maintain my own sanity and equilibrium while functioning day by day in 
this new environment, I had learned to act by rote, like a good soldier, 
doing as I was told and suspending disbelief. . . Reality for them was 
different from all that I had known before, and their reality by this time 
had become my reality.4 
 
What does it mean to be “turned around almost completely”? How does one come to take 
on the reality of another, especially when that other is the imprisoner? While separating 
one’s thoughts from the violence being undergone, or disassociating, is a technique often 
employed by prisoners, captivity reflects a greater horror when it extends from purely 
physical to mental captivity. Judith Herman asserts that isolating their victims – whether 
it is from information, financial resources, or other human beings – is the common thread 
that can be found within the tactics employed by perpetrators who are skilled in coercion 
and manipulation.5 The intersubjective deprivation can even extend to wiping away 
“internal images of connection to others,” such as those that are tethered to symbolic 
objects like pictures, letters, and mementos from loved ones:6  
Prisoners of conscience, who have a highly developed awareness of 
strategies of control and resistance, generally understand that isolation is 
the danger to be avoided at all costs…As tenaciously as their captors seek 
to destroy their relationships, these prisoners tenaciously seek to maintain 
communication with a world outside the one in which they are confined. 
They deliberately practice evoking mental images of the people they love, 
in order to preserve their sense of connection. They also fight to preserve 
physical tokens of fidelity. Under conditions of prolonged isolation, 
prisoners need “transitional objects” to preserve their sense of connection 
                                               
4 Ibid, 81. 
 
5 Ibid., 79.  
 
6 Ibid., 80. 
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to others. They understand that to lose these symbols of attachment is to 
lose themselves.7  
 
If isolation is a common factor in the situations of those who experience traumatic 
bonding, than it seems evident that the maintenance of our identity and agency must be 
tied to our social relationships, whether imagined or present. These examples of 
imprisonment reveal how our identities cannot be sustained through our own interior 
resources alone. We need real or imagined connections to others in order to prevent the 
dissolution of our identities. While the question of why and how abusers and tyrants 
deliberately employ coercive tactics to produce willing victims is a pressing one, my 
interest here is in what allows for the possibility of losing the self, or being “turned 
around almost completely.” Hearst describes how she parroted the SLA’s beliefs in order 
to avoid bodily harm, but “in trying to convince them, I convinced myself. I felt that I had 
truly joined them; my past life seemed to have slipped away.”8 While Hearst had been a 
healthy nineteen-year-old with friends, teachers, and families who affirmed her identity, 
when she was held hostage, no one was there to provide affirmation of her former self. 
She was able to maintain her own identity through her own efforts for a while, but over 
time it lost its reality. In the dearth of all other human connection, when Hearst received 
small rewards from her captors for good behavior, she slowly became dependent upon 
this recognition.9 Fueled by the positive feedback that she received as she embraced their 
wishes and beliefs, she took on the only identity that was recognized: “Tania.” Reflecting 
on her time with the SLA at the beginning of her autobiography, Hearst writes, “I feel 
                                               
7 Ibid., 80. Also, see Man’s Search for Meaning. Viktor Frankl describes how he kept hope alive during his 
imprisonment in a concentration camp by picturing his loved ones. 
 
8 Christopher Castiglia, Bound and Determined: Captivity, Culture-Crossing, and White Womanhood from 
Mary Rowlandson to Patty Hearst (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 91. 
 
9 Herman, 78-79. 
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older and wiser now, more disillusioned in my feelings about my fellow man.  I am aware 
of the stark reality that I am vulnerable.”10  
 
Relational Models of the Self 
Throughout the 20th century, relational models of selfhood have been offered by 
philosophers working in fields as diverse as American Pragmatism, Feminist Care Ethics, 
Dialogical philosophy, and Japanese Kyoto School philosophy.11 Relational theories of 
selfhood specify the ways in which the self is constituted by self-other interactions; they 
challenge the view that the self is an enclosed, self-sustaining entity. Hearst’s story 
illustrates the implications of a self that is thoroughly relational. Such a self is utterly 
vulnerable and at risk of dissolution because it depends upon forces outside itself to 
sustain itself. However, while the intersubjective dimension of our selfhood allows for 
the possibility that the self could be lost, it also leaves us open to the ways in which 
others can contribute towards the formation of a viable sense of self. It is not through 
private introspection alone that we achieve self-understanding. We learn about who we 
are when we are called to respond to the Other in dialogue. Catriona Mackenzie believes 
that others play a key role in the self’s ability to integrate the various aspects of itself and 
envision itself as an agent, i.e. someone who is “capable of effective action.”12 If we have 
                                               
10 Castiglia, 99.  
 
11 For example, see Steve Odin, The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996); Eva Feder Kittay and Ellen K. Feder, eds., The Subject of Care: 
Feminist Perspectives on Dependency (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, 2002); 
Watsuji Tetsuro, Rinrigaku, trans. Robert Carter (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996); 
Beata Stawarska, Between You and I: Dialogical Phenomenology (Ohio University Press, 2009). 
 
12 Catriona Mackenzie,  “Imagining Oneself Otherwise.” In Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, eds., 
Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self  (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 140. 
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supportive people in our lives who listen to our preferences, hopes, and fears, then we 
will not only have a better understanding of our identity, but this will also open up a 
space wherein we can imagine new ways of being in the world. Positive affirmation will 
make these new ways of being in the world seem attainable. As Mackenzie suggests, 
The affective, evaluative, and imaginative processes of reflection – by 
means of which we clarify what we value, distinguish our self-conceptions 
from our points of view, and so achieve self-knowledge cannot be purely 
introspective. Our emotional responses to aspects of our identities such as 
our temperamental characteristics – responses, for example, of shame or 
pride – are shaped by and responsive to the estimations and responses of 
others. And these responses, at least in part, form the basis for our 
judgments about ourselves.13 
 
If we find Mackenzie’s account believable, then we must conclude that self-knowledge 
emerges through our relationships with others. Another conclusion that we might draw 
from a relational model of the self is that self-understanding depends upon 
externalization. We will see that Beauvoir develops this claim through her concept of 
alienation in Chapter 3. We have to posit our identities, i.e. give an account of who we 
are, in order to understand who we are. Beyond self-understanding, externalizing the self 
through dialogue actually delivers a sense of reality to our own identity. In “Being-in-the-
world and Schizophrenia: Three Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Experience in 
Schizophrenia,”14 I examined how one of the symptoms that individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia described was an impoverished sense of self. While these individuals often 
reported feeling an all-encompassing sense of “unreality,” when empathically attuned 
therapists listened to them, some expressed a renewed sense of the reality of their selves. 
                                               
13 Ibid. 
 
14 This article will appear in Psychology and the Other: A Dialogue at the Crossroad of an Emerging Field. 
Eds. David Goodman and Mark Freeman. New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
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For example, one individual describes his or her loss of self and attests to the power of 
the therapist-client relationship: 
I cannot feel my being anymore. If I cannot feel myself, I cannot have 
control over an action. If I cannot feel myself, I cannot feel. I cross the 
street, and I don’t realize it, and I must cross it again… I am not aware of 
the presence of my own person…I cannot say ‘I’ in relation to myself, but 
only in relation to others. But when I am here talking with you all this does 
not happen.15  
 
While we do not have enough background information to presume too much from this 
account, it is striking to witness the shift between the individual’s self-disturbance 
described in the first part of the interview to his or her declaration at the end. What we 
can conclude, is that the intersubjective encounter confers a sense of reality and 
diminishes the self-disturbance. Somehow, in the meeting, this person received the reality 
of his or her selfhood back from the Other. While the examples of traumatic bonding 
discussed earlier show how the intersubjective constitution of one’s selfhood leaves one 
open to fracture, this latter example illustrates how it is also the means through which one 
is able to put the self back together again. 
In my dissertation I will begin by taking up the claim that Hegel puts forward in 
the master-slave section of the Phenomenology of Spirit that the self becomes aware of 
itself only through the presence of the Other. Hegel asserts that self-consciousness is 
incited when it meets another self-consciousness. Consequently, the self both discovers 
that it is an object for the Other and that this Other is capable of conferring recognition 
(Anerkennung).16 Hegel states that self-consciousness’ first tendency is to treat the Other 
as a means to an end. However, it eventually discovers that a stable sense of self 
                                               
15 Giovanni Stanghellini, Disembodied Spirits and Deanimated Bodies: The Psychopathology of Common 
Sense (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2004), 123-124. 
 
16 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press, 1977), § 178. 
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necessitates viewing the Other as an autonomous equal (not an object “for-it”).17 Hegel’s 
dense dialectic leaves the reader with a vision of selfhood wherein the self’s existence is 
found to be deeply colored by relations to others.  
 While Hegel is the starting point for my project, I turn to the work of two 20th 
century figures, East and West, Nishida Kitarō and Simone de Beauvoir, because they 
further develop Hegel’s notion of recognition (Anerkennung) through their discussion of 
how the face-to-face relationship that incites self-knowledge is mediated by social-
historical events and discourses. Beauvoir and Nishida appropriate Hegel’s notion of the 
relational self in different ways. Fundamentally, they make his notion of recognition 
more concrete, thus giving the reader of the master-slave dialectic an idea of the broader 
implications of Hegel’s view. Assessing that Hegel’s system is too “abstract,”18 Beauvoir 
concretizes the master-slave dialectic by turning to first-person narrative descriptions of 
self-other relations in The Second Sex, her novels, and autobiographies.19 While Hegel 
shows that the self comes to reflect on itself when it is confronted with another 
consciousness that sees it as an object, Beauvoir carries this a step further by detailing the 
way that prevalent social discourses structure the way that the self seeks recognition from 
the Other. Nishida makes Hegel’s notion of recognition more concrete by emphasizing 
that the self that becomes itself through recognition is always a being that acts and is 
                                               
17 Hegel, § 191. 
 
18 Karen Green and Nicholas Roffey, “Women, Hegel, and Recognition in The Second Sex,” Hypatia 25.2 
(2010), 377. 
 
19 See Karen Green and Nicholas Roffey and Richard Freadman, Threads of Life: Autobiography and the 
Will (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 144-5. 
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acted upon by the historical world.20 He highlights the agency of the historical world in 
the determination of the self. 
Both Beauvoir and Nishida take the structure of self-other relations witnessed in 
Hegel’s master-slave dialectic and investigate the ways that the actions of the self in 
response to the Other are shaped by a historical world of meaning. Beauvoir and 
Nishida’s focus on the historical world is crucial because freedom and individuality are 
not bare possessions of the I and the Thou. The possibilities of self-expression are 
delimited by one’s historical context.  
Beauvoir and Nishida scholars also have something to gain from reading each 
other and looking to their different appropriations of Hegel. My project will respond to 
the criticism that is often mentioned by Nishida scholars that Nishida’s discussion of the 
self and the historical world is too abstract.21 I contend that Beauvoir’s narratives can be 
utilized as fitting examples of the ontology that Nishida lays out because they model the 
close relationship between individual freedom and the agency of the historical world. The 
first person accounts of experience that Beauvoir recalls in the Second Sex demonstrate 
Nishida’s claims that the Other exists in the depths of the self 22 and the world acts on the 
self23 by calling to mind the structure of being-for-others and the social discourses that 
provide lenses through which individuals structure their lives. In Beyond Personal 
                                               
20 See Nishida Kitarō, “The Historical Body,” Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy, trans. and ed. 
by David A. Dilworth (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998). 
 
21 James W. Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School (Honolulu: University of 
Hawai‘i Press, 2001), 71; 80. 
 
22 Odin, 88.  
 
23 See Nishida, “The Historical Body,” 39-40 (NKZ 14: 269-270). (Nishida Kitarō Zenshū, 19 vols. (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, Shōwa, 1965-), vol. 1 p. 7.) [Hereafter cited as NKZ followed by volume and page 
numbers.] 
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Identity: Dogen, Nishida, and a Phenomenology of No-Self, Gereon Kopf writes that 
Nishida’s “preliminary reflections on alterity are similar to those developed by Hegel, 
Sartre, and Benjamin.”24 Kopf proposes that an investigation into selfhood must include 
attention to how the self constructs and presents itself to the Other, alluding to the 
phenomenological tradition and Ricoeur’s conception of narrative identity. I believe that 
due to her fundamental interest in narratives and self-other relations, a comparison of 
Beauvoir’s work and Nishida’s advances Kopf’s project. My dissertation will thus add to 
the recent work on Nishida’s conception of the social self by Kopf and Odin.25  
As Beauvoir acknowledges that human existence is ambiguous (we are bodies 
that undergo biological processes and the judgments of others, but we are also freedoms 
that separate themselves from the passivity of the body through thought and our 
projects)26 Nishida’s term basho, or place,27 is useful to the reader of Beauvoir who tries 
to envision a self that is always both. Basho effectively captures the dual aspects that 
Beauvoir describes. In the middle phase of his thought, Nishida replaces language of the 
“subject” with the new notion of a “field” of consciousness.28 Consciousness is not the 
property of an independent, self-sustaining individual. In order to capture these two 
sentiments, and to describe action without neglecting them, Nishida describes experience 
as a place or field. Any remnant of the identity of a being as closed off or self-directing is 
                                               
24 Gereon Kopf, Beyond Personal Identity: Dogen, Nishida, and a Phenomenology of No-Self (Surrey, 
Great Britain: Curzon Press, 2001), 111. 
 
25 See Kopf, Beyond Personal Identity and Odin, The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). 
 
26 Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), 7-12.  
 
27 Nishida Kitaro, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, (Tokyo: Sophia University, 1970), 6-7 (NKZ 7: 
16). 
 
28 John Maraldo, "Nishida Kitarō,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), ed. 
by Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/nishida-kitaro/>. 
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eradicated by the concept of basho. Agency doesn’t issue forth from a particularized 
subject; rather, basho becomes its site, source, and ultimately, the all-encompassing 
reality of body-mind-world. By asserting that reality is located in the space or basho of 
action, Nishida is able to avoid reductive accounts of the world where the self is simply 
opposed to matter. Consciousness and material beings interpenetrate such that there is no 
real outside or inside to human life. Nishida thus pushes Beauvoir’s notion of ambiguity 
to an extreme by eliminating the language of the subject.  
This dissertation draws upon Hegel, Beauvoir, and Nishida’s distinct notions of 
the relational self. While reading these authors alongside each other is mutually 
illuminating, it is important to highlight the limits of the comparison. In other words, 
while the project is oriented around common threads within their theories of the self, 
significant differences are also noted. For example, with regard to Hegel, I draw on the 
abstract structure of the struggle for recognition that comprises his view of the relational 
self in the master-slave section of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Furthermore, I highlight 
how social-historical discourses and practices shape the struggle for recognition. While 
these concepts also occur in Beauvoir’s philosophical project, she believes that Hegel 
neglects to account for the way that gender differences and the human tendency to flee 
freedom both affect the kind of recognition sought. Her discussion of the relational self 
emphasizes the importance of how gender is expressed in social-historical institutions, 
discourses, and practices. While the sections of Hegel that I use are descriptive, 
Beauvoir’s project is both descriptive and prescriptive. Beauvoir is very clear that there is 
an authentic form of existence, which is comprised of “assuming” one’s freedom and 
recognizing the Other’s freedom. Beyond this, she also has a social political agenda. The 
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Second Sex is written with the intent of critiquing concrete gender inequalities and 
oppressive social historical discourses of femininity in order to bring about actual change 
of social discourses and social-political structures.     
Like Hegel and Beauvoir, Nishida is also concerned with the way that historical 
place shapes identity. His account of the self bears more in common with Beauvoir than 
Hegel, because it is has both descriptive and prescriptive elements. Part of the 
prescriptive aspect involves encouraging the reader to realize that she or he is not a self-
sustaining individual. On the surface, this injunction resembles Beauvoir’s ideal notion 
wherein the self discovers that its “free” projects are directed toward the Other’s 
recognition, and are thus dependent (not self-sustaining). While this discovery leads to 
her ideal of mutual recognition between two subjects, the other aspect of her prescriptive 
orientation is that she never lets go of the possibility of individual transcendence, even 
within an oppressive situation. Broadly, The Second Sex details the oppressive situation 
that women have inherited, but Beauvoir continually reminds the reader that this situation 
is not inevitable, because human beings have a hand in shaping their identity and world. 
Therefore, the authentic self “assumes” her freedom through creating and inventing new 
values and ways of being in the world, while looking for recognition of these individual 
projects from others.  
Nishida’s ideal of realizing one’s dependence on others involves a profound shift 
with regard to self-understanding and action. While Beauvoir’s ideal is “assuming” one’s 
freedom, Nishida’s  ideal is diametrically opposed  in that the self is called upon to shed 
its belief in its own power so that its actions can be guided by that which is not self, or 
absolute nothingness. He attempts to invoke a fundamental transformation within the 
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reader wherein the self discovers that it is truly itself only through its own self-negation; 
it has its being in that which transcends it. For Nishida, the ultimate result of realizing 
one’s dependence on the Other is the realization that the ego is only one way of 
interpreting one’s reality. One is tied to the existence of Others as well as everything 
existing in the historical, social, and natural world in such a deep way that one’s own 
existence cannot be separated in a dualistic manner. When one realizes one’s 
indebtedness, then the locus of action can be shifted from an individualistic way of seeing 
the world to one that embraces non-duality.  
With regard to Nishida’s discussion of the relation between the self and the 
historical world, his later works are meant to address the impact of the social-historical 
world on the self. However, in contrast to Beauvoir, he does not investigate concrete 
injustices. Instead, he discusses the impact of history on the structure of self-identity. 
While in The Second Sex Beauvoir hopes to incite a transformation within the self with 
regard to resisting concrete inequalities, Nishida doesn’t advocate for social-political 
resistance. He intends to incite an ethical-religious transformation in the reader wherein 
she will discover that the base of her self is absolute nothingness. While both Beauvoir 
and Nishida hope to inspire self transformation in the reader, Beauvoir’s ideal rests upon 
transcendence and social-political resistance to oppressive situations, whereas Nishida’s 
ideal involves inner self-negation to allow for a new basis from which the self acts. 
Ultimately, both provide perspectives that shed light on the challenges that the Hearst 
case presents for a relational model of selfhood.  
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Chapter Outline 
Chapter II 
I begin by examining Hegel’s famous master-slave dialectic because it challenges 
the Western narrative of the self’s autonomy that emerges in modernity.29 In the chapter 
on self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel reveals how self-experience 
is incited by other human beings. In his account of self-consciousness, Hegel emphasizes 
the importance of intersubjectivity, which effectively eliminates the possibility of 
accessing the self in isolation from a relation to others.30 The structure of the selfhood is 
described as a “unity of itself in its otherness.” Hegel describes the encounter with the 
Other as one wherein the self loses itself by finding itself outside itself. Only in this 
meeting does the “unity of itself in its otherness” become “explicit.” 
 My reading of Hegel is informed by Evangelica Sembou and Robert Williams’ 
reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit; the crucial idea that emerges is: to be a self 
means to be tied to recognition by the Other. They both argue against the dominant 
interpretations that tie Hegel to the cogito of Idealism and seek to expose Hegel’s deep 
interest in intersubjectivity.31  
 
                                               
29 See Kopf, 6: “During the periods of the Enlightenment and Modernism this notion of an individual 
person-over-time was adopted as the general theory of Mensch-sein, underlying most philosophical, 
psychological, and ethical systems in the West…By then, the synthesis of Aristotelian and Neoplatonist 
thought within the Christian theological tradition had given rise to the notion of an individual and enduring 
core, which clearly demarcates and identifies an individual, human person.” 
 
30 Hegel, § 184. 
 
31 While some commentators believe that Hegel is wedded to a metaphysical account of Spirit, Sembou, 
Pinker, and Williams argue that Hegel doesn’t abandon his interest in intersubjective recognition in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit. See Evangelia Sembou, “Hegel’s Idea of a ‘Struggle for Recognition’: The 
Phenomenology of Spirit,” History of Political Thought Vol XXIV No. 2 (Summer, 2003), 263; Terry 
Pinkard, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
7-8; Robert R. Williams, Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other, (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 1992), 1-3.  
 14 
 
Chapter III 
Beauvoir’s interest in Hegel stems from the thesis of the master-slave dialectic, 
which claims that “the subject posits itself only in opposition; it asserts itself as the 
essential and sets up the other as nonessential, as the object.”32 Beauvoir appropriates 
Hegel’s notion of recognition by claiming that the human being is essentially a “project 
of self toward the other.”33 The Second Sex can be read as Beauvoir’s effort to “…adapt 
and make concrete the confrontation of self and other to be found in Hegel.”34 She 
accomplishes this by examining social discourses and first person narratives that reveal 
the way that human beings, especially women, strive for recognition. The type of 
recognition that men and women often want from each other is not simply a confirmation 
of freedom and sovereignty, as Hegel presents in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Rather, 
men, and especially women, often alienate themselves into an image of themselves 
(persona, social role, life story, etc.) in order to flee their existential freedom.35 I will 
stress that while flight from one’s freedom is a motivating factor in alienation, gendered 
social-historical discourses and practices also heavily encourage alienation by holding up 
ideal feminine and masculine ways of being.  
In addition, my reading of Beauvoir will highlight how our demand for 
recognition issues from our need for the validation of our self-concepts and projects. 
While we will see how Beauvoir’s ethics urge one to relinquish efforts to coerce the 
                                               
32 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. by Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 7. 
 
33 Simone de Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 93.  
 
34 Green and Roffey, “Women, Hegel, and Recognition in The Second Sex,” 378.  
 
35 Nancy Bauer, “Being-with as Being-against: Heidegger Meets Hegel in The Second Sex,” Continental 
Philosophy Review 34 (2001), 144.  
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Other into affirming an arbitrary self-concept of one’s own making, it is important to note 
that she doesn’t suggest foregoing all attempts to seek recognition. Realizing this point 
ensures that we do not miss the inextricable role of the Other in Beauvoir’s vision of the 
self: “Man can find a justification of his own existence only in the existence of other 
men.”36 In Beauvoir’s view, we are primed to seek intersubjective recognition. This 
leaves us vulnerable to the possibility that we will be denied recognition and will 
consequently risk losing our identity and agency, like Hearst and others who have been 
subjected to physical or mental imprisonment. The sobering conclusion that we may draw 
from such instances of traumatic bonding is that the self can be lost and it cannot be 
saved through the effort exerted by a particularized self alone. In other words, recognition 
is central to the constitution and maintenance of selfhood, and a particular individual 
cannot give it to her or himself. We get ourselves back from the other.  
 
Chapter IV 
Nishida alludes to Hegel both directly and indirectly in many of his works. In a 1931 
essay, “Hegel’s Dialectic from My Point of View,” Nishida declares, “There is much in 
my present thought that I have learned from Hegel, and I feel closer to Hegel than to 
anyone else.”37 Even when Nishida doesn’t directly reference him, Hegel’s influence on 
his thought seems likely in such passages as: “The I becomes an I through recognition by 
a Thou, just as a Thou becomes a Thou only through recognition by an I.”38 This vein of 
                                               
36 Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 72. 
 
37 As quoted in Peter Suares, The Kyoto School’s Takeover of Hegel: Nishida, Nishitani, and Tanabe 
Remake the Philosophy of Spirit (Lanham, MD.: Lexington Books, 2011), 3-4. 
 
38 As quoted in Odin, The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism, 91. While Nishida does not 
directly allude to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic here, I will make a case in Chapter 4 that statements like 
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thought runs throughout Nishida’s entire philosophical project in his repetition of the 
concepts “affirmation-qua-negation” and “continuity of discontinuity,” which echo the 
idea that individuality emerges through a field of relation.39 Nishida also prompts the 
reader to realize the mutual dependence of self and Other, but instead of taking this idea 
directly from Hegel, he draws on the Buddhist teaching of self-realization through 
emptiness. Hegel’s main influence on Nishida’s work can be witnessed in the allusions to 
Hegel’s logic as he seeks to describe a concrete logic that captures a unified reality that 
overcomes the division between subject and object. Here, Nishida’s use of Hegel’s 
concept of the unity between thought and being is apparent.40 Nishida’s later works on 
the historical world41 rely on the same desire for unity; he hopes to capture worldly 
interactions without recourse to a separation between world, self, and Other. It is 
important to note that throughout his corpus, Nishida’s use of the concept “self” at times 
refers to a particular human being and at other times refers to basho.  
In this chapter, I will seek to show how the intersubjective self is an important 
motif within Nishida’s overall philosophical project as it broadens the reader of Nishida’s 
                                                                                                                                            
this one reveal a likely influence. Hegel does not use the term “Thou” in the master-slave dialectic, but I 
believe that Nishida is drawn to the term “recognition” that Hegel uses to show that the other’s affirmation 
is a prerequisite for the existence of the self. There are other Nishida quotes that do not use the term “thou” 
that could also be influenced by Hegel (e.g., the frequently occuring statement: “the individual determines 
itself only in relation to other individuals”). At times, Nishida doesn’t seem to attribute any special 
meaning to the term “Thou” other than another human being that the self encounters. At other times, he 
seems to use the term “Thou” to highlight the self and the other’s ultimate non-duality. 
 
39 Kopf, 111-112. While Hegel and Beauvoir describe recognition as a human phenomenon, Nishida writes 
that any other being in the natural world (“including mountains, rivers, trees, and stones”) is a Thou, when 
seen from the standpoint of non-duality. See Odin, 92.  
 
40 For example, concerning his maiden work, Nishida writes “From the beginning, the idea of the 
spontaneous self-development of pure experience in An Inquiry into the Good contained in a fundamental 
way also Hegel’s idea of the development of the concrete concept.” As quoted in Peter Suares, The Kyoto 
School’s Takeover of Hegel: Nishida, Nishitani, and Tanabe Remake the Philosophy of Spirit (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 3; 9. 
 
41 For example, “Logic and Life,” “The Historical Body,” and “I and Thou.” 
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understanding of key aspects of his thought, including the self and its basis in 
nothingness, place, and the historical world (with reference to his notions of expression 
and creative activity). Focusing on the dynamic between I and Thou will help correct the 
overemphasis, in American Nishida scholarship, on the individual “true self” and the 
neglect of his discussion of the social self.42 This can be explained in part due to the lack 
of translations of some of his later essays including the 1932 “I and Thou.” For example, 
in Nishitani Keiji’s biography on Nishida, Steve Odin points out how Nishitani neglects 
to consider the importance of the I-Thou dimension of selfhood in Nishida’s thought. 
Much attention is devoted to Nishida’s concepts of the “self as pure experience” and the 
“self as absolute nothingness,” even though Nishida’s later writings articulate the self in 
relation in the social-historical world.43 While all three ways of formulating the self 
demonstrate the non-duality and interpenetration of the particular and the universal, i.e. 
self and world, Nishida’s work on the social-historical world contains a distinct way of 
rendering this understanding of the self through his notion of the I-Thou relation. Aside 
from what the relational self can tell us about other themes in Nishida’s philosophical 
project, Nishida’s view offers insight into a vision of the self that is a confluence of 
relations. The implications of Nishida’s view is that the self is always tied to an 
intersubjective space. The deepest reality of the self lies both in the intimacy of deepest 
inward subjectivity and reality as Other. Nishida maintains that the self is expressive and 
free, yet he simultaneously implies that the self does not possess itself. Similar to 
                                               
42Steve Odin points out that Nishida scholars have tended to focus on Nishida’s conception of the true self 
as something individual. However, in his later essays, Nishida clarifies that the self is always social. See 
The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism, 85-87.  
 
43 Like Odin, Kopf presents an argument that upholds the importance of the social self in Nishida’s thought: 
“[Nishida]…made the I and Thou relationship the fundament of his theory of self-awareness,” 84. Odin 
claims that the “I-Thou” dimension of selfhood is a “central and recurrent motif” throughout Nishida’s 
entire philosophical project. See The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism, 81.     
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Beauvoir’s discussion of selfhood, Nishida’s model of the self is one wherein the self is 
not a self-directing agent as discursive entity. By upholding the centrality of 
intersubjective relation in the maintenance of identity, when paired with Hearst’s story, 
Nishida’s vision of the self also provides an explanation for why Hearst lost her sense of 
self when isolated and held captive.  
 
Chapter V 
In this chapter, I bring Beauvoir and Nishida’s thought into dialogue. I 
demonstrate how examining Beauvoir and Nishida together yields two accounts of 
agency that converge on the idea that the Other is a condition of selfhood. However, their 
discussions of agency are weighted towards the perspective of the self in the case of 
Beauvoir and towards the side of the world in Nishida. Their slightly different foci 
present the reader with two ways of visualizing the acting self that is a product of worldly 
relations.  
Beauvoir affirms the importance of alienation and self-understanding directly in 
The Second Sex, “A being cannot achieve self-awareness except by alienating itself; it 
searches for itself within the world in a foreign form that it makes its own.”44 Beauvoir’s 
account of alienation contends that we require distance to know the self; Nishida would 
not disagree, but for him it is not the self alone that is alienated in the object because the 
agency of the world forms the self. While Beauvoir asserts that alienating oneself into 
one’s work or social role shows us how we tend to have difficulty affirming our lack of 
substance, Nishida focuses on the agency of the object – these determining forces – rather 
than the subject. The historical world that shapes the human being is actually the 
                                               
44 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. by H. M. Parshley (New York: Knopf, 1952), 88. 
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condition for individuality. Beauvoir’s idea that social discourses construct our 
subjectivity is more in line with Nishida’s projects. However, her language of “assuming 
one’s freedom” leads the reader to think in terms of an individual ego making decisions 
rather than a being that is truly empty of an individual essence.45  
While Nishida maintains that the self is born in a historical world of relations that 
determines it, he gives few examples of this model of selfhood in his writings. As 
mentioned earlier, turning to Beauvoir’s descriptions of self-other relations in The Second 
Sex allows us to consider the implications of such a view. The narratives in this text 
demonstrate the ways that the individuality and agency of the self are a product of 
historical discourses and events. The self is an agent through its determinations, just like 
the self that acts is the self that is born out of the historical world, for Nishida. Such 
descriptions help us envision what Nishida means when he says that the self is something 
that is made.46 
 As Beauvoir acknowledges that human existence is ambiguous – we are always 
both subjects and objects (determining and determined) – Nishida’s concept of basho, or 
place,47 supplies a logic that captures a self that is always both. Basho provides us with a 
metaphor for how the self is a unique conduit for social-historical discourses. Given 
Beauvoir’s commitment to situated freedom and the fundamental impulse to seek 
                                               
45 While Nishida may critique Beauvoir’s language of the subject who alienates herself or assumes herself, 
ultimately Beauvoir’s existentialist orientation makes individual transformation of paramount importance; 
indeed, authentic ethics require it. Nishida is also interested in self-transformation; for him, the latter is 
achieved when the self realizes that she or he is not a self-sustaining individual. This conversion experience 
allows for true ethical action, which issues from the realization and embodiment of oneness.  
 
46 Agustin Jacinto, “The Return of the Past: Tradition and the Political Microcosm in the Later Nishida,” in 
Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, & the Question of Nationalism, ed. by James W. Heisig and John 
C. Maraldo (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1995), 140. 
 
47 Nishida Kitaro, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, 6-7 (NKZ 7: 16). 
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recognition from the Other, which structures our agency in a manner that is not clear-cut 
and unilateral, basho is a useful non-dual metaphor. 
 Nishida and Beauvoir’s accounts are similar in that they each hold up human 
vulnerability as the path to ethical action. Examining their ethics together provides us 
with two notions of self-surpassing. Both describe our avoidance – through fear – of our 
own finitude and encourage the reader to confront it. For Beauvoir, this means being 
open to the Other’s capacity to recognize or refuse recognition without attempting to 
coerce her. For Nishida, moments of loss or trauma open the self to its total inability to 
control fate. In this moment of helplessness, one can make a turnaround wherein one’s 
actions issue from absolute nothingness rather than the strivings of the ego.  
 
 While both authors provide accounts of the relational self that are influenced by 
Hegel, their discussions of agency are weighted toward the perspective of the particular 
self in the case of Beauvoir and toward the side of the world as self (or, Self, as 
encompassing the non-dual ‘self-other’) for Nishida. Ultimately, this difference can be 
viewed as grounding the distinct ways in which the authors conceive of ethics. Turning to 
the author’s ethics further reinforces their models of relational selfhood. More 
specifically, according to Beauvoir, the self consists of both immanence and 
transcendence. However, at times, she privileges transcendence, i.e. our ability to surpass, 
through our self-created projects, the ways in which we are simply constituted by our 
situation. She believes that it is up to human beings to invent values; part of maturation 
involves realizing that values are not “ready-made.” However, Beauvoir complicates this 
position through her assertion that one does not create projects or values for oneself 
 21 
 
alone. The human being creates with an eye to the Other; we hope to receive recognition 
for our acts. “My essential need is therefore to be faced with free men,” Beauvoir writes. 
48 While Beauvoir recognizes that ethics rests upon the others’ recognition of one’s 
project, and is thus a kind of “self-surpassing,” ethical action still entails appealing to 
others, and is thus dependent upon the individual’s desire for affirmation. 
 In contrast, Nishida’s notion of ethical action consists of undermining one’s belief 
in one’s own capacity to act ethically. Paradoxically, according to Nishida, shedding this 
perception results in spontaneous compassion. It is our desire to both avoid uncertainty 
and control the way that others perceive us that prevents us from realizing non-duality. In 
Nishida’s Buddhist-influenced world view, reality is completely empty of “self-nature”; 
realizing this leads to action that is free of the idea that the self can exist in separation 
from other beings. Such action is deemed ethical by Nishida because it is empty of self 
will. Therefore, in relation to Nishida’s view in which the agency of the world is 
highlighted, I believe Beauvoir’s model of the ethical agent privileges the subject.  
 While both idealize the individual who confronts her finitude and remains open to 
her own vulnerability, neither believe that ethical behavior can be reduced purely to the 
behavior and will of the individual. Since the self is always oriented toward the Other, 
when subjected to oppressive situations, the self cannot simply will itself to transcend 
such situations. Hearst’s story serves as a sobering illustration of the self that is 
thoroughly bound to intersubjective recognition. Her case and the cases of others who 
                                               
48 Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, 129. 
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have experienced traumatic bonding show that the self does not possess itself. For better 
or worse, we get ourselves back from the Other. Hearst’s case dramatically presents the 
implications of a relational model of self. While Chapter V will discuss Beauvoir and 
Nishida’s views of agency, we will return to the challenge that her story presents to the 
relational self and the tools that Beauvoir and Nishida provide in order to surmount these 
challenges directly in the conclusion.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 HEGEL’S NOTION OF THE RELATIONAL SELF AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
RECOGNITION IN THE MASTER-SLAVE DIALECTIC  
 
In his discussion of the master-slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, 
Hegel introduces the bold claim that the self becomes aware of itself only through the 
presence of the Other. He states that self-consciousness is incited when it encounters 
another self-consciousness. The first two implications of this mutual encounter are that 
consciousness discovers that it can be an object for the Other, and secondly, it sees the 
Other as a source of recognition (Anerkennung).49 Hegel introduces an intersubjective 
component to the notion of selfhood: each self-consciousness plays a mediating role for 
the other by constituting that through which each comes to know itself. In order to 
possess a stable self-conception of its own autonomy, self-consciousness strives to turn 
its “subjective certainty” into an “objective reality.” The latter is an existence that is 
affirmed by free others.50 While self-consciousness at first views the Other as a means to 
an end, it comes to understand that a viable sense of self requires realizing that the Other 
is an autonomous equal (not merely an object “for-it”).51 While Hegel does not suggest 
that mutual recognition is a moral ought, we will see in later chapters that it is for 
Beauvoir and Nishida. According to Beauvoir and Nishida, we cannot extricate the 
ethical ideal of realizing I-Thou relations from the ontological premise that the self  is 
                                               
49 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. by A.V. Miller (Oxford University Press, 1977), § 178. 
 
50 Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit (New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969), 11.  
 
51 Hegel, § 191. 
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dependent on other free Thous for its existence. All three authors offer ontological 
models of the self wherein the self’s existence is found to be inextricably in-relation with 
others.52  
My reading of the Phenomenology suggests that Hegel reveals an ontological 
model of selfhood based on relation. However, beyond this positive claim, I note that 
Hegel also explores the negative consequences of ignoring its reality. Thus, in Hegel, and 
later on in Nishida and Beauvoir, While Hegel shows how self-consciousness initially 
takes itself to be self-sufficient and wholly self-governing, the Phenomenology 
demonstrates how this perception is mistaken.53 This means that beyond his critical 
project, he also offers up positive claims regarding the ontological position that the self is 
oriented primordially to seek intersubjective relations.  
In order to clarify how self-other relations are an integral component of selfhood, 
one must examine Hegel’s discussion of how self-consciousness is a product of Geist 
(spirit manifest as the interweaving of history, practices, and institutions). This is related 
to his assertion that intelligibility is not a matter of the pure subject; it is a matter of 
social-historical forms of knowing. It is necessary to expand the discussion of the 
relational self to include his notion of Geist because self-other relations are structured 
based on social-historical discourses and practices. More specifically, the way that human 
beings recognize or fail to recognize each other is shaped by social-historical discourses 
                                               
52 Beyond an ethical ideal, or an ontological dimension of the self’s existence, Robert Williams points out 
that self-recognition in the Other is a structure of Reason itself: “Self recognition in the other is the 
universal, relational structure that pervades all aspects of Reason in its concrete actuality.” See 
Recognition: Fichte and Hegel on the Other, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 
196. 
 
53 Stephen Houlgate,  “G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831)” in The Blackwell Guide to the Modern Philosophers : 
From Descartes to Nietzsche, ed. by Steven M. Emmanuel (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 
 301-302. 
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and practices. Thus far, I have introduced the idea that 1) the self’s existence, or being, is 
tied to the Other, 2) the self’s knowledge of itself is incited by and exists 
interdependently with the Other, 3) self-knowledge, and intelligibility in general, are 
shaped by social-historical practices and discourses, and 4) the self has the tendency to 
realize its indebtedness to these shaping factors and seek recognition from the Other. 
Based on these points, I will show how Hegel’s theory of the relational self and the 
importance of recognition occurs at the level of ontology, ethics, and epistemology. 
There are scholars who would dispute the view that, for Hegel, the ontological 
make-up of the self is tied to the Other as well as historical forms of knowledge and 
practices. Yet, a purely metaphysical and/or Idealist reading of Hegel misses some of his 
key insights with regard to intersubjectivity. The work of such authors as Evangelica 
Sembou, Robert Williams, and Robert Pippin suggest that a more intersubjectively 
informed reading of the Phenomenology is in order.  
Again, my reading of Hegel’s project in the Phenomenology takes him to be 
advancing epistemological, ontological, and ethical claims. Unpacking these arguments 
will allow me to demonstrate, in later chapters, how Beauvoir and Nishida took up 
Hegel’s notion of the relational self in their own ontological and ethical projects. 
 
Intersubjectivity and The “Metaphysical” and “Non-Metaphysical” Debate 
 One of the most prominent debates in Hegel scholarship on the Phenomenology 
concerns the various interpretations of Spirit, or Geist. Scholars tend to align themselves 
in either the “metaphysical” or “non-metaphysical” group with respect to whether or not 
they interpret Spirit as a statement about Being itself. My project does not focus on Spirit 
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alone; however, depending on how one reads this crucial concept, current debates 
emphasize reading Hegel’s notion of selfhood as either a normative concept defined in 
relation to history or as an ontology, i.e. a theory about being itself. . The non-
metaphysical, historical reading is ultimately more compelling, as it better accounts for 
the intersubjective dimension of selfhood that is so indispensable for Hegel’s dialectics, 
especially as it manifests in the Phenomenology.  
Pippin and Terry Pinkard (I place Sembou and Williams here too) advance non-
metaphysical readings of Hegel, as they see him making a transcendental argument about 
the conditions needed for anything to be an object of thought. Furthermore, they view 
Hegel as offering a genealogy of certain discourses that unfolded in the West with respect 
to the self and nature. For these thinkers, Hegel’s project concerns historical concepts; it 
does not extend into the actual structure of Being itself. However, scholars such as 
Stephen Houlgate and Jean Hyppolite do not see a division between Hegel’s description 
of the categories of thought, or the logic of the mind, and the logic or structure of being 
itself.54  
 Broadly, the non-metaphysical reading of Hegel stresses that Spirit is merely an 
intersubjective background55 against which individuality forms itself. Therefore, instead 
of adopting the early 19th century metaphysical reading that views Spirit as a divine 
essence whose development is teleological,56 Spirit is described as a concept referring to 
the conditions that make thought possible. While Kant gave a purely formal account of 
                                               
54 Ibid., 119.  
 
55 Evangelia Sembou, “Hegel’s Idea of a ‘Struggle for Recognition’: The Phenomenology of Spirit,” 
History of Political Thought Vol XXIV No. 2 (Summer, 2003), 274. 
 
56 Paul Redding, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2010 Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/hegel/>. 
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the conditions for the possibility of knowledge, Hegel’s project, according to such a 
reading, includes actual, lived social-historical practices as conditions for the possibility 
of knowledge. For example, situations in which the subject desires worldly objects, 
interacts with others, and is engaged in labor are actual conditions that prompt self-
consciousness, according to Hegel.  
Those who read Hegel as advancing a “non-metaphysical” project in the 
Phenomenology focus on this latter point. With respect to self-other relations, Williams 
writes: 
When Hegel introduces the crucial concept of spirit (Geist) he shows that 
spirit originates in and results from a process of recognition that involves 
struggle, domination and reconciliation. Spirit has its existential genesis in 
interpersonal recognition. It is an I that is a We and a We that is an 
I…This implies that Geist is a fundamentally interpersonal and social 
conception.57 
 
Contra the traditional interpretation that Spirit is a “transcendent metaphysical entity,” 
Williams argues that Hegel actually aims to show how Spirit is the intersubjective matrix 
of relations out of which both intelligibility and an individual’s identity emerge. Absolute 
Spirit, then, according to Williams, is a historical achievement of a community where 
mutual recognition prevails. Pointing to the following passage in the Phenomenology, 
Williams suggests that forgiveness allows individuals to realize their indebtedness to one 
another and mutually recognize each other: “The word of reconciliation is the objectively 
existing Geist, which beholds the pure knowledge of itself qua universal consciousness in 
and through its opposite… [This is] a reciprocal recognition which is the absolute 
Geist.”58 Again, this conception of Spirit does not suggest that Spirit develops in a 
                                               
57 Williams, 14.  
 
58 As quoted by Williams, 208. 
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particular manner based on teleological necessity; rather, Williams holds that Spirit is an 
intersubjective framework that is always at work in history. This intersubjective realm 
becomes “actual” when a society is composed of subjects who mutually recognize each 
other.  
Like Williams, Sembou attests to the centrality of intersubjectivity within Hegel’s 
project. She argues that Hegel doesn’t prioritize a metaphysical view of Absolute Spirit 
and leave behind his claims about intersubjectivity and recognition in the 
Phenomenology.59 Sembou affirms Williams’ idea that Hegel uses the term Spirit – 
where Spirit is an intersubjective background – instead of “subjectivity” because it resists 
reducing the self to an atomistic, wholly self-determining entity; for both, the self is 
thoroughly intersubjective. Sembou writes that understanding Hegel’s project as a whole 
in the Phenomenology requires that one grasp that “absolute knowing” does not refer to a 
positive claim about reality in itself; Hegel uses “absolute” to refer to that which is “self-
determining” instead of that which is “conditioned” or necessary. Absolute knowing 
refers to an individual or community’s realization that the subject cannot be extricated 
from the object; this means that objects do not exist free from social-historical forms of 
knowing. Sembou offers a way of thinking about this concretely:  
Inherent in ‘spirit’ – or interpersonal relationships, as these are understood 
by humans in the course of history – is a ‘struggle for recognition,’ which 
gives shape to human life, as well as being the driving force for change. 
Once humans come to realize this, they have reached the standpoint of 
‘absolute knowing.’ They now know that it is they who define the beliefs 
and values of the society in which they live, and that these beliefs and 
values in turn underlie social and political institutions, as well as 
governing all relationships among them. They also recognize that all 
philosophical and scientific theories are, to a large extent, determined by 
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the kind of life they lead, by their relationship with nature (and the ways 
they conceive this), and by their understanding of interpersonal relations.60 
 
Sembou’s particular way of reading Hegel’s assertion that “Substance is essentially 
Subject”61 is to hone in on human beings’ conceptions about the world. She emphasizes 
how Hegel strives to overcome dualistic ways of conceiving of reality, unlike Descartes’ 
theory of thinking substance and extended substance,62 by highlighting how human 
practices shape the object of knowledge. Ultimately, both Sembou and Williams claim 
that the Phenomenology is about the subject’s assumptions about experience and how 
these assumptions are influenced by intersubjective relations. 
Responding to the late nineteenth century metaphysical readings of Hegel that 
viewed Spirit as the Divine moving towards self-consciousness,63 Pippin, Sembou, and 
Williams locate the Phenomenology’s fundamental contribution to Western philosophy in 
its emphasis on the importance of intersubjectivity and social-historical forms of knowing 
in defining the self and reason.  
This social-historical, intersubjective reading of Spirit offers a more effective 
model of selfhood for explicating Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, wherein the self is 
ontologically, epistemologically, and ethically tied to the Other. I will delve deeper into 
the self-other relation to show how it is structured by social historical forms of knowing, 
with the relational self as the focus of investigation.   
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Method and Epistemology in the Phenomenology: The Natural Attitude and the Unity of 
Thinking and Being 
 
 While this chapter will focus on the model of self that is put forward in the 
master-slave dialectic, it is important to situate these claims within the larger project of 
the Phenomenology. Thus, this section will explore Hegel’s epistemology and method in 
the Phenomenology. Furthermore, with respect to my reading of Hegel, it will give 
support for the position that Hegel offers an ontological theory of the relational self.  
Briefly, the first three chapters of the text examine common epistemological 
assumptions of Modern philosophy: for example, Kant’s idea of the thing-in-itself, 
Empiricist and Rationalist positions, and philosophical problems like the One and the 
Many, etc.64 Hegel’s task in these chapters is to expose the problems inherent in one-
sided claims about the world.65 For example, one such one-sided position is the fact that 
consciousness downplays intentionality by thinking of the object only and forgetting that 
the object is always “for consciousness.” Hegel aims to show that the subject plays an 
active role in its relation to the world; it is not a passive knower. Broadly, Hegel reminds 
the reader that human beings tend to adopt abstract positions and view the self and 
objects in the world in a reified manner. Human beings’ tendency to take up “one-sided” 
views will be important to my own project as the failure of such views leads to the 
promotion of a model of selfhood that is rooted in relationships with others as well as 
social-historical forms of knowing.  
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In terms of the latter, Hegel’s text can be classified as a reconstruction of how the 
modern subject came to, or developed, certain assumptions about its relation to the world 
and its autonomy.66 The work is both reconstructive and critical, however, in that Hegel 
exposes various philosophical, political, and religious claims about the world to the 
reader while simultaneously showing how they are self-contradictory.67 Ultimately, 
Hegel will also make positive ontological claims about the self that exists through its 
relation to beings outside itself.  
I begin by examining how Hegel undermines the Western narrative of the self’s 
autonomy that emerges in modernity.68 While Hegel is interested in what the subject 
contributes to knowledge, he is critical of Kant’s way of accounting for this (i.e. 
transcendental conditions, namely, space and time as pure forms of intuition, the 
categories, and the transcendental unity of apperception) because, as I mentioned earlier, 
these characteristics are too formal. Hegel begins with the natural attitude because he 
wants to restore the unity of thinking and being that is obscured when one engages in 
abstract thinking. While Locke and Kant presuppose that thinking and being are 
fundamentally opposed, Hegel reasons that this opposition stems from their assumption 
that knowledge is an instrument that allows the subject access to reality, which stands 
over and against the subject.69 Therefore, in an effort to philosophize prior to the 
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postulations of critical philosophy, Hegel begins his inquiry into the relation between 
thinking and being by taking up the natural attitude. Kant’s critical project sought to 
uncover the conditions under which knowledge is possible. However, Hegel’s way of 
linking thinking and being is to show how ordinary consciousness provides its own 
criterion.  
Working to refute Modern philosophy’s skepticism that cognition is an instrument 
or medium70 that is fundamentally divorced from the object of knowledge, Hegel displays 
the problem with conceptualizing cognition in this manner in the introduction to the 
Phenomenology: “If we remove from a reshaped thing what the instrument has done to it, 
then the thing – here the Absolute – becomes for us exactly what it was before this 
[accordingly] superfluous effort.”71 One problem that occurs when a thing-in-itself, or the 
Absolute, is posited is that it introduces a profound gap between mind and world that 
cannot be closed. Hegel goes on to demonstrate how both cognition and the object of 
knowledge are assumed to be true. While the object is readily given, the qualification of 
being the true – we see this in Hegel’s description of philosophy as “the actual cognition 
of what truly is”72 – the cognizing power of the subject, must also be true because 
consciousness provides the criterion by which the line is drawn between itself and the 
Absolute. In other words, if we trust the self to make any truth statements about reality, 
including the idea that the knowledge of reality and reality itself are opposed, then Hegel 
claims that we cannot simultaneously maintain that knowledge is an instrument that 
distorts actuality:  
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To be specific, it [the fear of error] takes for granted certain ideas about 
cognition as an instrument and as a medium, and assumes that there is a 
difference between ourselves and this cognition. Above all, it presupposes 
that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition on the other, 
independent and separated from it, and yet is something real; or in other 
words, it presupposes that cognition which, since it is excluded from the 
Absolute, is surely outside of the truth as well, is nevertheless true… 73  
 
Again, the problem with this assumption is that positing a separation between the two 
relies upon the fact that consciousness is already the true because it is drawing the line. 
More concretely, Hegel argues that the skeptic, by picturing cognition as a medium that 
might be flawed, forgets that she is the one who establishes what is true by claiming that 
cognition as a medium lies apart from reality. This is what Hegel means when he says 
that consciousness provides its own criterion; consciousness is the ultimate authority of 
what is true. Therefore, skepticism, or doubt about the efficacy of the cognitive faculties 
can never be through-going; the knower cannot get outside of herself in order to 
determine whether or not cognition can accurately grasp the object.74  
Later on, Hegel writes that while knowledge is always after the pure object in-
itself, “the in-itself that would supposedly result from it [knowing] would rather be the 
being of knowledge for us. What we asserted to be its essence would be not so much its 
truth but rather just our knowledge of it. The essence or criterion would lie within 
ourselves.”75 While consciousness would like to grasp immediate knowledge of the 
object, it cannot abandon its subjectivity and “test its own knowledge by that standard 
[the object in itself].”76 Ultimately, it is impossible to escape the role that the subject 
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plays in knowledge because it is the standard that determines truth. However, despite the 
fact that Hegel follows a Kantian line of thinking by focusing on how the subject plays a 
role in the constitution of the object, Hegel believes that he overcomes Kant’s split 
between the thing-in-itself and the subject by demonstrating that positing a realm of 
noumena is a type of bad metaphysics itself. This is the case because positing the thing-
in-itself goes beyond the bounds of experience. Hegel stresses that experience entails 
awareness of being; conceptualizing being as “out there” involves stepping out of 
experience.  
Broadly, Hegel is a thinker who strives for unity. Instead of introducing a realm of 
noumena, he presents the thinking being as a being who is inextricably part of nature, or 
the possible objects of thought. This is how he surpasses Kant and Locke’s metaphor of 
reason as an instrument. Gadamer insists that reason is not synonymous with thought for 
Hegel; rather, it is the “unity of thought and reality.”77 This means that all difference, e.g. 
the difference experienced in reflection or self-consciousness, issues from this unity: 
It is true that consciousness of an ‘other’, of an object in general, is itself 
necessarily self-consciousness, a reflectedness-into-self, consciousness of 
itself in its otherness. The necessary advance from the previous shapes of 
consciousness for which their truth was a Thing, an ‘other’ than 
themselves, expresses just this, that not only is consciousness of a thing 
possible only for a self-consciousness, but that self-consciousness alone is 
the truth of those shapes.78 
 
Here we see that the same structure of “unity of itself in its otherness”79 that is grasped in 
the most basic definition of self-consciousness – perceiving an identity between thinking 
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of oneself as an object and the object of oneself – is actually present in all knowledge. 
The object prompts self-consciousness, but, as the object is only grasped through 
consciousness, it cannot have a reality that is not already a part of the perceiver. In the 
following passage, we see the same structure of “unity of itself in its otherness” which 
lends support to Gadamer’s reading:  
This simple infinity, or the absolute Notion, may be called the simple 
essence of life…This self-identical essence is therefore related only to 
itself; ‘to itself’ implies relationship to an ‘other’, and the relation-to-self 
is rather a self-sundering; or in other words, that very self-identicalness is 
an inner difference…These sundered moments are thus in and for 
themselves each an opposite – of an other…each is therefore in its own 
self the opposite of itself…80 
 
Here the structure of life itself is one wherein a unity separates itself. We begin to see 
how Hegel’s ontology defines a being’s identity as that which occurs based on its 
relations to other beings. This is apparent in the structure of self-consciousness, which is 
incited by worldly interactions with objects and Others, as well as all living beings. The 
self exists and knows itself through that which differs from itself. 
Now that we have briefly examined Hegel’s ontological statement about the 
“unity of itself in its otherness,” we will return to Hegel’s discussion of the social-
historical forms that mediate self-knowledge. The awareness that the self is 
fundamentally tied to these forms is part of the larger movement wherein the self 
broadens its one-sided views about itself and reality. Self-consciousness becomes aware 
that it is a product of Geist (history, practices, institutions, and being itself). In order to 
demonstrate how intelligibility is a matter of social-historical forms of knowing,81 rather 
than a product of the self alone, Hegel gives a developmental account of the normative 
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assumptions that are held about mind/world relations, the self, religion, politics, etc. 
Therefore, he begins with natural consciousness rather than philosophy:  
…an exposition of how knowledge makes its appearance will here be 
undertaken…it can be regarded as the path of the natural consciousness 
which presses forward to true knowledge; or as the way of the soul which 
journeys through the series of its own configurations…so that it 
may…achieve finally…the awareness of what it really is in itself.82  
 
Returning again to the criterion for establishing the true, since it lies within consciousness 
itself, the proper method of philosophy is to “look on” while “consciousness examines its 
own self.”83 However, Hegel believes that by “looking on,” the contradictions in these 
normative assumptions will be revealed. The path that natural consciousness takes is thus 
a serious matter for Hegel and a cause for despair; he warns that it will lose its self as 
well as its truth when it sees how its Notions fail.  
 Throughout the introduction, Hegel chides skeptical assumptions about 
epistemology. He concludes that while the philosophical assumptions of his time 
continually worry about how the cognitive apparatus could lead to erroneous knowledge, 
knowledge is by definition, once removed from the Absolute: “The first object, in being 
known, is altered for consciousness; it ceases to be the in-itself, and becomes something 
that is the in-itself only for consciousness. And this then is the True: the being-for-
consciousness of this in-itself.”84 Knowledge is never identical to the object; it is always 
once removed. More precisely, knowledge is always mediated by consciousness. Again, 
this consciousness is not bare or formal, though; it contains historical shapes of knowing. 
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In the remainder of the Introduction, Hegel highlights how the Phenomenology contains a 
record of the natural progression of human knowledge that the reader can watch unfold.  
Beginning with the natural attitude, Hegel demonstrates how different shapes of 
consciousness (Gestalten des Bewusstseins) are transformed as they encounter 
experiences that contradict their one-sided convictions. Hegel uses the word aufheben, or 
sublation, to characterize the dialectical movement of the shapes of consciousness; after 
discovering contradictory views they “confront and incorporate” these views.85 Williams 
claims that Hegel doesn’t try to either merely surpass or uphold the natural attitude. 
Rather, he aims to expel dogmatic and partial truths from ordinary consciousness.86 The 
latter operates dogmatically: “It thinks abstractly by lifting its object out of context, and 
seeking to maintain it [in] fixed isolation from, or opposition to, everything else.”87 
Again, this forgetting of context and relation will be my point of focus in my 
investigation of models of selfhood. Williams writes:  
The creation of rigid oppositions, and the abstract isolation of the elements 
from relation is the cul-de-sac of ordinary consciousness and reflection. In 
its interpretation of the Gestalten des Bewusstseins, ordinary 
consciousness grasps only the moment of difference, or abstract identity, 
while suppressing relation and mediation. Thus, ordinary consciousness 
tends to interpret itself subjectively.88 
 
Now we are in a better position to understand what Hegel means when he says that the 
movement of self-consciousness is “the way of despair.”89 He uses this term to capture 
how consciousness possesses abstract concepts about itself that ultimately fail. 
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Consciousness doesn’t recognize that its life is a “unity of itself in its otherness.” The 
subject itself is the source of its despair because “consciousness is for itself its own 
concept.”90 This means that the subject possesses an abstract view of itself as separate 
from the world. The section on the unhappy consciousness is an example of how 
consciousness can become consumed with this abstract idea that it is separate from the 
whole of life. Here we glimpse a more complete articulation of self-consciousness’ wish 
to see itself as autonomous. Self-consciousness desires to lift itself out of life and regard 
itself as “independent” from life.91 Throughout the Phenomenology, Hegel will examine 
different structures of Geist, or world spirits. The unhappy consciousness is one such 
world spirit. It neglects the unity between the realms of spirit and body. Williams avows 
that Hegel sees each world spirit as suffering from the “problem of self-recognition in 
otherness.”92 By separating reality into a world of spirit and a world of body, the 
individual fails to see that it is both. Here, Hegel references the Christian privileging of 
the soul and debasement of the body. Despite the individual’s attempts to claim 
independence from its bodily existence, the latter continues to reassert itself. The self 
continually fails to recognize that the view that it holds about itself is often partial and 
one-sided; what is needed is a recognition of itself in what it perceives to be other than 
itself. The problem of the unhappy consciousness is that it fails to accept that it is both 
body and spirit.   
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Self-Consciousness: “The Truth of Self-Certainty” 
Now that we have a view of the larger methodological and epistemological 
framework within which Hegel is working in the Phenomenology, we can turn to the 
chapter on self-consciousness. Here we will be presented with the modern view of the 
self which proves to be untenable. Out of this failure, Hegel introduces the idea of the self 
that is rooted in relations with others. The notion of recognition, then, becomes central. 
According to Fred Neuhouser, this chapter begins with a “bare concept of freedom,” i.e. 
that the self’s thoughts and actions issue only from itself. Hegel uses the term 
Selbstandigkeit, that which depends on itself to be itself, to express the former.93 
Neuhouser writes that the modern subject possesses a “basic drive” to affirm its 
autonomy. Therefore, as Hegel aims to subject these normative assumptions to inquiry in 
order to tease out the conditions that are necessary to support such assumptions, the 
chapter on self-consciousness is meant to envision the conditions that are necessary to 
fulfill the self’s desire to be free.94 In this section I will re-construct Hegel’s argument 
concerning the failure of Selbstandigkeit while teasing out how the conditions that 
prompt self-knowledge provide us with an ontological model of the relational self. 
At the beginning of the chapter, the initial movement to self-consciousness is 
prompted by the discovery that objects are not “wholly independent realit[ies]” because 
they appear as objects “for” consciousness and are thus shaped by it.95  
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In the previous modes of certainty what is true for consciousness is 
something other than itself. But the Notion of this truth vanishes in the 
experience of it. What the object immediately was in-itself – mere being in 
sense-certainty, the concrete thing of perception, and for the 
Understanding, a Force – proves to be in truth, not this at all; instead, this 
in-itself turns out to be a mode in which the object is only for an 
other…For the in-itself is consciousness; but equally it is that for which an 
other (the in-itself) is; and it is for consciousness that the in-itself of the 
object, and the being of the object for an other, are one and the same.  
 
Here, the idea that objects are always “for” consciousness affirms Williams’ point that 
Hegel is continually working towards self-recognition in the other. Recalling the 
epistemological issues that Hegel struggles with in the introduction to the 
Phenomenology, the subject comes to realize that its knowledge of objects is not direct; 
instead, it is mediated by itself. For example, I may want to know an apple in itself 
without my concept of the apple distorting it. However, according to Hegel, it is 
impossible to do so because I am the one who has pointed to the apple as an object of 
knowledge. While I have tried to separate my knowledge of the apple from the apple 
itself, I end up recognizing my own activity in the object; i.e., I see that I already 
determined that the material object in question was an apple. Furthermore, my pointing to 
the object will depend upon the practices within my social-historical context. For 
instance, to use another example, at different times in history, different explanations were 
given to the existence of planets and stars. Throughout the Phenomenology, self-
consciousness continually realizes that each viewpoint that it believes can stand alone 
actually relies on that which it tries to dismiss. For instance, recall the unhappy 
consciousness who rejects her bodily existence in favor of her soul and comes to realize 
that her spiritual life depends upon her body. 
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While the examples that I gave to explain the unity of consciousness and its object 
are epistemological and non-metaphysical, I believe that Hegel’s ontological point is that 
the structure of self-consciousness is one wherein itself as object and itself as knower 
emerge as distinct, yet belonging to the same existence. We will see in a moment when 
Hegel introduces his concept of “life” that all of being is a whole that separates from 
itself into many beings. This whole is then driven to recognize the fact that beings share a 
common basis.96 Again, Williams characterizes this structure as “self-recognition in 
otherness.” 
Returning to the idea that objects are not “wholly independent realit[ies]” due to 
their appearance as objects “for” consciousness, Neuhouser writes, “From this point on 
‘the true’ will be located not in an isolated object but in a subject-relating-to-an-object 
that, only as a whole, is self-sufficient. “97 The criterion for the “true” is the object that 
appears to consciousness as an in-itself. However, since one may mistakenly apply 
concepts to objects, consciousness continually “tests” the object to see if it corresponds to 
its concept.98 This “testing” takes place in experience; for example, in order to be called a 
“good teacher,” the person in question’s actions must fit the concept of a “good teacher.” 
This section of the Phenomenology will test the concept of freedom as Selbstandigkeit. 
Hegel begins his inquiry into self-consciousness by describing the two objects 
that appear to consciousness in everyday experience: 
Consciousness, as self-consciousness, henceforth has a double object: one 
is the immediate object, that of sense-certainty and perception (not me) 
which however for self-consciousness has the character of a negative; and 
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the second, viz. itself which is the true essence and is present in the first 
instance only as opposed to the first object. In this sphere, self-
consciousness exhibits itself as the movement in which this antithesis is 
removed, and the identity of itself with itself becomes explicit for it.99 
 
Here, Hegel describes the sensory object as “negative” because it is encountered as being 
in opposition to and external to the self. Hegel writes that the object incites consciousness 
to reflect on itself by opposing it. However, consciousness seeks to consider itself apart 
from the object and thus make its self thematic. It is through the presentation of the object 
that opposes it that we see the first glimpse of consciousness’ perception of itself as 
sovereign. However, the claim is even more radical because self-consciousness is 
“present in the first instance only as opposed to the first object.”100 This means that it is a 
worldly object that first incites self-consciousness. According to Hegel, Kant is mistaken 
to assume that the transcendental unity of apperception is inherently self-conscious a 
priori. From the beginning of the chapter, the self’s existence and knowledge of itself 
depends upon what is perceived as other to itself, i.e., worldly objects. Furthermore, we 
will see from the first moment of self-consciousness that the subject is engaged in a 
struggle for recognition. 
We can further understand what Hegel means when he says that self-
consciousness arises from an object that “has the character of a negative” by looking to 
his famous statement that self-consciousness is “Desire in general”: 
With that first moment, self-consciousness is in the form of consciousness, 
and the whole expanse of the sensuous world is preserved for it, but at the 
same time only as connected with the second moment, the unity of self-
consciousness with itself; and hence the sensuous world is for it an 
enduring existence which, however, is only appearance, or a difference 
which, in itself, is no difference. This antithesis of its appearance and its 
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truth has, however, for its essence only the truth, viz. the unity of self-
consciousness with itself; this unity must become essential to self-
consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is Desire in general.101  
 
Here it becomes clear, once again, that self-consciousness is incited after individuals take 
up a relationship with a worldly object. While self-consciousness is sure of its own being, 
it doesn’t view worldly objects as having the same claim to existence that it possesses 
with reference to itself. When Hegel says that the “unity of self-consciousness with 
itself…must become essential, i.e. self-consciousness is Desire in general,” he is 
referring to the fact that our certainty about ourselves is entangled with our desire for 
objects. The phrase “must become” implies that self-consciousness inherently seeks 
confirmation of its existence from objects; it doesn’t possess it inherently. Earlier in the 
same paragraph, Hegel writes that consciousness is comprised of two “moments.” In the 
second moment, self-consciousness is a mere tautology. However, in the first moment, 
self-consciousness confronts objects outside of itself as “other.”102 Objects are part of 
self-consciousness’ awareness of itself, but its unity is privileged as that which is, or has 
“being.” We see that consciousness possesses a strained relationship with itself in that 
part of its self-relation is connected to worldly objects, but it also sees itself as separate 
from them. In the next chapter, we will see how Beauvoir reframes this idea and 
describes human experience as both Mitsein and separation. 
 In the next paragraph Hegel introduces the close connection between self-
consciousness and objects through his concept of “life”:  
The object of immediate desire is a living thing. For the in-itself, or the 
universal result of the relation of the Understanding to the inwardness of 
things, is the distinguishing of what is not to be distinguished, or the unity 
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of what is distinguished. But this unity is, as we have seen, just as much its 
repulsion from itself; and this Notion sunders itself into the antithesis of 
self-consciousness and life: the former is the unity for which the infinite 
unity of the differences is; the latter, however is only this unity in itself, so 
that it is not at the same time for itself. To the extent, then, that 
consciousness is independent, so too is its object, but only implicitly. Self-
consciousness which is simply for itself and directly characterizes its 
object as a negative element, or is primarily desire, will therefore, on the 
contrary, learn through experience that the object is independent.103  
 
This paragraph summarizes self-consciousness’ realization that the object of desire and 
itself are connected in that they are both living. Hegel emphasizes that life is both a unity 
and a breaking apart. Self-consciousness grasps the unity of differences, or the belonging 
together of all that is also differentiated. Given that my focus is on the relational self, it is 
important to highlight that while self-consciousness learns that the object is independent, 
i.e. that it does not simply exist entirely for self-consciousness, the object is only 
“implicitly” independent. I believe that Hegel suggests here that while beings are 
individuated they emerge from a common basis: life. While the object is tied to life, self-
consciousness will realize later on that life is essential to it in the same way that it is 
essential to the object. The main point is that one’s identity is not wholly independent. 
However, desire also teaches the self that the object has its own reality; the object is not 
purely “negative.” 
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Hyppolite, as well as Kojeve, highlight how desire is fundamental to the entire 
chapter on self-consciousness; the desire for the sensuous object lays the groundwork for 
the later structure of desiring recognition from the other.104 Hegel writes: 
…self-consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this 
other that presents itself to self-consciousness as an independent life; self-
consciousness is Desire…it explicitly affirms that this nothingness is for it 
the truth of the other; it destroys the independent object and thereby gives 
itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty. 105  
 
Self-consciousness, by its negative relation to the object, is unable to 
supersede it; it is really because of that relation that it produces the object 
again, and the desire as well. It is in fact something other than self-
consciousness that is the essence of Desire; and through this experience 
self-consciousness has itself realized this truth. But at the same time it is 
no less absolutely for itself, and it is so only by superseding the object; 
and it must experience its satisfaction, for it is the truth. On account of the 
independence of the object, therefore, it can achieve satisfaction only 
when the object itself effects the negation within itself; and it must carry 
out this negation of itself in itself, for it is in itself the negative, and must 
be for the other what it is…Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction 
only in another self-consciousness.106 
 
As described earlier, self-consciousness relates to itself through another; however, the 
form of the relation is one in which self-consciousness wants to get something from the 
Other. In the case of desire and the living object, when self-consciousness destroys the 
object, it shows that it is sovereign; the object is nothing and self-consciousness possesses 
true reality. Through this movement, self-consciousness displays its own agency and self-
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 46 
 
sufficiency. Because it is only sure of itself when it “supersedes,” or destroys, the other, it 
needs the Other; this is what Hegel means in the second paragraph when he says that the 
relationship “produces the object again and the desire as well.” We see Hegel beginning 
to build a case for premise that the self is primarily “outside itself” when he concludes 
that the “essence of Desire” is something exterior for self-consciousness. Self-
consciousness is driven to realize the satisfaction of its desire. The example that Hegel 
uses in paragraph 171 to illustrate this “superseding” of the object is “consuming.” Self-
consciousness experiences its own power by eating other objects of life. While desire, 
manifested as consumption or destruction, initially affords self-consciousness with a 
feeling of autonomy, the object of desire ultimately fails as a source of the subject’s self-
certainty. Hegel gives two reasons for the failure: 1) The independence that the sublation 
of the object affords the subject cannot be complete because self-consciousness depends 
on the object to affirm itself. 2) The feeling of autonomy is only momentary; the minute 
that the object is destroyed, self-consciousness loses that which it feels its own power 
against.107 
 In the last lines of paragraph 175 we see self-consciousness’ realization that 
destroying the object of desire fails. Instead of negating the object from without, self-
consciousness must find an object that “effects the negation within itself.” We find out at 
the end of the paragraph that such a being is another self-consciousness.  
After Hegel introduces this description of Life and the necessity of recognition 
from another self-consciousness, he gestures toward his later discussion of Spirit; both 
life and Spirit share the structure of a “unity of itself in its otherness.” Hegel writes:  
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A self-consciousness exists for a self-consciousness. Only so is it in fact 
self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its 
otherness become explicit for it…A self-consciousness, in being an object, 
is just as much ‘I’ as ‘object.’ With this, we already have before us the 
Notion of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is the experience 
of what Spirit is – this absolute substance which is the unity of the 
different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, 
enjoy perfect freedom and independence: ‘I’ that is ‘We’ and ‘We’ that is 
‘I.’ It is in self-consciousness, in the Notion of Spirit, that consciousness 
first finds its turning-point…108  
 
Throughout the chapter, and even the text as a whole, one-sided, partial views of the self 
and experience are expelled. Self-consciousness at first fails to see that its certainty is 
bound up with the object; it depends on the object. Just as self-consciousness is tied to the 
object, all living things depend on each other and thus exist as the “unity of itself in its 
otherness.” Gadamer connects Hegel’s concepts of “life,” “self-consciousness,” and 
“Spirit”: “…the structural identity between the life processes of what lives and self-
consciousness demonstrates that self-consciousness is not at all the individualized point 
of ‘I=I,’ but rather, as Hegel says, ‘the I which is we and the we which is I’, which is to 
say spirit.”109  
Since the living object of desire has failed, self-consciousness seeks out a new 
object which might affirm it. The next section of the chapter, entitled “Independence and 
Dependence of Self-Consciousness: Lordship and Bondage” begins with Hegel’s bold 
claim:  
Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so 
exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged. The 
Notion of this unity in its duplication embraces many and varied 
meanings… The detailed exposition of the concept of this spiritual unity 
in its duplication will present us with the process of recognition.110  
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Here Hegel reveals that self-consciousness is incited when it encounters another self-
consciousness capable of considering it as an object of thought.111 The first two 
implications of this meeting are that consciousness discovers that it can be an object for 
the other and secondly, it sees the other as a source of recognition.  
 While the Other is held up as a path to solidifying self-consciousness’ certainty of 
itself, the Other is also described as what incites self-consciousness’ loss of itself:  
Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out 
of itself. This has a twofold significance: first, it has lost itself, for it finds 
itself as an other being; secondly, in doing so it has superseded the other, 
for it does not see the other as an essential being, but in the other sees its 
own self.112 
 
The Other draws the self out of itself, for Hegel. In being seen, the self gains a new way 
of relating to itself. However, this also represents a loss of self-determination because the 
self is now dependent on the Other. Self-consciousness at first sees the Other as 
something existing only for-it. While attracted to the Other’s power to recognize, self-
consciousness does not consider its free existence in its own right. While self-
consciousness is certainly relating to an Other, it “supersedes” the Other’s alterity by only 
focusing on how the Other recognizes itself. Hegel describes this unequal relation as 
expected: “At first, it [recognition] will exhibit the side of the inequality of the two…one 
being only recognized, the other only recognizing.”113  
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 Self-consciousness’ inability to see the Other non-instrumentally destroys the 
possibility for recognition. By failing to recognize the Other as an “essential being, ” 
“…it proceeds to supersede its own self, for this other is itself.”114 Hegel’s point is that 
self-consciousness is now outside itself. It is dependent on the Other’s recognition. If it 
sees the Other as non-essential, than it destroys the possibility that it will find itself in the 
Other. 
Therefore, we find that each self-consciousness plays a mediating role for the 
other. This means that each plays a necessary role through which each becomes an object 
for themselves. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in order to possess a stable 
self-conception of its own autonomy, self-consciousness must turn its “subjective 
certainty” into an “objective reality.” The latter is an existence that is affirmed by 
others.115  
Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself 
with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an 
immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only 
through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually 
recognizing one another.116 
 
While self-certainty is discovered in mutual recognition, we are reminded of how Hegel 
reveals that at first the relation is unequal; that is, only one is recognized. He traces out 
two ways that the self seeks to establish its supremacy over itself as a being that is 
dependent upon what is outside of itself for affirmation. Hoping to assert that it is above 
life, “each seeks the death of the other,” and risks its life in the process in order to show 
that its freely-chosen ideals are more important to it than even life itself. However, the 
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life and death struggle fails in affording the subject with recognition because life is 
essential to both individuals. Without life, affirmation is found to be impossible. In §189, 
Hegel summarizes how the notion that the self is a simple unity that is independent exists 
until it is challenged by the arrival of the Other. He divides what has happened thus far in 
the chapter on self-consciousness into two “shapes of consciousness,” where one is 
independent and “for-itself” (the lord) and the other is dependent and exists only to 
recognize the first (the bondsman).  
In immediate self-consciousness the simple ego is absolute object, which, 
however, is for us or in itself absolute mediation, and has as its essential 
moment substantial and solid independence. The dissolution of that simple 
unity is the result of the first experience; through this there is posited a 
pure self-consciousness, and a consciousness which is not purely for itself, 
but for another, i.e. as an existent consciousness, consciousness in the 
form and shape of thinghood.117 
  
In this dense paragraph, Hegel states that our initial reflection affords us with the 
perception that the self is absolute, substantial, and independent. The onlooker who has 
been following this chapter of the Phenomenology, however, sees that the self is actually 
mediated by objects of desire and Others. The encounter with the Other causes the self’s 
perception of itself as self-sustaining to crumble. The self deals with the loss of itself by 
positing itself as essential and the Other as a negative.   
Hegel begins to unpack the complexity of these two self relations (the self for-
itself and the self-for-the-Other) by stating that each position is “mediated” by the other. 
Therefore, each position doesn’t occur alone; both occur simultaneously. In Kojeve’s 
formulation, the master’s self-certainty is no longer purely “subjective”; it has been 
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“objectivized and mediated by the slave’s recognitions.”118 However, Hegel discloses that 
the bondsman cannot offer the lord a stable reflection of itself as sovereign because the 
recognition is not mutual. It is actually through the object which the bondsman masters 
for the lord that the latter receives a feeling of mastery. However, it is not the object 
alone that affords the lord with a feeling of independence; it is the fact that the slave is 
dependent for his livelihood on the master:  
In these two moments, the master gets his recognition through an other 
consciousness, for in them the latter affirms itself as unessential, both by 
working upon the thing, and, on the other hand, by the fact of being 
dependent on a determinate existence; in neither case can this other get the 
mastery over existence, and succeed in absolutely negating it.119 
 
The lord, through the fact that he is lord, always views the bondsman as “unessential.” 
Since the material object could not provide lasting recognition on account of the fact that 
it was a thing, the bondsman, when deprived of his freedom becomes thing-like and thus, 
similarly, cannot be a source of lasting recognition. Therefore, the bondsman’s power to 
recognize the lord as autonomous dwindles because the former is not consistently 
recognized as an “essential” for-itself.  
 The lord, thinking that he is Selbstandigkeit, in actuality comes to realize that his 
“truth” is that of the bondsman: 
In all this, the unessential consciousness is, for the master, the object 
which embodies the truth of his certainty of himself. But it is evident that 
this object does not correspond to its notion; for, just where the master has 
effectively achieved lordship, he really finds that something has come 
about quite different from an independent consciousness. It is not an 
independent, but rather a dependent consciousness that he has achieved. 
He is thus not assured of self-existence as his truth; he finds that his truth 
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is rather the unessential consciousness, and the fortuitous unessential 
action of that consciousness.120 
 
Instead of resting in his role as master, the master finds that he is completely dependent 
upon the slave for his identity as master. Returning to the instances of traumatic bonding 
discussed in the introduction, from the side of the imprisoner, we see that he or she is 
dependent upon the prisoner for his or her identity. In instances of intimate partner 
violence, abusers present themselves as all-powerful beings while in reality their power 
issues from the victims who are taught to submit to being those who merely recognize.  
 At this point in the Phenomenology, the reader realizes that self-consciousness 
can only maintain itself, for itself, through mutual recognition, which is mentioned 
earlier.121 Hyppolite writes: 
Self-consciousness, then, comes to exist only by means of an ‘operation’ 
that poses it in being as it is for itself…this mutual recognition, in which 
individuals recognize each other as reciprocally recognizing each other, 
creates the element of spiritual life – the medium in which the subject is an 
object to itself, finding itself completely in the other yet doing so without 
abrogating the otherness that is essential to self-consciousness.122  
 
The encounter with the other mirrors the way that Hegel first discusses self-
consciousness as necessarily posing itself as an object for itself. We see Hegel’s tendency 
to move toward unity in this stage as well. The peculiarity of self-consciousness is that it 
both rejects its belonging to the world by reflecting on itself as for-itself while 
simultaneously seeing that it is a being of the world.123 In mutual recognition, self-
consciousness sees that its own relation to self occurs through another being in the world. 
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This is an ontological point that affirms that the self’s being is tied to the Other. 
Hyppolite details how self-consciousness experiences itself as autonomous, but only as a 
“negative.” Self-consciousness: 
…negates itself and maintains itself in that negation. Concretely, this is 
the very existence of man, ‘who never is what he is,’ who always exceeds 
himself and is always beyond himself, who has a future, and who rejects 
all permanence except the permanence of his desire aware of itself as 
desire.124 
 
 Here it is easy to see how Heidegger, Sartre, and Beauvoir took up Hyppolite’s gloss on 
Hegel, i.e. the idea of human existence as free transcendence and directedness toward the 
future. Interestingly, at least for Beauvoir, recognition by an Other is the foundation for 
the maintenance of freedom.125  
At this point in the chapter, Hegel turns to analyzing the bondsman. We learn that 
while the master appeared to be independent, but came to be exposed as dependent, the 
bondsman appears to be dependent but is in actuality independent – through dependence.  
Hegel examines how the experience of facing the possibility of his own death has 
allowed the bondsman to realize “absolute negativity, pure being-for-self.” Furthermore, 
in his relation of dependence before the lord, the bondsman forsakes everything but his 
service. In his work, he experiences his independence by transcending his own life, if 
necessary, and dedicating himself to labor. The bondsman finds in the product of his 
labor a mirror for the power of his subjectivity. Hegel describes the process of alienation: 
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“Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is.”126 In 
labor, the for-itself of self-consciousness is recognized. Moreover, self-consciousness 
sees its affinity with objects of the world. 
When the bondsman succeeds in transcending his desires and creates a product, 
his self takes on an aspect of “permanence” in the object: “It is in this way, therefore, that 
consciousness, qua worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own 
independence.”127 Hegel ends the chapter on self-consciousness by asserting that through 
work, the bondsman comes to acquire a mind of his own. However, self-consciousness 
continues to struggle with being tied to the world through a need for recognition.128  
In conclusion, the master-slave section of the Phenomenology provides the reader 
with a series of critiques as well as positive ontological, epistemological, and ethical 
claims. First, Hegel begins by showing how the modern view of the subject that is 
Selbstandigkeit fails. However, despite this failed model of the self, we see that self-
consciousness nevertheless attempts to fulfill this notion of itself. Despite its dependence, 
it desires affirmation, or recognition, of its autonomy. Self-consciousness begins in the 
moment when desire for a worldly object arises. Next, we see that when this fails, self-
consciousness discovers in its encounter with another self-consciousness that the Other is 
a source of more lasting recognition. Lastly, we see from this dialectic that the structure 
of self-consciousness is identical with that of life, i.e., “unity of itself in its otherness.” 
The section on lordship and bondage makes the epistemological point that self-
knowledge is achieved through self-other relations and labor. Moreover, it introduces the 
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possibility of mutual recognition. Lastly, the section shows that the ontological structure 
of self-consciousness is one of unity through difference, i.e. selfhood is inextricable from 
the Other’s power to provide recognition.  
 
Spirit and Intersubjectivity in the Phenomenology 
In order to situate the claims that Hegel makes about the relational self in the 
master-slave dialectic, I will briefly examine some of the ways that forms of knowing are 
mediated by social-historical discourses and practices for Hegel. This will pave the way 
for making an argument that intersubjectivity is inextricable from Hegel’s project. The 
model of selfhood that emerges in the Phenomenology is one that is grounded upon 
relations with Others and social historical forms of knowing. I aim to highlight the logical 
structure of the self, which can be summarized by an ontology wherein the self is the 
“unity of itself in its otherness.” This ontology is rendered explicit by 1) showing how the 
self depends upon the Other and 2) how its access to itself is shaped through social-
historical discourses that are themselves inseparable from the logical structure of being. 
As the last section addressed the former, now I will investigate the latter.  
Moving from the last section of the chapter on Self-consciousness, wherein the 
unhappy consciousness is in despair about its “two world metaphysics,” (i.e. this world 
and the beyond, soul and body, etc.) the chapter on reason ends with the realization that 
knowledge of nature involves Geist, or the activity of reason. This means that the former 
involves social-historical forms of knowledge. Therefore, nature cannot be grasped 
wholly objectively; the premise of Idealism is also rejected here; reality cannot be known 
through the I, where the I is all reality. Thus, broadly, the inquiry throughout the text 
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moves from an investigation of the object of the senses, to the investigation of the I, to 
the investigation of history. In this section, scientific theories of Hegel’s time are 
examined in order to reveal their one-sidedness.129 As the self is mediated by these 
social-historical forms of knowledge, it will be instructive to examine a few examples; to 
this end, I will discuss the paradigm of psychological laws of behavior, the figure of 
Antigone, and the French Revolution’s ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity. My 
discussion of these historical perspectives will end in an investigation of the ethical ideal 
of actualized Spirit that Hegel introduces. 
Towards the end of the section on “Observing Reason,” Hegel shows how the 
problem with scientific paradigms, in particular the psychological paradigm that seeks to 
explain the human being based on psychological laws of behavior, is that they are 
reductive, i.e. they cannot give a true picture of individuality. For example, Hegel writes 
“What is asserted to be a fixed Law that is in itself constant can only be a moment of the 
unity which is reflected into itself, can only appear as a vanishing magnitude.”130 Laws 
only capture a moment of observing a particular; they cannot encapsulate the self or 
knowledge of the self. He goes on to describe psychology as a discipline in which Spirit 
relates itself “to the various modes of its actuality as an otherness already given.”131 
Spirit neglects its individuality when it adopts this stance towards its being because 
human action is not pre-determined. 132 However, it also neglects the dimension of itself 
that is universal when it acts in a way that it considers purely individual because there is a 
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“universal (Geistige) character to all action;” 133 the individual’s “essential nature is the 
universal of Spirit.”134  The psychological paradigm thus, is an example of a form of 
knowing that is historical and also one-sided by ignoring the context of relations that 
form individual existence.  
Hegel immediately gives an example of what he means. Psychological laws that 
seek to explain the subject must reference the given situation of the subject, which 
include its “habits, customs, religion, and so on.”135 Hegel reasons that we can conclude 
that individuality includes Geist, or the intersubjective background,136 that it inherits 
along with the way that it relates to this background in action when it transgresses the 
norms of its culture.137 The famous example that Hegel uses to illustrate this concept is 
Sophocles’ Antigone. Here, Antigone, in being claimed simultaneously by Greek divine 
and human laws, is an exemplar of individuation through her choice to forego her role as 
a citizen in order to bury her brother. The point, though, is that the self does not give birth 
to its character alone; it relies on an intersubjective background of meaning, i.e., in 
Antigone’s case, divine and human laws. However, at the same time, the self cannot be 
reduced to blindly following psychological laws or social roles. The figure of Antigone is 
significant because she shows how individuality emerges out of an intersubjective 
framework. However, the fact that burying her brother caused her to violate her social 
role, as citizen, does not mean that she is an individual independent of the determining 
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force of context; nor does it mean that her actions do not involve a new norm. 
Concerning the latter, Rocio Zambrana suggests that transgression can be “norm-setting,” 
depending upon how it is interpreted in the future.138 Therefore, the individual can 
contribute to advancing new social-historical norms, which mediate self-understanding. 
Zambrana points out that while the earlier chapters on self-consciousness 
articulate the shapes of the self, the chapters on Spirit concentrate on the shapes of the 
self in relation to shapes of the world.139 As Hegel writes  
Spirit is thus self-supporting, absolute, real being. All previous shapes of 
consciousness are abstract forms of it…Spirit is the ethical life of a nation 
in so far as it is the immediate truth – the individual that is a 
world…These shapes, however, are distinguished from the previous ones 
by the fact that they are real Spirits, actualities in the strict meaning of the 
word, and instead of being shapes merely of consciousness, are shapes of a 
world.140  
 
Hegel is moving toward the complete interpenetration of reason and worldly existence 
with his notion of Spirit: “Reason is Spirit when its certainty of being all reality has been 
raised to truth, and it is conscious of itself as its own world, and of the world as itself.”141 
Hegel’s discussion of Spirit as lived, ethical experience reveals again that consciousness’ 
abstract views about the world fail due to its inability to see that “the individual is a 
world.” In interpreting this passage, Williams argues that Hegel critiques the idealist 
position which intuits the world from only the perspective of the “I”; reason is discovered 
as that which is socially mediated. For Hegel, the “embodiment of reason and rationality 
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is not the cogito, but a social spirit (Geist) that finds expression in the life of a people.”142 
Here the term “expression” is important because, just as the first part of the chapter on 
self-consciousness showed how self-consciousness emerges in action (through desire, 
interactions with the Other, and work), here again, we see that rationality is not the a 
priori product of a rational subject; rationality emerges in social-historical practices.  
Given my intent to clarify the ways in which Hegel’s claims about the relational 
self in the Phenomenology are epistemological, ontological, and ethical, I will take a 
moment to explore how Hegel’s discussion of Spirit involves positive ethical claims. 
Hegel’s discussion is ethically significant: in two main ways. He suggests that 1) purely 
abstract ideals, like those asserted in the time of the French Revolution – liberty, equality, 
and fraternity – end in violence because they don’t take into account concrete forms of 
Spirit and 2) such abstract ideals result in what we might call unactualized Spirit, i.e., 
abstract beliefs that are not enacted in the real world. Recalling the earlier passage where 
Hegel writes that the shapes of Spirit are “actual” shapes of the world, the reader learns 
that Spirit can be either actualized or unactualized. Unactualized Spirit occurs when 
freedom is not guaranteed by concrete practices in an actual society. Regarding the first 
point above, Hegel writes of the Enlightenment’s belief in the ideal of absolute freedom: 
…by virtue of its own abstraction, it divides itself into extremes equally 
abstract, into a simple, inflexible cold universality, and into the discrete, 
absolute hard rigidity and self-willed atomism of actual self-
consciousness. Now that it has completed the destruction of the actual 
organization of the world, and exists now just for itself, this is its sole 
object, an object that no longer has any content, possession, existence, or 
outer extension, but is merely this knowledge of itself as an absolutely 
pure and free individual self…The relation, then, of these two, since each 
exists indivisibly and absolutely for itself, and thus cannot dispose of a 
middle term which would link them together, is one of wholly unmediated 
pure negation, a negation, moreover, of the individual as a being existing 
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in the universal. The sole work and deed of universal freedom is therefore 
death.143 
 
Here we see that absolute freedom takes the form of an abstract rule that does not have 
anything built into it to remain sensitive to context (actual social practices). Furthermore, 
the self is reduced to the will alone (without reference to its community). The pure 
commitment to the rule above all else means that there is no necessary connection 
between the law, which states that a citizen is free, and the actions of the citizen. We can 
thus infer that absolute freedom is unactualized in concrete societies. The negation of the 
self “existing in the universal” means that the cultural and religious practices and 
institutions of a particular society are made irrelevant and relegated below the supreme 
good of absolute freedom. Furthermore, such a position is violent because if the 
commitment to freedom is valued above all else, then it can be enforced by killing.  
While the Phenomenology can be read as a genealogy of modern, Western 
subjectivity, Hegel does not write purely descriptively. In the section on Antigone, for 
example, he seems to privilege the fact that she individuates herself by reacting against 
the social norms of her time period.144 Furthermore, the notion of “actualized” and 
“unactualized” Spirit, and the condemnation of unactualized Spirit in the French 
Revolution, seem to suggest that Hegel values the former over the latter. Ultimately, 
Hegel attempts to show in the chapters on Spirit that our understanding of ourselves is 
always mediated by a historical place, and he seems to place some value in the reader’s 
realization that the self is mediated. This claim is supported by the Phenomenology’s 
overall theme of gradually overcoming one-sided views of the world when such views 
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are found contradictory. One-sided views of the self, like the modern assumption that the 
self is radically independent, self-governing, and autonomous, are shown to fail. For 
instance, the master-slave dialectic models the failure of this notion by exposing how 
self-consciousness is incited by interactions with worldly objects and Others. Moreover, 
the master-slave dialectic offers the reader the positive claim that realizing that the self is 
mediated by the Other will open up the possibility of mutual recognition, thus avoiding 
the dangers of mis-recognition (e.g., mastery and servitude).    
Action, therefore, becomes decisive for understanding Hegel’s claim that 
individuality is based on relations that exist outside of itself.145 Individuality cannot be 
reduced to a system of psychological laws, nor can it be explained in terms of action that 
does not grow out of a particular context. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, 
Williams, Sembou, and Pippin stress the importance of intersubjectivity in Hegel’s 
project in the Phenomenology. Action becomes an important part of their discussion of 
intersubjectivity because it is through concrete actions that the self seeks recognition. 
Sembou points out how action cannot be explained without reference to its norm-setting 
characteristics. When I decide to pursue one action over another, I am in that moment 
claiming that one possibility is higher than another and should be for others as well. More 
completely, I want others to recognize and accept that my action is right.146 Sembou 
writes  
‘Spirit’ is exactly the intersubjective or social framework that is 
presupposed by and underlies the ‘experience of consciousness’ as well as 
the way(s) people come to under-stand the relations among themselves in 
a particular political community at a given time in history. Most crucially, 
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inherent in human relationships is a ‘struggle for recognition’, as each 
individual attempts to impose her own needs or understanding of reality 
on the others and demands that they accord her recognition.147 
  
Therefore, the self cannot be understood without reference to the actions that it takes 
before a world of others and norms. The intersubjective background is an inextricable 
part of action and self-understanding.  
Robert Pippin advances a similar position when he claims that Hegel is critical of 
a concept of agency that focuses solely on the actor’s intention without considering how 
others respond to the action after it is initiated. Pippin points to §401 in the 
Phenomenology, where Hegel writes “an individual cannot know what he is until he has 
made himself a reality through action.”148 In Pippin’s words, “…one counts as a 
practically responsible subject by being taken to be one.”149 Here, the structure of 
“finding the self in what is other” resurfaces. The self recognizes and finds itself in the 
externality of its own action.150 Again, this means that our identity depends upon how 
Others recognize or mis-recognize our actions. However, Hegel’s concept of 
intersubjective recognition is broadened by another insight of the Phenomenology: Spirit 
is also a necessary condition of the self. This means that the subject and the recognizing 
or non-recognizing Other are both rooted in certain practices and assertions about truth 
                                               
147 Ibid., 280-81. 
148 Robert Pippin, “Hegel’s Social Theory of Agency: The ‘Inner-Outer’ Problem” in Hegel on Action, ed. 
by Arto Laitinen and Constantine Sandis (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 65-66.   
 
149 As quoted by J. McDowell in “Towards a Reading of Hegel on Action in the 'Reason' Chapter of the 
Phenomenology” in Hegel on Action, ed. by Arto Laitinen and Constantine Sandis (London: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2010), 79. 
 
150 In the next chapter we will see how Beauvoir is greatly influenced by this premise. She will claim that 
the self is a “project of self toward the other” and that it can only claim to be itself in a creative act.  
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that shape them.151 Recognition is tied to these social-historical forms of knowing. The 
former discourses that emerge in the psychological paradigm, Greek ethical life, and the 
French Revolution, are illustrative examples of such practices and truth claims.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have suggested that Hegel provides an ontological model of 
selfhood based on relation in his famous master-slave dialectic. Furthermore, I have 
drawn on other parts of the Phenomenology in order to emphasize that the structure of 
self-other relations is shaped by social historical discourses and practices. I have also 
demonstrated Hegel’s interest in the relational self with regard to epistemology and 
ethics. Self-knowledge is found to be dependent upon intersubjective relations. 
Furthermore, Hegel suggests that the self possesses the capacity to seek mutual 
recognition from the Other. 
Williams, Sembou, and Pippin’s analyses of intersubjectivity, recognition, and 
social-historical discourses and practices within the Phenomenology demonstrate the 
extent to which the modern idea of the self as Selbstandigkeit fails. They argue that the 
self understands itself and acts through these modes. Therefore, the self cannot be wholly 
self-governing and autonomous, because it is deeply shaped by recognition and social-
historical forms of knowing. Hegel’s claim about the self’s dependence upon an 
intersubjective field of meaning is an expression of the larger ontological claim that the 
self, and all “living” beings, are indebted to forces beyond themselves.  
Epistemology and ontology are inextricable in the Phenomenology because the 
self understands itself through understanding its own ontology. More specifically, the 
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structure of recognizing oneself in the Other is part of the structure of the self, but it is 
also a part of the structure of “life” itself. Here we may recall Hegel’s assertion about life, 
“Thus the simple substance of Life is the splitting-up of itself into shapes and at the same 
time the dissolution of the splitting-up is just as much a splitting-up and a forming of 
members. With this, the two sides of the whole movement which before were 
distinguished, viz. the passive separateness of the shapes in the general medium of 
independence, and the process of Life, collapse into one another.”152 Here we see that life 
possesses the structure of “splitting” itself up and then dissolving these differences. As 
we saw earlier, self-consciousness is the movement from world to self and the resulting 
separation into for-itself and in-itself. Ultimately, the idea that the self comes to realize its 
indebtedness to forces beyond itself is an ontological statement about the self.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
152 Hegel, § 171. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE VULNERABILITY OF SELFHOOD AND THE DEMAND FOR 
RECOGNITION: BEAUVOIR’S APPROPRIATION AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
HEGEL’S MASTER-SLAVE DIALECTIC  
 
Hegel’s master-slave dialectic shows up repeatedly in Beauvoir’s corpus. Given 
her dedication to describing individual identity as that which emerges from an 
intersubjective world, it is not surprising that Hegel’s foundational premise, that self-
consciousness is incited by the Other, exerts an undeniable influence on her work. 
Beauvoir provides the reader with a vision of the self as ecstatic, or outside itself; it is 
most basically a “project toward the Other.”153 Like Hegel, she does not think that the 
self is independent and self-sustaining; the self experiences itself through its relation to 
the Other. She characterizes the independent dependence of human reality as that which 
is “both Mitsein and separation.” This means that the self cannot be extracted from its 
relations to Others; it is dependent on others to access itself and understand itself. 
However, the self is also separation in that it is a singular bodily existence that is 
endowed with choice and responsibility. While she appropriates the idea of the self as a 
splitting up of consciousness and object from Hegel,154 she offers her own original 
contribution by describing the psychological tendencies that this produces in human 
beings, in particular the way that both Mitsein and separation are experienced in anguish. 
Furthermore, she complicates Hegel’s structure of self-other interactions by revealing the 
role that social-historical discourses play in the struggle for recognition.  
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My own reading of Beauvoir’s view of the self will focus on how she provides the 
reader with a notion of the self that is fundamentally tied to the intersubjective space that 
it emerged from; the overarching implication of this view is that the self is vulnerable; it 
cannot sustain itself through its own inner resources. Therefore, the self is continually 
engaged in authentic and inauthentic attempts to justify its existence through appeals to 
the Other.  
In this chapter I will describe what Beauvoir offers a model of selfhood that takes 
seriously the idea that the self is thoroughly intersubjective. First, I will examine the ways 
in which the self is mediated by its relations to that which is outside of itself, including 
Others and social-historical discourses. This will include a discussion of Beauvoir’s 
concept of the human tendency toward “alienation” in the form of a self-concept, created 
object, or life story. As the self exists in a space outside of itself, Beauvoir describes our 
relation to self as a continual, sometimes agonizing struggle between reifying our self-
conceptions and assuming our transcendence. Again, I believe that one of Beauvoir’s 
insights is that self-relation is not something that is given and stable; it is vulnerable due 
to its dependence on others. Therefore, more specifically, the struggle that every 
individual undergoes is characterized by the temptation to coerce the Other into affirming 
a static self-concept of one’s own choosing and the opposing possibility of living without 
static justification from the Other. Beauvoir’s version of authenticity stands out from 
other Existentialists like Heidegger and Sartre because it rests on more than adopting the 
proper relation toward one’s freedom; on her view, authentic existence requires the 
existence of free Others.155 The implication of this view is that authenticity is not entirely 
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under one’s own control; the self is vulnerable to ethical and personal failures as its 
authentic existence remains tied to the Other. 
Secondly, I will trace how Beauvoir’s view of the self appropriates and 
transforms aspects of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. I will argue that Beauvoir goes 
beyond Hegel’s discussion of the relational self in the master-slave dialectic in three 
ways: 1) She provides psychological descriptions of tendencies that human beings 
employ in order to escape the way that their self-relations exist outside of themselves, 2) 
While Hegel’s account of self-consciousness describes a subject who seeks recognition of 
its freedom, Beauvoir shows how the weight of social-historical discourses actually drive 
the subject to desire to be recognized for these narratives rather than its freedom, and 3) 
Beauvoir’s discussion of recognition differs from Hegel’s by arguing that recognition is 
about validating the worth of one’s existence – by communicating to the Other through 
one’s act – instead of seeking certainty about one’s autonomy. One of the methodological 
ways that Beauvoir’s discussion of the relational self extends beyond Hegel’s is that she 
provides the reader with narrative descriptions which model and illustrate the ways in 
which the self is a space of relation rather than an entity or pure self-relation. Thus, this 
section will rely on Beauvoir’s use off narratives in order to make the above points. 
Lastly, I will argue that while Beauvoir cautions the reader against the tendency 
towards alienation and flight from freedom, she doesn’t mean to say that one should 
resist the desire to seek justification of one’s existence through recognition from others. 
As she often criticizes alienation and allowing one’s relations to others to be motivated 
by anguish before one’s freedom, Beauvoir’s texts seem to suggest that all attempts to 
justify one’s existence must be renounced because they deny one’s transcendence; since 
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each moment presents a new opportunity for unique action, the self cannot receive 
justification for its entire being. However, what is not readily apparent in Beauvoir’s own 
corpus is that she doesn’t advocate that we resist all attempts to be justified by the Other. 
If the ontological structure of the self is such that we relate to ourselves only through the 
Other, than our “salvation”156 does not lie in simply avoiding fleeing our freedom toward 
being. Our salvation lies in the Other. For Beauvoir, authentic existence differs from 
Heideggarian resoluteness or Sartrean courage to choose in good faith; for her, 
authenticity lies in taking up projects that are always toward the Other. This means that 
one is always in need of the Other’s recognition; the Other gives me back to myself in a 
way that I cannot produce alone. Therefore, on my reading of Beauvoir, the good life is 
fraught with risk and does not lie entirely under one’s own control.  
As a novelist and existentialist, Beauvoir’s way of engaging philosophy relies 
heavily on describing concrete historical situations, character types, and relationships 
rather than describing atemporal, abstract structures of reality or subjectivity. Therefore, I 
will seek to show how looking to The Second Sex fleshes out Hegel’s claim that one’s 
relationship to oneself occurs through the Other’s power to confer recognition.157 
Beauvoir accomplishes this by examining social discourses and first person narrative 
descriptions of experience that reveal the way that human beings, especially women, 
strive for recognition. While my dissertation is not specifically concerned with sexual 
difference and female oppression, I will show how The Second Sex is a concrete 
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157 While the claim that one’s self-relation depends upon intersubjective recognition could be considered to 
be an atemporal statement, Beauvoir appeals to concrete descriptions of experience that appear to prove the 
accuracy of the claim.  
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illustration of certain aspects of Hegel’s structure of self-other interactions in the master-
slave dialectic and the claims that Beauvoir herself makes in “Pyrrhus and Cineas” and 
The Ethics of Ambiguity with regard to the relational self.   
Beyond her appropriation of Hegelian recognition, Beauvoir seems to be 
influenced by the figure of the bondsman in the master-slave dialectic, who glimpses his 
autonomy in the object of his production.158 Recalling Beauvoir’s description of the 
human being as “a project toward the Other,” the idea that the self’s identity is bound up 
with action and creation may reveal the influence of Hegel’s discussion of how the 
bondsman relates to himself through his labor. Beauvoir describes this way of 
discovering autonomy in one’s creation through the term “alienation” in The Second Sex. 
While this term does not show up frequently in the text, I believe that Beauvoir’s 
philosophy as a whole is implicitly colored by the idea. Indeed, alienation in the form of a 
created object or personal life story seems to be a primary way that the self accesses and 
recognizes itself. Beauvoir affirms the importance of alienation and self-understanding 
directly in The Second Sex, “A being cannot achieve self-awareness except by alienating 
itself; it searches for itself within the world in a foreign form that it makes its own.”159  
Given that Beauvoir, herself, privileges human freedom and the possibility of two 
subjects mutually recognizing each other’s freedom, it may seem odd that this chapter is 
devoting space to her theory of alienation. Indeed, given her commitment to social 
activism and existentialist ethics, it is not surprising that she seems to suggest that 
transcendence is more truly “human” than one’s facticity. According to Beauvoir, to be at 
home in the world and to allow for humanist ethics, one must realize that transcendence 
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159 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. by H. M. Parshley, 88. 
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is a defining dimension of one’s being.160 Despite this leaning, Beauvoir states that 
human existence is always lived out through the tension of ambiguity; we are always both 
subjects and objects (determining and determined). Despite Beauvoir’s emphasis on 
freedom and the dangers of alienation, the latter remains a way of accessing the self as 
well as illustrating the human reaction to one’s freedom. Devoting space to Beauvoir’s 
theory of alienation allows us to see how self-understanding is a struggle between the 
desire to alienate oneself into an object to appear necessary and the desire to live without 
static justification.  
 
Beauvoir’s View of the Self: Intersubjectivity, Recognition, and Alienation 
In this section, I will describe Beauvoir’s overall picture of the self in order to 
show how the self exists outside itself. This section will explain how the self is mediated 
by its environment, especially other human beings and social-historical discourses. It will 
also explore the psychological tendencies that result from the self’s ontological make-up. 
This will lead us to investigate alienation, recognition, and authentically assuming one’s 
existence as always outside of oneself. This section will also lay the groundwork for my 
claim that Beauvoir’s model of the self is not something that can relate to itself without 
the mediation of the Other. While one may mistakenly read Beauvoir as condemning all 
attempts to justify one’s existence, I believe that given the prevalence of her discussion of 
alienation, coupled with her discussion of recognition and creation, she believes that the 
self is built to seek justification of itself; therefore, one ought not believe that all 
justification is inauthentic.    
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Firstly, proposing that Beauvoir possesses a “model of the self” is somewhat 
problematic because, in her view, the self is not an unchanging object that could be 
isolated from its world and studied as a pure in-itself. Since the self is not thing-like it can 
be more aptly described as an ongoing struggle between the opposing realms of 
objectivity (being) and subjectivity (freedom). Indeed, much of her writing is dedicated to 
discarding the idea that the self is a self-sustaining, unchanging, and independent essence. 
Instead, she highlights how the self is identical with itself only in action: The self is “not 
first a thing but a spontaneity that desires, that loves, that wants, that acts…I am a project 
of self toward the other, a transcendence.”161 While this passage is from the beginning of 
her first philosophical essay, “Pyrrhus and Cineas” (1943), we will see how the idea that 
the self is defined through projects, instead of through reflection on a concept of the self 
as an interior substance, is a persistent theme throughout Beauvoir’s entire philosophical 
project. Beauvoir cites Hegel early on in the essay to support her discussion of the self as 
that which acts:  
Hegel has shown convincingly that reality should never be conceived as 
an interiority hidden in the depths of appearance. Interiority is not 
different from exteriority; appearance is itself reality. Man is not an 
immobile presence.162  
 
In this reference, we also see Beauvoir’s rejection of Kant’s distinction between the 
thing-in-itself and appearances. While Kant holds that the transcendental unity of 
apperception is an a priori given, Hegel and Beauvoir hold that there is no fully formed 
faculty of “mineness” which then enters into experience. Recalling Hegel’s statement that 
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“self-consciousness is Desire in general” 163 and Beauvoir’s notion that the self is first “a 
spontaneity that desires,”164 we see that both suggest that the self is formed when the 
world impinges upon it and it is incited to action by the welling up of desire. In an article 
on Hegel’s dissemblance of an inner versus an outer realm, or conscious intention and the 
resulting bodily movement, Robert Pippin points to two passages that support this 
dissembling: “Ethical self consciousness now learns from its deed the developed nature of 
what it actually did” (469) and “an individual cannot know what he is until he has made 
himself a reality through action” (401). These passages from The Phenomenology are 
quite close to Beauvoir’s claims about action and may have directly influenced her when 
she writes in “Pyrrhus and Cineas,”  
Only that in which I recognize my being is mine, and I can only recognize 
it where it is engaged. In order for an object to belong to me, it must have 
been founded by me. It is totally mine only if I founded it in its totality. 
The only reality that belongs entirely to me is, therefore, my act.165  
 
One can draw out two characteristics of Beauvoir’s vision of selfhood here, which 
interestingly follow from the former Hegel passages: 1) the self is not accessed in an 
inner realm of introspection and 2) the self only appears in action. The implications of 
these concepts are that one’s relationship to oneself will always entail the context out of 
which the action unfolds.  
In “Pyrrhus and Cineas,” Beauvoir describes a scene where a man lays on a 
hillside and contemplates his identity. She writes that his existence cannot be reduced to 
his mere presence on the hillside. Rather, his being includes the surrounding hills, the 
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temperature, and the city, wherein he exists “as someone absent.” She writes, “He cannot 
suddenly spring forth into the world in the pure ipseity of his being without the world 
suddenly springing forth in front of him.”166 Through a phenomenological description, 
Beauvoir displays how the self never appears as an unmediated thing-like existent.  
In the immediately preceding passage, we may also glimpse Heidegger’s 
influence on Beauvoir’s model of the self. Indeed, on the same page she quotes him: 
“Man is always infinitely more than he would be if he were reduced to what he is in the 
instant.” She writes, “Man is always somewhere else; there exists no privileged spot in 
the world about which he can safely say this is me…He is himself only through his 
relationships with something other than himself.”167 If the human being is not an 
“immobile presence,” than he must be changing and non-substantial. It therefore makes 
sense to claim, as we saw earlier that the self is comprised of “projects,” or ways of 
comporting itself toward other human beings.   
This assertion helps us understand Beauvoir’s insistence that the self is 
transcendence.168 The self is not something finished and accessible through introspection. 
It is not a collection of experiences either. The nature of the human being is, rather, a 
continuous reaching toward the future that is evident in the projects that one takes up: 
“His condition is to surpass everything given.”169 Beauvoir also uses the terms “lack” and 
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169 Ibid., 98. Interestingly, the idea of transcendence prompts her to reject Heidegger’s claim that 
authenticity is resolute being-toward-death. She counters that as Heidegger affirmed elsewhere, one’s being 
is better grasped through “engagement in the objective world” (114) rather than an inner grasping of one’s 
own finitude. Nancy Bauer suggests that Beauvoir’s emphasis on the self as “relation to” is influenced by 
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“nothingness” to describe this aspect of human reality. While the human being is 
transcendence, she is also an object that exists at the disposal of other transcendences 
who may deny or affirm her projects. This means that the self as transcendence is tied 
inextricably to the self that desires recognition.170 Recalling the earlier quotation, the self 
is a “project toward the Other.” The self is propelled to act and this action is always in 
relation to another.  
In the Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir uses the term ambiguity to capture the fact 
that human existence is comprised of being an object, or facticity, before others (i.e. 
constituted in ways that are out of our control) and a subject, or transcendence, (i.e. 
possessing the capacity to constitute ourselves). More specifically, regarding the 
“objective” dimension of our existence, we are historically situated bodies that are 
subject to biological processes, social discourses, and the judgments of others. On the 
other hand, regarding the subjective dimension, we are also freedoms that separate 
themselves from the passivity of the situated body through thought and projects.171   
In agreement with Hegel, Beauvoir asserts that the self is not a static essence that 
exists in an inner realm apart from action; however, Beauvoir emphasizes in The Ethics 
of Ambiguity that freedom is also not bare or radically contingent. Transcendence does 
not imply a way of being synonymous with the random bouncing around of the clinamen, 
                                                                                                                                            
Heidegger’s notion of Mitsein and sorgen.” See Nancy Bauer, “Being-with as Being-against: Heidegger 
Meets Hegel in The Second Sex,” 130-131. Furthermore, the tendency towards bad faith relates to 
Heidegger’s concept of losing oneself in das Man, 138-139. 
 
170 However, at least in “Pyrrhus and Cineas” and The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir implicitly affirms the 
transcendence part of one’s nature as more truly “human” than one’s facticity. This seems to be in part 
motivated by her criticism of Hegel that he neglects the “living subjectivity” of the individual in his grand 
system. To be at home in the world and to allow for humanist ethics, one must realize that transcendence is 
a defining dimension of one’s being. See Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, 111. 
 
171 Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 7-12.  
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or the Epicurean atom.172 When Beauvoir speaks of immanence, she is referring to both 
our material existence and the fact that our actions grow out the particular historical 
situation that we inherit. The reader may interpret the latter as having a constraining 
effect on our freedom, but part of Beauvoir’s original notion of the self is that freedom 
arises out of a concrete situation. The deeper idea here is that identity does not issue from 
an inner individual will; rather, it forms itself out of a complex network of social and 
historical relations, practices, and discourses. Therefore, even when Beauvoir speaks of 
transcendence as the birthplace of our action and projects, these cannot be described as 
entirely our own. While Beauvoir’s Existentialist leaning leads her to subtly privilege 
transcendence, the implication of her notion of ambiguity is that the self does not possess 
itself or decide in a vacuum of interiority; the self is thoroughly a social-historical 
existence.  
When Beauvoir speaks of the situation of the self, one of her points of focus is the 
context of Others before and out of which the self acts. Indeed, the theme of self-other 
relations features prominently in the majority of Beauvoir’s philosophical and literary 
works. It is worth noting that Hegel’s “each consciousness seeks the death of the other” is  
the quotation that opens her philosophical novel She Came to Stay, written one year 
before her first philosophical essay “Pyrrhus and Cineas.” Ten years later, in the 
introduction to The Second Sex she writes: “The category of Other is as original as 
consciousness itself...[it] can be found in the most primitive societies…alterity is the 
fundamental category of human thought. No group ever defines itself as One without 
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immediately setting up the Other opposite itself.”173 Both passages occur at the beginning 
of important texts and thus reflect Beauvoir’s preoccupation with the intersubjective 
dimension of consciousness. With regard to Beauvoir’s model of selfhood, this means 
that the Other draws me out; my self-relation is incited by and constituted in relation to 
the presence of the Other. Thus, there is no fully formed self that then appeals to the 
Other; instead, the self constitutes itself through its relation to the Other. Such a model of 
selfhood makes the issue of recognition central. Indeed, influenced by Hegel’s master-
slave dialectic, Beauvoir asserts that the basic structure of self-other relations can be 
characterized by the struggle for recognition. . The examples of traumatic bonding 
discussed in the introduction are real-life illustrations of how important recognition is to 
the maintenance of identity. In Hearst’s case, the fact that she took on a new identity 
shows us that recognition is an ongoing need. She wasn’t simply able to rely upon the 
recognition that she received in the past. With reference to the prisoners who were trained 
in the resistance of mental coercion and manipulation, we recall that they preserved their 
identities by visualizing their connection to Others before their imprisonment. However, 
this doesn’t mean that recognition was not an ongoing need for them. Rather, they 
practiced imaginatively reactivating the recognition that they received from relationships 
in the past.   
The theme of recognition arises in her early work when she writes “I am not first 
a thing but a spontaneity that desires, that loves, that wants, that acts…I am a project of 
self toward the other, a transcendence.”174 The self that is referenced in the last two 
quotations is described as that which “posits itself” and aims to influence the Other. The 
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self that Beauvoir describes, from the outset, actively seeks recognition of its specific 
goals from the Other.  
Fundamentally, “man is relation to,” or that being who always desires 
recognition: 
A man would be nothing if nothing happened to him, and it is always 
through others that something happens to him, starting with his birth….I 
am the instrument of his destiny. This is why our actions toward the other 
seem to us so heavy and at the same time weightless...through him our 
words and gestures received a meaning. He freely decided their 
meaning…each of my actions by falling into the world creates a new 
situation for [the Other].175 
  
Here Beauvoir reveals how the intersubjective dimension of existence is inseparable from 
personal identity. Beauvoir focuses in on the vital role that the self plays in the life of 
Others as well as the way that the Other’s freedom separates him or her from the self’s 
actions. When Beauvoir says that the self is “the instrument” of the Other’s “destiny,” she 
implies that the self becomes itself always through appealing to Others for recognition. 
The self’s actions actually acquire meaning when they are affirmed and taken up by 
another. Herein lies the vulnerability of the self that is a “project toward the Other.”  
Beauvoir’s philosophical project is also a psychology in that, apart from offering 
the reader an ontological model of selfhood based on action and relation, she also 
presents human tendencies that emerge as reactions to its own structure of consciousness, 
nature, and other human beings. For example, In the Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir 
further develops how human beings flee from their transcendence. Recalling the split 
human realities of transcendence and immanence, Beauvoir writes that human beings 
relate to their ambiguity through anguish. One’s transcendence presents itself as 
intolerable and frightening; therefore, the human being desires that its entire being match 
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the solidity of the body. While one’s existence is always overflowing itself, or 
transcending, toward possibilities (since there is no objective standard that one acts by), 
one wants to be something substantial. In the next section I will examine the human 
tendency to flee transcendence with particular focus on how this impacts self-other 
interactions. I will highlight what I think can be overlooked in reading Beauvoir: namely, 
while the desire for recognition arises in part as a reaction to the anguish that freedom 
provokes, relating to one’s transcendence authentically is not just a matter of abandoning 
the need to be recognized. Authentically relating to one’s ambiguity consists of 
struggling to withhold reifying one’s self-concept and allowing the Other the freedom to 
judge one as he or she sees fit. However, realizing that one’s self-relation occurs through 
the Other’s recognition reminds one that one cannot simply view others’ recognition as 
irrelevant or unnecessary.  
 
Alienation 
Beauvoir’s notion of alienation appears throughout her philosophical works. 
Alienation occurs when human beings identify with a singular action or self-concept in 
such a way that they refuse to acknowledge that the transcendence aspect of their being 
overflows any all-encompassing idea that they can hold about their identity. The self-
concept could be a social role or profession or even a possession (e.g. one’s property or 
an object of one’s creation). Beauvoir suggests that human beings want to settle once and 
for all who they are for several reasons: 1) From birth, human beings are attracted to 
belonging to the Mitsein. 2) They are driven to relate to themselves; such a relation seems 
at first glance to require that one encapsulate oneself into an object that one can in turn 
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relate to. 3) As human beings are set up to look for recognition from others, they recoil 
from the fact that the Other is utterly free to refuse to recognize them; this prompts them 
to try to control the Other by providing him or her with an unchanging version of 
themselves. In The Second Sex Beauvoir writes, “Primitive people alienate themselves in 
their mana, their totem; civilized people in their individual souls, their egos, their names, 
their possessions, and their work: here is the first temptation of inauthenticity.”176 Such a 
behavior is inauthentic because it solely affirms one dimension of human reality, namely, 
one’s facticity. As we saw earlier, as transcendence produces anguish because one’s self-
understanding and the recognition that one receives from others is never settled, human 
beings tend to deny their transcendence and adopt views of themselves that are static. 
They then attempt to convince others to recognize them for these static identities.  
As alienation often carries a negative connotation in Beauvoir’s work, it is easy to 
mistakenly assume that she merely counsels readers to avoid it. However, in The Second 
Sex she also asserts “A being cannot achieve self-awareness except by alienating itself; it 
searches for itself within the world in a foreign form that it makes its own.”177 Rather 
than being a cowardly, short-sighted stance toward oneself that emotionally stronger 
individuals can avoid, we see that the human subject can only grasp itself by making 
itself into an object.178 Beauvoir refers to alienation as a human “tendency” and an 
“existential fact.”179  
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Therefore, while it is bad faith for one to solely affirm one’s facticity or being-in-
itself, it is significant for an understanding of human selfhood that one of the primary 
ways that one grasps oneself is through alienation into an object that is then recognized 
by others. While Beauvoir often writes about alienation in terms of labor and artistic 
production, she argues that the drive to escape oneself into an object of one’s choosing – 
or the Other’s choosing – begins in early childhood.  
In an immediate way the newborn lives the primeval drama of every 
existent – that is, the drama of one’s relation to the Other. Man 
experiences his abandonment in his anguish. Fleeing his freedom and 
subjectivity, he would like to lose himself within the Whole…He never 
manages to abolish his separated self: at the least he wishes to achieve the 
solidity of the in-itself, to be petrified in a thing; it is uniquely when he is 
fixed by the gaze of other that he appears to himself as a being. It is in this 
vein that the child’s behavior has to be interpreted: in a bodily form he 
discovers finitude, solitude, and abandonment in an alien world; he tries to 
compensate for this catastrophe by alienating his existence in an image 
whose reality and value will be established by others. It would seem that 
from the time he recognizes his reflection in a mirror – at a time that 
coincides with weaning – he begins to affirm his identity: his self merges 
with this reflection in such a way that it is formed only by alienating 
itself…the child at about six months of age begins to understand his 
parents’ miming and to grasp himself under their gaze as an object. He is 
already an autonomous subject transcending himself toward the world: but 
it is only in an alienated form that he will encounter himself.180  
 
As we can see from this passage, alienation is closely tied to anxiety before one’s 
freedom, wherein freedom is that which separates and differentiates oneself from Others. 
Contra Heidegger, the anxiety felt in life is not provoked by finitude according to 
Beauvoir; instead, it is undergone as a result of the nothingness that “…allows one to 
constantly transcend all transcendence.”181 Here, she is closer to Sartre than Heidegger in 
her insistence that anxiety (for her, the wish to flee from one’s freedom through 
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alienating oneself in an image that others might affirm), is motivated by the insecurity 
that one feels as a self that must seek validation from free others. The fundamental 
struggle of human existence is negotiating one’s relation to Others, but more specifically, 
it is negotiating one’s separateness with one’s primordial belonging-with Others. 
Selfhood arises through this very struggle. Here, we are reminded of Beauvoir’s notion 
that fundamentally, “man is relation to.” It is significant that Beauvoir writes that the 
child’s sense of himself is mediated by the Other; it is only when the Other objectifies 
him that he “appears to himself as a being.” The centrality of alienation and the mediation 
of the Other in the formation of selfhood is evident when Beauvoir writes that separation 
is experienced as catastrophic. The child’s recourse to this catastrophe is to seek an 
identity that is affirmed by others.182  
The tendency to alienate oneself continues throughout adulthood, according to 
Beauvoir. If alienating oneself into an object whose worth may be established by the 
Other is how the human being tends to respond to transcendence, it follows that part of 
the impetus for engaging in projects – which are always projects toward the Other – is to 
attempt to make one’s existence “necessary” rather than “contingent.” With regard to 
production, if one alienates oneself into one’s writing, art, invention, etc., then one may 
delude oneself that one is really the book, painting, or invention rather than nothingness. 
However, it is important to remember that alienating oneself into the created object is 
more than a delusion. It is also a way of accessing oneself.  
In “Pyrrhus and Cineas,” Beauvoir describes how an author may write a book out 
of the desire to be affirmed. While the author hopes to attain recognition of her very 
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being through the creative act, she cannot will this recognition. Selfhood shows itself to 
be vulnerable because the readers themselves are untouched by the author’s desire to be 
validated:  
But they [the readers] never demand me, and yet I wish to be necessitated 
by them in the very singularity of my being. The book that I write does not 
fill a void shaped in advance exactly like it…Only the other can create a 
need for what we give him; every appeal and every demand comes from 
his freedom. In order for the object that I founded to appear as a good, the 
other must make it into his own good, and then I would be justified for 
having created it. The other’s freedom alone is capable of necessitating my 
being. My essential need is therefore to be faced with free men.183 
 
After exposing the self’s powerlessness to coerce the Other into affirming his creativity 
and the object of creation, Beauvoir concludes by stating that the self who desires 
recognition needs free Others. Indirectly, pointing to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, this 
conclusion is arrived at after several examples of the way that appealing to slave 
consciousness fails.184 While we saw earlier that alienating oneself into one’s mana, soul, 
or work is inauthentic, this passage is important because it shows that 1) we actually need 
to be justified and necessitated by others and 2) we can earn this justification through 
glimpsing ourselves, or alienating ourselves, in our projects. However, regarding the 
latter point, Beauvoir’s caveat is that we can never attain justification “once-and-for-all.” 
This is the why our selfhood is always outside itself and characterized by vulnerability. 
Again, if we consider the occurrence of traumatic bonding in concentration camps, 
prisons, religious cults, brothels, and relationships of intimate partner violence, we see 
the dangerous implications of the self that is utterly outside itself. 
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Beauvoir expands on her idea that the self recognizes itself and is recognized by 
Others only in its actions: 
If I seek myself in the eyes of others before I have fashioned myself, I am 
nothing. I take on a shape and an existence only if I first throw myself into 
the world by loving, by doing. And my being enters into communication 
with others only through those objects in which it is engaged. I must 
resign myself to never being entirely saved. There are endeavors that 
extend over an entire life; others are limited to an instant, but none 
expresses the totality of my being since this totality is not.185  
 
At first this assertion appears to be quite extreme. Don’t we recognize ourselves 
immediately in reflection on our identities or feel a minimal sense of self that infuses all 
experience as mine? However, Beauvoir’s claim seems to be that we require distance in 
order to see ourselves. Again, like Hegel’s bondsman, she asserts that the self glimpses 
its own power and unstable sovereignty in its action and creation. However, Beauvoir 
also mentions “seeking” oneself in “the eyes of others” and “enter[ing] into 
communication with others” in this passage. These sections remind the reader that we 
live in a world with Others and that we do not relate to ourselves purely through our act. 
Rather, this passage suggests that we grasp ourselves through the Other’s recognition of 
our act. Why then does Beauvoir jump from communicating with others and engaging 
oneself in projects to a statement about “never being entirely saved”? In the paragraphs 
leading up to this passage, Beauvoir makes two other statements about the Other’s power 
to save or justify the self’s transcendence: “We need others in order for our existence to 
become founded and necessary” and “I intend to save my being in the world, such as it is 
realized in my actions…Only through these objects that I make exist in the world can I 
communicate with others. If I make nothing exist, there is neither communication nor 
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justification.”186 For Beauvoir, there are two ways of relating to one’s transcendence. The 
most common is to flee it through alienation. The second is to assume it. The latter is 
characterized by affirming that one’s existence is “nothingness” and the only relation to 
self is through action. Self-identity, then, must be located in one’s ever-changing and 
transcending projects. The other side of assuming one’s existence involves admitting to 
oneself that others are free to judge one how they see fit. While assuming one’s existence 
may appear as something that one simply has to will oneself to do in order to live 
authentically, I think that it is easy to miss that one still needs the Other’s recognition in 
order to be “saved.” The former quotations reveal that human nothingness needs to be 
recognized, or made necessary, not just by the self but by the Other.  
The language of “founding” reveals the implication of Beauvoir’s view of 
selfhood. If the self is always a project toward the Other, it must seek itself in the Other. 
According to her, when the human being “assumes” her existence, she simultaneously 
“renounces all possession, because possession is a way of searching for being.”187 While 
we will see that Beauvoir often aligns attempts to “justify” or “found” one’s existence as 
inauthentic when they stem from cementing one’s concept of oneself or coercing the 
Other to affirm a fixed self-concept, renouncing possession doesn’t mean renouncing the 
need to be justified in one’s nothingness through the Other’s recognition. For Beauvoir, 
selfhood is something that is in need of saving; furthermore, one cannot justify oneself 
from within. Therefore, if others continually refuse to justify one’s existence, than one 
cannot simply validate oneself. In the next section, we will explore the extent to which 
one’s situation constrains the self. More specifically, the implication is that in an 
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oppressive environment, the ability to know oneself and be justified are lost. In 
Beauvoir’s view, there are no hidden, interior resources that one can draw on to be a self 
on one’s own. 
While the individual acts in part in order to justify her existence through the 
affirmation of her projects by others, if she desires to authentically relate to her freedom, 
the affirmation that she desires must entail the furtherance of her project through the 
inspiration for new projects. She locates recognition as that which “carries off [one’s 
project] toward a new future by new projects.”188 Here, Beauvoir seems to insist that 
authentic action means that the appeal toward the Other in action and creation is always 
directed toward the Other’s freedom which represents an unknowable future. She reveals 
the close tie between the self as acting being and the self as an appeal to the Other: 
Thus it is not for others that each person transcends himself; one writes 
books and invents machines that were demanded nowhere. It is not for 
one-self [soi] either, because “self’ [soi] exists only through the very 
project that throws it into the world. The fact of transcendence precedes all 
ends and all justification, but as soon as we are thrown into the world, we 
immediately wish to escape from the contingence and the gratuitousness 
of pure presence. We need others in order for our existence to become 
founded and necessary. It is not a matter of making recognized in us the 
pure abstract form of the self [moi] as Hegel believes. I intend to save my 
being in the world, such as it is realized in my actions, my works, my life. 
Only through these objects that I make exist in the world can I 
communicate with others. If I make nothing exist, there is neither 
communication nor justification.189 
 
While I will take up Hegel’s influence on Beauvoir in the next section, this 
passage reveals that our drive to seek recognition seems to be an unconscious need which 
stems from our very ontology. However, Beauvoir clearly states that transcendence 
cannot be justified just like she said in the former passage that one cannot be “entirely 
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saved” because one’s being is “not.” But, she immediately follows this statement with a 
description of the human being’s desire to be justified, first by writing that we “wish” to 
escape from our freedom and then by claiming that we “need” Others to justify our 
existence. These conflicting statements reveal the extent to which selfhood is an ongoing 
struggle that needs “saving” for Beauvoir. While Beauvoir’s discussion of anguish and 
inauthenticty may lead us to read her as condemning all attempts that relate to the Other 
through a need to justify oneself, we see that we absolutely need the Other in order to be 
a self.  
Lastly, in The Second Sex, Beauvoir devotes a lot of space to describing feminine 
alienation, which manifests itself in a particular way, given woman’s historical situation: 
Narcissism is a well-defined process of alienation: the self is posited as an 
absolute end, and the subject escapes itself in it… There are many other – 
authentic or inauthentic – attitudes found in woman…What is true is that 
circumstances invite woman more than man to turn toward self and to 
dedicate her love to herself…Her education has encouraged her to alienate 
herself wholly in her body.190 
 
Here Beauvoir moves from stating that alienation is an existential fact and describing its 
structure to showing how social-historical discourses and practices impact the way in 
which it manifests itself. The narcissistic woman’s self-relation is thus strongly impacted 
by these discourses; she will then seek recognition of the self that is shaped by them from 
Others. 
Ultimately, the self’s flight from freedom is a significant part of self-other 
relations because if Beauvoir is correct in stating that human beings often alienate 
themselves into their “souls, egos, etc.”191 as a result of this fear, than self-other 
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interactions are structured more by seeking recognition of these objects rather than 
recognition of one’s freedom or transcendence. 
 
Recognition, the Master-Slave Dialectic, and Narrative Descriptions  in The Second Sex 
In this section I will examine the implications of Beauvoir’s theory of selfhood in 
The Second Sex. My point of focus will be the way that she appropriates and transforms 
Hegel’s fundamental idea that the self depends on and comes to reflect on itself through 
the Other because it is this insight that lies behind her theory of selfhood. I will begin this 
section by outlining some of the key ideas that emerge in The Second Sex. Secondly, I 
will examine Beauvoir’s interest in Hegel and then move on to analyzing her use of the 
master-slave dialectic in The Second Sex. Lastly, I will show how Beauvoir makes 
Hegel’s notion of selfhood more concrete through her use of narratives. I will argue that 
Beauvoir goes beyond Hegel’s discussion of the relational self in the master-slave 
dialectic in three ways: 1) Firstly, she provides psychological descriptions of tendencies 
that human beings employ in order to escape the way that their self-relations exist outside 
of themselves. 2) Secondly, while Hegel’s account of self-consciousness describes a 
subject who seeks recognition of its freedom, Beauvoir shows how the weight of social-
historical discourses actually drive the subject to desire to be recognized for these 
narratives rather than its freedom. 3) Lastly, Beauvoir’s discussion of recognition focuses 
on communicating to the Other through one’s act in a way that seeks validation of one’s 
existence; this motivation for recognition differs from Hegel’s account which states that 
the subject seeks recognition so that it can attain “certainty” of itself and its freedom.  
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An Introduction to The Second Sex 
As we have seen, recognition is a central concept in Beauvoir’s work. Following 
in line with her earlier works, Beauvoir stresses repeatedly in The Second Sex that human 
existence is mediated.192 Following Hegel, spirit reaches self-consciousness through the 
mediation of others. While at first the self is hostile to the fact that the other has the 
power to confer meaning on its facticity, it realizes that if the other is destroyed, it loses 
the possibility to get itself back from the other. Beauvoir echoes this notion in The Ethics 
of Ambiguity: “by taking the world away from me, others also give it to me.”193 The self 
is not sovereign; it must appeal to others for recognition.  
Given Beauvoir’s view that the Other’s recognition is integral to the self’s 
existence and self-conception, The Second Sex can be read as concretizing this claim. She 
does this by showing how the patterns of self-other interactions, especially those between 
men and women, are grounded in historical situations. One’s situation, for Beauvoir, is 
comprised of one’s social roles within public and private realms, material opportunities, 
political rights, and cultural discourses. Broadly, The Second Sex demonstrates the ways 
in which human existence, in particular female existence, is mediated by these 
variables.194 While Beauvoir’s guiding question throughout the text is “what about 
woman’s historical situation led her to occupy the role of Other to man?,” the text itself 
provides a model of the ways that social discourses and concrete historical positions 
heavily determine the situation out of which identity arises.  
                                               
192 The Second Sex, 88.  
 
193 Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 71.  
 
194 The Second Sex, 88.  
 89 
 
More specifically, Beauvoir’s analysis of the psychological ties between men and 
women in The Second Sex can be used to illustrate the ways in which self-other relations 
determine the self. These are given in vivid detail in Beauvoir’s descriptions, gathered 
from interviews with women and examples from literature. For example, summarizing 
her findings with regard to man’s relation to woman, Beauvoir writes:  
A husband looks for himself in his wife…he seeks in her the myth of his 
virility, his sovereignty, his unmediated reality…But he himself is a slave 
to his double: what effort to build up an image in which he is always in 
danger! After all it is founded on the capricious freedom of Woman. Man 
is consumed by the concern to appear male, important, superior. He play 
acts so that others will play act with him.195 
 
In passages describing woman, Beauvoir says, “She does not separate man’s desire from 
love of her own self.”196 Or, similarly: 
[Woman] wants to feel like a woman for her own personal satisfaction. 
She only succeeds in accepting herself from the perspective of both the 
present and the past by combining the life she has made for herself with 
the destiny prepared for her by her mother, her childhood games, and her 
adolescent fantasies.197 
 
While these rich passages illustrate how men and women possess the deep-seated desire 
to be recognized by each other, they also illustrate how the way that each wants to be 
recognized depends upon the social discourses of his or her situation. Both quotations 
describe individuals who act in bad faith by seeking confirmation of a fixed image of 
themselves from the Other. But the deeper point is that the weight of one’s situation 
compels one to relate to oneself by seeking recognition of these discourses from the 
Other. This comes out strongly in the first line of the latter quote: “[Woman] wants to 
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feel like a woman for her own personal satisfaction.” While we may think of discourses 
as thought patterns that we can enter into at will, Beauvoir suggests that the discourses 
are internalized to such a degree that woman’s desires propel her to live them out; they 
“satisfy” her in her core.  
Beauvoir privileges transcendence because she thinks that the possibility of ethics 
rests on one’s capacity to choose the right course of action in every new situation. She 
also locates authenticity in assuming one’s freedom; an authentic self-relation occurs 
only when one glimpses oneself in one’s “free” act. However, the implication of such a 
view when put into relation with the two preceding passages is that projects are not 
entirely of the individual’s own making; the projects themselves are influenced by these 
same discourses. Moreover, we saw above that one’s projects are only made meaningful 
when they are affirmed by others. Therefore, regardless of whether we speak of an 
authentic form of existence or one that seeks to affirm a fixed image of oneself, identity 
emerges in relation to the discourses and practices of one’s situation and is radically 
dependent upon the whims of the Other; the self is thus utterly vulnerable. We see this 
clearly in the second passage when fulfillment is described as hinging upon woman’s free 
projects as well as the degree to which she lives out her role as “woman.” If we think of 
the way that the self “gets itself back from the Other,” in the scenario that Beauvoir 
presents, than woman doesn’t just seek recognition of “the life she has prepared for 
herself”; she seeks recognition on the basis of discourses of femininity.  
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Hegel’s Influence on Beauvoir 
The subject of Hegel’s influence on Beauvoir is not new in Beauvoir scholarship. 
Within this area of research, there is disagreement among scholars with regard to 
Beauvoir’s use of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic in The Second Sex. For example, Eva 
Lundgren-Gothlin takes the position that The Second Sex suggests that women do not 
participate in the master-slave dialectic because they do not engage in a life and death 
struggle with men, i.e. they do not forcefully demand recognition as subjects. The result 
of this is that women become absolute Others by never demanding recognition, or 
seeking reciprocity, from men.198 While Karen Green and Nicholas Roffey agree with 
Lundgren-Gothlin that women do not enter into a life and death struggle with men, they 
argue that Beauvoir does place women in the role of the dependent consciousness in 
Hegel’s dialectic. This means that man occupies the role of the Master and woman only 
recognizes, or “lives” for man.199 Nancy Bauer, on the other hand, highlights how women 
desire to be recognized as objects because this allows them to “…ward off a fear that is 
the other side of…[their] existential freedom: namely, the fear that…[their] relationship 
to the world is insecure.”200 Therefore, contra Green and Roffey, Bauer claims that 
women do not merely recognize and live for men; their recognition of men is actually 
self-serving in that it allows them to avoid “assuming” their transcendence.  
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On Bauer’s view, Beauvoir’s interest in the master-slave dialectic lies in the fact 
that for her, self-consciousness, whether male or female, is fundamentally oriented 
towards seeking recognition from the Other by controlling the Other’s perception of 
itself. In short, Bauer argues that women do seek recognition from men, but they seek 
recognition of themselves as desirable objects.201 Similarly, men also seek recognition of 
static self-concepts from women; however, the difference is that they seek recognition of 
themselves as static subjects while women seek recognition of themselves as static 
objects. Here, a “subject” refers to the transcending aspect of one’s being or the fact that 
one is capable of exercising autonomy. An “object” refers to one’s immanence, or the 
idea that one is constituted in a certain way that is enduring. Beauvoir shows how men 
don’t actually seek affirmation of their freedom, or subjectivity; they, too, often fall into 
the trap of seeking recognition of a fixed concept of themselves (e.g. purely independent 
or Selbstandigkeit). Beauvoir’s interest in the human drive to seek recognition of an 
unchanging self-concept is evident from an idea that frequently recurs in her work: 
human beings relate to their freedom through anguish and flight.202 Bauer identifies the 
important role that anguish plays in Beauvoir’s account of recognition; anguish motivates 
one to alienate oneself into a static self-concept. In my own project, I think that this is 
one of the ways that Beauvoir moves beyond simply re-hashing Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic in The Second Sex. By describing psychological tendencies, like anguish, that 
emerge as a response to one’s constitution as a self that has its being in that which is 
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outside itself, Beauvoir presents an original discussion and illustration of the implications 
of Hegel’s relational self.  
I find Bauer’s analysis the most convincing, but I suggest that all three views 
don’t fully grasp Beauvoir’s appropriation and transformation of Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic. While the first two positions emphasize that women don’t seek recognition 
from men, I side with Bauer that women do look for affirmation, but they often seek 
affirmation of themselves as objects rather than subjects. In my view, Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit traces the failure of modernity’s notion of selfhood as 
Selbstandingkeit. If this reading of the text is correct, we see that Hegel affirms that one’s 
self-conception is historically-situated and variable. I read Beauvoir as taking up the 
master-slave dialectic first from her own historically-situated place and then throughout 
history in order to examine the discourses that one is subjected to as a woman. In one 
sense, she is in agreement with Hegel about the force that the discourses about selfhood 
wield when it comes to one’s self-relation and self-other interactions. However, her 
transformation of the dialectic based on a different social-historical situation is important 
because it reveals the extent to which discourses on masculinity and femininity structure 
the self’s desires for recognition. Hegel is silent on this point in the master-slave 
dialectic. As Bauer points out, human beings are tempted to seek recognition from each 
other for themselves as objects because it allows them to flee their transcendence. I want 
to advance this claim by showing that beyond one’s psychological reaction to one’s 
freedom, the weight of one’s social-historical situation also compels one to seek 
recognition of such discourses. In order to accomplish this end, I will examine narratives 
that reveal the way that subjects seek recognition of social-historical discourses in the 
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Other. These two motivations for seeking recognition of oneself as an object need not be 
ranked in importance or completely separated. I would rather like to focus on the role that 
social-historical discourses play because I find that a more thorough discussion is needed 
in order to tease out Beauvoir’s position from Hegel’s with regard to the relational self. 
For example, Beauvoir’s original notion of the psychological tendency of the self 
to seek control of the Other’s perception of his/her identity is shown clearly when 
Beauvoir makes the case in The Second Sex that woman “wants to feel like a woman for 
her own personal satisfaction.”203 Beauvoir takes the structure of seeking recognition 
from Hegel’s dialectic, but transforms it by pointing to the way that women’s social-
historical situation encourages her to seek recognition of herself as a pleasing object 
instead of as an autonomous, independent freedom. While Bauer points out that women 
and men seek recognition of themselves as objects based on discourses and on their 
experience of anguish, I believe that a more thorough investigation is needed to account 
for the idea that the discourses don’t just come from without; the discourses satisfy us 
internally.  
Furthermore, Bauer captures Beauvoir’s injunction to the reader to live 
authentically by avoiding the tempting belief that one could take oneself out of 
relationship and by avoiding the temptation to coerce the Other to see oneself as one 
wishes to be seen. However, what is not readily apparent in Beauvoir’s own corpus and 
what also stands out as an unexplored dimension of Bauer’s discussion of Beauvoir’s 
notion of authenticity is that Beauvoir doesn’t advocate that we resist the desire to be 
justified by the Other. While she criticizes the individual’s narcissistic attempt to justify 
oneself in a way of one’s choosing and then thrust this upon the Other, she states clearly 
                                               
203 Beauvoir, The Second Sex, 725. 
 95 
 
that others compel the individual to act. Furthermore, one’s action becomes meaningful 
when it is understood by others: “through him our words and gestures received a 
meaning.”204 From infancy on Beauvoir details how we relate to ourselves through the 
eyes of others. While it is easy to read Beauvoir’s discussion of authenticity as an attitude 
where one invites the Other to judge one  as he or she sees fit, I don’t think that this 
invitation means that the self ought to give up all its desire for justification. Fleeing from 
one’s transcendence is inauthentic when it leads to denying one’s power to make 
decisions and when it means that one tries to coerce the Other into affirming a static self-
concept. However, anguish before one’s transcendence can be positive when it leads the 
self to engage in projects even if the impetus is only to justify oneself in the eyes of 
another. On Beauvoir’s view, I experience my abandonment in anguish; my separation 
from the Mitsein is a catastrophe. But, it is through this separation that I can relate to the 
Other. It is through my very need for recognition that motivates me to act.  
Now that I have described some of the ways that scholars understand Beauvoir’s 
use of the master-slave dialectic as well as introduced my own way of reading Beauvoir 
and Hegel together, I will turn to a more thorough discussion of what I take to be  
Beauvoir’s appropriation and transformation of Hegel’s view of the relational self.  
Most basically, the master-slave dialectic grounds Beauvoir’s project in The 
Second Sex as she seeks to picture the ways that the self’s authentic and inauthentic 
desires for recognition are structured by social and historical practices and discourses. 
Beauvoir recasts the master-slave dialectic in her own words in the introduction: 
“…following Hegel, a fundamental hostility to any other consciousness is found in 
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consciousness itself; the subject posits itself only in opposition; it asserts itself as the 
essential and sets up the other as inessential, as the object.”205 In her own original theory 
of selfhood, we can observe how Hegel’s idea that “the subject posits itself only in 
opposition” is active; for instance, Beauvoir appropriates Hegel’s notion of recognition 
by claiming that the human being is essentially a “project of self toward the other.”206 
The self develops its self-concept and actions always already in relation to Others; more 
specifically, the self seeks recognition of its identity and projects. Furthermore, 
Beauvoir’s notion that the self understands itself through action rather than through 
solitary introspection is also found in Hegel’s discussion of how desire motivates our 
practical engagement in the world in the chapter on self-consciousness. 
Due to the references to Hegel which appear throughout her student diaries, her 
first philosophical essay, and in her two major philosophical works, The Ethics of 
Ambiguity and The Second Sex, it seems likely that Beauvoir’s attention to 
intersubjectivity and selfhood in her work can be explained to some degree by her interest 
in Hegel. Indeed, in all three of these texts Beauvoir includes sections on “Others” or  
“Social Life.” Furthermore, she retells parts of the recognition section of the master-slave 
dialectic in each of these works.207  
With respect to The Second Sex in particular, aside from her allusions to the 
master-slave dialectic, Beauvoir also references Hegel’s ideas on sexuality, ethics, 
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parenthood, and marriage throughout The Second Sex.208 However, these are brief 
references when compared to her main use of Hegel, which is an investigation of the idea 
that surfaces in the master-slave dialectic; namely, “alterity is the fundamental category 
of human thought.”209 My particular focus within this claim is the model of selfhood that 
emerges. As I have presented, much of Beauvoir’s philosophical project is aimed at 
fleshing out how one’s relation to oneself is based upon one’s relation to Others. I think 
that Green and Roffey are correct when they suggest that part of Beauvoir’s project is to 
“…adapt and make concrete the confrontation of self and other to be found in Hegel.”210  
I believe that she achieves this end through her narrative descriptions of self-other 
interactions in The Second Sex, which reveal the way that social-historical discourses 
structure these interactions. As stated earlier, I believe that Beauvoir’s transformation of 
Hegel’s master-slave dialectic lies more in the fact that her discussion of the weight of 
the “situated” aspect of one’s identity compels one to seek recognition of oneself as an 
object rather than a subject. What I mean by “situation” here is the place of individuality, 
which is comprised of social-historical discourses and Others which one comports 
oneself toward. Beauvoir exposes that the way that the self wants to be recognized is 
often not unique; it is structured by historical notions. Hegel’s account of recognition 
involves a subject asserting a demand to be recognized for its freedom. However, 
Beauvoir proposes that the struggle for recognition is more about demanding that one is 
seen as an image of one’s choosing. The weight of discourses is not the only explanation 
that she gives for this phenomenon. She also argues, as Nancy Bauer points out, that the 
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anguish before one’s freedom and the freedom of the Other drives one to seek out a 
settled version of oneself, i.e. a depiction of oneself as an object rather than a 
transcendence. Beauvoir points out how the relation to the Other’s freedom is peculiar 
because the self needs the Other to be made “necessary.” However, the appeal to the 
Other is less a matter of inviting the Other to exercise his or her freedom and more a 
matter of trying to coerce the Other into affirming the self-concept of the self’s choosing.   
 Therefore, while others are the means through which my projects are made 
meaningful, Beauvoir focuses in The Second Sex on the ways in which women’s 
oppression is tied to the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, which affirms that when two 
consciousnesses encounter each other, each possesses a tendency to dominate the other. If 
one consciousness holds some “advantage” over the other then domination of the other is 
possible and the former seeks to preserve its position above the other through 
oppression.211  In the “History” section of the Second Sex, Beauvoir writes that “there is 
no ideological revolution more important in the primitive period than the one replacing 
matrilineal descent with agnation” because it elevates man’s status to absolute master 
while relegating woman to the role of eternal servant.212 At this moment when man is 
identified as the sovereign possessor and dispenser of life to each generation, “when he 
asserts himself as subject and freedom,” woman’s existence becomes “Other” and 
“mediatory”; this means that woman admits to recognizing man as the free subject and 
surrendering her human desire to be recognized as a free subject herself.213 
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 Woman, seen as matter and passivity, becomes a convenient placeholder for all of 
the traits that man does not want to claim; she is the object against which man 
experiences the power of his will and the certainty of his freedom. While man projects his 
fear of materiality onto woman, he also “hopes to realize himself by finding himself 
through her”.214 Both man and woman look to each other for deep-seated affirmation of 
their self-worth. However, again, while Hegel’s dialectic is written for the subject who 
desires affirmation for its independence and belief in its own sovereignty, Beauvoir 
believes that men and women more often seek recognition of discourses on masculinity 
and femininity. In Bauer’s view, Beauvoir’s use of the master-slave dialectic emphasizes 
that women and men fit the dialectic more or less well during different times in history. 
For example, women and men “asymmetrically” recognized each other before the time of 
slavery when they worked to produce food together. However, after men possessed 
slaves, women came to be the absolute Other and ceased to demand recognition of 
themselves as subjects from men.215   
In the introduction to The Second Sex, Beauvoir asserts that the “category of the 
“Other” is a fundamental aspect of consciousness. She cites its existence in primitive 
societies and ancient mythologies and points specifically to opposites like Good and Bad, 
“Sun-Moon, God and Lucifer.”216 Beauvoir quickly follows this discussion with an 
appeal to Hegel:  
These phenomena could not be understood if human reality were solely a 
Mitsein based on solidarity and friendship. On the contrary, they become 
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clear if, following Hegel, a fundamental hostility to any other 
consciousness is found in consciousness itself; the subject posits itself 
only in opposition; it asserts itself as the essential and sets up the other as 
the inessential, as the object.217  
 
Beauvoir, thus, takes the struggle between the two consciousnesses in the master-slave 
dialectic to be an essential component of the self and self-knowledge. Beauvoir brings 
this structure of “posit[ing] itself only in opposition” and brings it to life by looking at the 
history of unjust societies and female oppression. In the opening of the section entitled 
“Myths,” Beauvoir explores psychological intentions and consequences with regard to 
men’s assumption of the role of the One, or the master: 
Once the subject attempts to assert himself, the Other, who limits and 
denies him, is nonetheless necessary for him: he attains himself only 
through the reality that he is not. That is why man’s life is never plenitude 
and rest, it is lack and movement, it is combat. Facing himself, man 
encounters Nature; he has a hold on it, he tries to appropriate it for 
himself. But it cannot satisfy him.218 
 
Here, not only do we glimpse man’s dependence upon the Other and his constant struggle 
to experience himself through mastery, but we also see Beauvoir repeating Hegel’s 
account of self-consciousness’ encounter with “Life” at the beginning of “The Truth of 
Self-Certainty” section.219 Like Hegel, she goes on to show how consumption of nature 
fails because it destroys the object that provides a mirror for its autonomy.220 In 
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Beauvoir’s words, after consumption, man “remains alone.”221 While man experiences 
his sovereignty through dominating an object of nature, the object cannot “give himself 
back to himself” because it does not possess free consciousness. Following the movement 
of the dialectic in her own text, Beauvoir moves on to describing man’s encounter with 
woman. Woman, a being endowed with consciousness, is a better candidate for 
recognizing man’s freedom.  
 Beauvoir cites the master-slave dialectic directly on the second page of the 
“Myths” section when describing the male benefit of aligning woman with nature and 
passivity: 
He [man] has contradictory aspirations to both life and rest, existence and 
being; he knows very well that “a restless spirit” is the ransom for his 
development, that his distance from the object is the ransom for his being 
present to himself; but he dreams of restfulness in restlessness and of an 
opaque plenitude that his consciousness would nevertheless still inhabit. 
This embodied dream is, precisely, woman; she is the perfect intermediary 
between nature that is foreign to man and the peer who is too identical to 
him. She pits neither the hostile silence of nature nor the hard demand of a 
reciprocal recognition against him; by a unique privilege she is a 
consciousness, and yet it seems possible to possess her in the flesh. 
Thanks to her, there is a way to escape the inexorable dialectic of the 
master and the slave that springs from the reciprocity of freedoms.222 
 
In the first part of this passage, Beauvoir repeats the notion put forward in Hegel that 
self-knowledge requires that the self splits into object and consciousness.223 In the Ethics 
of Ambiguity, she recasts this splitting up of the self into consciousness and object in 
terms of two opposing realities: immanence and transcendence: “Man knows and thinks 
this tragic ambivalence which the animal and the plant merely undergo. A new paradox is 
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thereby introduced into his destiny. ‘Rational animal,’ ‘thinking reed,’ he escapes from 
his natural condition without, however, freeing himself from it.”224 While in this passage 
and in the first part of the one above, Beauvoir references consciousness and nature, the 
domains of rest and life could also be mapped onto the self as both “Mitsein and 
separation.” Then, she moves on to reference the part of the master-slave dialectic where 
recognition from another self-consciousness is deemed necessary in order to satisfy the 
self’s notion of itself that it is an autonomous being. Here, Beauvoir aligns men with 
Hegel’s master who emerges from the life and death struggle and demands unceasing, 
nonreciprocal recognition. She describes woman as man’s ideal slave-like consciousness 
because she consents to her role as slave; furthermore, she is a consciousness that can be 
possessed through sexual intercourse. Woman is the closest that man can come to 
controlling the consciousness of the Other and securing long-standing recognition.  
 Importantly, Beauvoir’s analysis of the master differs from Hegel’s because the 
latter describes the master as desiring to be constantly affirmed for his sovereignty and 
power. The description Beauvoir gives above emphasizes that man, from the start, desires 
“restfulness.” I believe that Beauvoir’s analysis here falls in line with the claims that she 
makes in “Pyrrhus and Cineas” about the self’s need for validation. Man desires to 
possess and control the being who has the ability to give him unceasing validation. 
Beauvoir suggests here that what motivates recognition is not the desire to be affirmed as 
a freedom, bound by nothing; instead, the human tendency to flee one’s separation, or 
freedom, towards a state without conflict is the true impetus. Here, Beauvoir provides a 
rich account of a common psychological reaction to the way in which the self exists 
ontologically outside of itself. Furthermore, discourses of masculinity certainly play a 
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role in man’s initial drive to secure validation from woman. When man hopes to secure 
recognition of himself through possessing woman in the sexual act, he isn’t seeking 
recognition of himself as a gender-neutral, abstract freedom; he seeks recognition of 
himself as a masculine subject. 
Pointing ahead to Hegel’s notion of mutual recognition, and re-casting it in her 
own terms, Beauvoir writes: 
The other is present only if the other is himself present to himself: that is, 
true alterity is a consciousness separated from my own and identical to it. 
It is the existence of other men that wrests each man from his immanence 
and enables him to accomplish the truth of his being, to accomplish 
himself as transcendence, as flight toward the object, as a project. But this 
foreign freedom, which confirms my freedom, also enters into conflict 
with it: this is the tragedy of the unhappy consciousness; each 
consciousness seeks to posit itself alone as sovereign subject. Each one 
tries to accomplish itself by reducing the other to slavery…The conflict 
can be overcome by the free recognition of each individual in the other, 
each one positing both itself and the other as object and as subject in a 
reciprocal movement…this is where he is in his truth: but this truth is a 
struggle endlessly begun, endlessly abolished….unable to accomplish 
himself in solitude, man is ceaselessly in jeopardy in his relations with his 
peers: his life is a difficult enterprise whose success is never assured.225 
 
While Beauvoir asserted above that the Other is necessary for the self to know itself, she 
now adds, following Hegel, that only an Other who is free to affirm or reject the self can 
confer recognition. This passage also reveals how in Beauvoir’s retelling of the master-
slave dialectic, she adds her own original ideas. For instance, she stresses that the human 
condition is one in which the struggle between the master and the slave is continually 
playing out. This is a matter of emphasis rather than an outright difference with Hegel. 
The implication of Hegel’s description of mutual recognition in §184 is that one’s self-
relation – the fact that one sees oneself as an “immediate,” independent being – depends 
upon the mediation of another free consciousness and is thus always susceptible to 
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failure. Rather than proposing a new idea, Beauvoir emphasizes the vulnerable nature of 
the relationship that Hegel introduces. Beauvoir’s description of assuming one’s freedom 
involves admitting that the struggle for recognition is ongoing because the self itself is a 
“negativity” and a “lack”: 
In Hegelian terms it might be said that we have here a negation of the 
negation by which the positive is re-established. Man makes himself a 
lack, but he can deny the lack as lack and affirm himself as a positive 
existence…However, rather than being a Hegelian act of surpassing, it is a 
matter of a conversion. For in Hegel the surpassed terms are preserved 
only as abstract moments, whereas we consider that existence still remains 
a negativity in the positive affirmation of itself.226  
 
Here, Beauvoir asserts against Hegel that the process for seeking justification and 
self-consciousness is continual. In Hegel, Beauvoir sees a finality in the synthesis. 
However, her own view is that the self is always ambiguous; the distance between self-
consciousness and the body – the lack – is an ontological reality that must be affirmed 
along with the contingency of all moral choices.227  
Beauvoir recasts Hegel’s idea that each consciousness is both a subject and an 
object for the other in terms of her understanding of the opposing realms of 
transcendence and immanence, or existence and being. Beyond Hegel’s claim, that the 
Other is necessary for self-knowledge, Beauvoir writes that the Other is also the means 
through which the self becomes truly human. The self is fundamentally “a flight toward 
the object,” or a  project. Therefore, realizing that her being is not fixed or given is the 
task of the human being, according to Beauvoir. Given that the self, according to 
Beauvoir, is “unable to accomplish himself in solitude,” it seems that the Other provides 
the self with the impetus to act, and consequently to realize his or her transcendence 
                                               
226 Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 13.  
 
227 Ibid., 13-14. 
 105 
 
through action. While what appears to be at stake in Hegel’s discussion of recognition is 
the self’s desire to see itself as “self-certain” and “essential,” for Beauvoir, recognition 
allows individuals to become truly human by inciting them to engage in projects: “It is 
the existence of other men that wrests each man from his immanence and enables him to 
accomplish the truth of his being, to accomplish himself as transcendence, as flight 
toward the object, as a project.” While Hegel would agree that the Other incites self-
consciousness, Beauvoir goes beyond these statements by asserting that the Other incites 
the self to engage in freely-chosen projects, which is ultimately how one “accomplishes” 
oneself as a human being.  
However, as we saw above, the human tendency to force recognition from an 
Other that is subjugated by the self is also frequently at work. Furthermore, as Bauer 
rightly points out, Beauvoir adds to Hegel’s discussion of the self’s encounter with the 
Other that mutual recognition entails more than solely recognizing the Other’s 
subjectivity or freedom; it must include acknowledging that the Other and itself are 
always both subject and object, or immanence and transcendence.228 This is significant 
because it expands on Hegel’s discussion of the first encounter with another self-
consciousness when self-consciousness realizes that the Other is both an object before it, 
but also identical to it, with regard to its ability to confer recognition.229 Beauvoir 
emphasizes that mutual recognition isn’t just about recognizing the Other’s freedom; it 
also concerns the self-realization that one is continually an object of consciousness for 
the Other and thus vulnerable to the Other’s judgment. While Hegel states that self-
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consciousness is made into an object by the Other, Beauvoir deepens this claim. 
According to her, when the human being “assumes” her existence, she simultaneously 
“renounces all possession, because possession is a way of searching for being.”230 While 
it seems clear that Beauvoir means that the authentic individual withholds from viewing 
herself as the embodiment of a static self-concept, it appears that this statement also 
pertains to the quelling of the drive to control or halt the Other’s continual capacity to see 
her as an object. The unstable human situation prompts Beauvoir to write that human 
beings are always “in jeopardy” with Others because the Other’s consciousness 
recurrently turns one into an object. Moreover, it is the Other that incites my action and 
holds the key to recognizing my act. 
 
Beauvoir’s Use of Narratives in Second Sex 
 
 Now that we have examined Beauvoir’s original notion of selfhood, her 
fundamental interest in intersubjectivity, and her use of the master-slave dialectic in The 
Second Sex, we are in a position to show how her use of narrative descriptions in The 
Second Sex make the model of the self that is put forward in Hegel’s master-slave 
dialectic more concrete. First we will explore the role that narrative plays in her own 
work in general. As the narratives presented are taken from literature as well as self-
reports, Beauvoir’s own discussion of the way in which narratives aid existential 
philosophy in “Literature and Metaphysics” (1946) is helpful when analyzing the 
function of narrative in The Second Sex. Summarizing Beauvoir, Margaret Simons writes:  
Beauvoir describes the goal of philosophy as a “disclosure” of 
metaphysical reality, which she describes in Heideggerian terms as 
grasping one’s ‘being-in-the-world,’ that is, one’s experience of embodied 
freedom and abandonment, of the opacity of things and the resistance of 
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foreign consciousness. Beauvoir argues that since the metaphysical 
meaning of human events and objects in the real world cannot be grasped 
by the pure understanding, but can only be disclosed within an overall 
relation of action and emotion, philosophers must reject system building 
and turn to the novel.231 
 
Simons rightly points out that for Beauvoir, narratives present a wider scope of human 
experience than philosophical essays by describing action as it unfolds as well as the 
subjective meaning that unfurls out of situations and events. Applying this reasoning to 
my own project means that a philosophical theory of selfhood succeeds in achieving the 
goal of philosophy – i.e., the disclosure of lived experience – when it is demonstrated in 
narrative format. However, Beauvoir by no means suggests that we should discard 
philosophical theory; indeed, her own work describes human experience in terms of 
theoretical constructs (e.g. transcendence and immanence). Rather, she advocates the 
combination of theory and literature: 
It is not by chance if existentialist thought today attempts to express itself 
sometimes by theoretical treatises and sometimes by fiction; it is because 
it is an effort to reconcile the objective and the subjective, the absolute and 
the relative, the timeless and the historical. 232 
 
Following along with Hegel’s phenomenological premise that all perception includes 
consciousness of the object, Beauvoir asserts that narratives display this insight 
concretely. The subjective element of human experience is captured in narrative form 
because here we see action as it unfolds and affects a particular human being in a 
particular situation. While Beauvoir describes Hegel’s notion of recognition as “too 
abstract” in “Pyrrhus and Cineas,” she praises Hegel’s own use of literature in the 
Phenomenology three years later in “Literature and Metaphysics.” 
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…when spirit has not accomplished itself but is only in the process of 
accomplishing itself, Hegel must confer on it a certain carnal thickness in 
order to recount adequately its adventures. In the Phenomenology of 
Spirit, Hegel resorts to literary myths such as Don Juan and Faust, because 
the drama of the unhappy consciousness finds its truth only in a concrete 
and historical world.233  
 
Beauvoir references an instance in which Hegel’s unhappy consciousness comes to 
realize that it is more than immaterial existence: “there has entered into it the Spirit of the 
earth.” The unhappy consciousness comes to understand that its body allows it to actually 
exist.234 Hegel’s allusion to Faust when describing the unhappy consciousness’ 
realization is significant for Beauvoir’s claims about literature’s ability to capture lived 
experience because it shows that Hegel turns to narrative to effectively demonstrate 
particular, bodily existence. The passages above suggest that, for Beauvoir, philosophical 
claims (like her model of the self in relation) are both closest to reality and easily grasped 
when they appear in the life-like setting of a narrative that includes descriptions of a 
settings, relations amongst characters, action, and interior monologues.  
 Now that we have surveyed Beauvoir’s use of narratives in general, I will turn to 
narratives drawn from a variety of chapters in The Second Sex in order to illustrate the 
former claim. First I will show how Beauvoir takes the structure of finding oneself in the 
Other from Hegel and goes on to explore psychological reactions to this structure. 
Starting with “Childhood,” we see a vivid illustration of the “fundamental hostility”235 
towards the Other that exists in consciousness itself in a passage about a daughter’s 
rebellion from the novel Sido by Colette Audry. While Hegel provides an outline of the 
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outcomes of a meeting between two consciousnesses, Beauvoir provides an illustration of 
the experience of a Hegelian struggle for sovereignty, i.e., what it feels like from the 
inside: 
I wouldn’t have known how to answer the truth, however innocent it was, 
because I never felt innocent in front of Mama. She was the essential 
adult, and I resented her for it as long as I was not yet cured. There was 
deep inside me a kind of tumultuous and fierce sore that I was sure of 
always finding raw…I didn’t think she was too strict; nor that she hadn’t 
the right. I thought no, no, no with all my strength. I didn’t even blame her 
for her authority or for her orders or arbitrary defenses but for wanting to 
subjugate me. She said it sometimes: when she didn’t say it, her eyes and 
voice did. Or else she told ladies that children are much more docile after 
a punishment. These words stuck in my throat, unforgettable…This anger 
was my guilt in front of her and also my shame in front of me…living the 
silent madness that made me only repeat, ‘Subjugate, docile, punishment, 
humiliation,’ I wouldn’t be subjugated.236 
 
Here, we see the strong desire that exists in both the mother and the child to be 
recognized as an autonomous being; this is evident in the Mother’s desire to experience 
herself as Master and the daughter’s resistance to being reduced to slave consciousness. 
What stands out most strongly is the idea that the self is deeply affected by – and here 
resentful of – the Other’s power to judge. The inner and outer struggle against being 
reduced to an object (against one’s will) before a powerful Other is displayed in rich 
detail here. Aside from illustrating how the self feels guilt and resentment when faced 
with an Other who struggles to achieve mastery over it, Beauvoir’s philosophical point 
seems to be that as a self, we are constituted to be susceptible to the Other’s judgment in 
such a way that it deeply affects our own self-relation (e.g., “I never felt innocent in front 
of Mama). While Hegel claims that the Other mediates our self-certainty and feeling of 
autonomy, Beauvoir’s account of how the Other impacts our self-relation is weighted 
more towards desiring recognition of one’s worth and value. 
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 Beauvoir’s interest in the recognition of self-worth is also evident when Beauvoir 
quotes Sophia Tolstoy’s diary: “The feeling of being indispensable to them [my children] 
is my greatest happiness…My only resources, my only weapons to establish equality 
between us [my husband and I], are the children, energy, joy, health…”237 Sophia 
Tolstoy, here, describes how her relation to her children gives her a sense of worth; she is 
necessary and “indispensable” because her children esteem her as such. Here we see how 
her self-relation is mediated through her children’s recognition. Furthermore, the children 
become a way of increasing her worth next to her husband. Being their mother makes her 
more powerful in the eyes of her husband and color his perception of her. Ultimately, this 
passage and the ones that follow reveal that the self depends upon another consciousness 
in order to relate to itself; the self looks to the Other for confirmation of its worth. 
 Moving away from Beauvoir’s discussion of mother-child relations, I will now 
turn to analyzing a major theme in The Second Sex, namely the male gaze. To this end, I 
will examine women’s descriptions of the male gaze drawn from first person experience 
and literature. While Hegel’s master-slave dialectic centers on self-consciousness’ desire 
to be seen as all-powerful, free, and dependent upon only itself, Beauvoir focuses on how 
women come to internalize a different drive, namely, the desire to be seen as a desirable 
sexual object by masculine eyes.  
 
The Male Gaze 
Because girls are taught to desire recognition as  women, the experience of the 
gaze of the Other takes on a more determinate role in the lives of women than in the lives 
                                               
237 Ibid., 565. 
 
 111 
 
of men. In the chapter on childhood, Beauvoir writes that boys and girls both seek 
recognition of themselves as objects from their parents.238 In this chapter, she details the 
way that the drive for recognition develops. For both boys and girls, the gaze and 
recognition of the Other confers a sense of reality and worth on the subject.239 When a 
child first recognizes himself in the mirror and realizes that he is a separate, autonomous 
being Beauvoir writes that he flees this reality “and tries to compensate for this 
catastrophe by alienating his existence into an image whose reality and value will be 
established by others.”240 Beauvoir goes on to write:  
…the passivity that essentially characterizes the ‘feminine’ woman is a 
trait that develops in her from her earliest years…[for the boy,] it is by 
doing that he makes himself be, in one single movement. On the contrary, 
for the woman there is, from the start, a conflict between her autonomous 
existence and her ‘being-other’; she is taught that to please, she must try to 
please, must make herself object.241 
 
While both sexes strive for intersubjective recognition, the boy gains his through 
performing transcendent activities through which he experiences himself as a being that 
overcomes obstacles in the world. Beauvoir writes that boys receive recognition and 
experience their own autonomy for climbing trees, playing sports, roughhousing with 
friends, etc. because such activities fall in line with discourses of masculinity. 
Conversely, the girl is encouraged to live out discourses of femininity; she is taught to be 
a “living doll.” She must wait for others to notice and praise her appearance. The girl 
experiences her own human agency but she is aware of being recognized not for this 
agency but for herself as object. The consciousness of being a passive body before others 
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effects a sharp split between her freedom and her image before others. The girl’s actions 
can no longer be performed fluidly because her image performs them. That is, if she 
hopes to be recognized, her actions become burdened with the way that they could be 
received by others. She must “try to please.” While it is unclear what percentage of the 
time young girls comport themselves this way, Beauvoir believes that 1) young girls are 
aware that they must try to offer up a pleasing image of themselves to Others and 2) This 
tendency increases in adolescence and can lead to pathological disassociation.  
Beauvoir describes a young woman’s description of the “shock” of feeling herself 
seen by another as a woman for the first time. Beauvoir summarizes this experience: 
“The little girl feels that her body is escaping her, that it is no longer the clear expression 
of her individuality; it becomes foreign to her; and at the same moment, she is grasped by 
others as a thing: on the street, eyes follow her…”242  This “doubling” produces anguish 
but the girl will soon discover the power in being the seductive object. The excitement 
and approval that the girl sees in men’s eyes invite her to believe the myth that woman is 
an “enchantress.” Beauvoir writes that the connection between the man’s arousal and her 
own seduction is particularly strong for the girl.243  
The woman’s consciousness of a split between herself as subject and herself as 
object is often maintained throughout her entire life. Due to the enormous pressures 
exerted on her to be recognized by men, the heterosexual woman dedicates an immense 
amount of time worrying about and shaping the object/image that escapes herself as 
subject. In a sense, the young woman internalizes the male gaze so that she is always 
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acting before him; all of her movements become burdened by play-acting rather than 
unselfconscious dedication to a “freely-chosen” project. 
Beauvoir writes “… in the solitude of her room, in salons where she tries to attract the 
gaze of others, she does not separate man’s desires from the love of her own self.”244 
Here we see clearly that if Beauvoir is correct in her analysis of a young woman’s 
experience then her self-worth is contingent upon male sexual recognition. However, she 
seeks/receives recognition from a man for being an object, not a subject. Again, Beauvoir 
expands Hegel’s discussion of the self that seeks recognition in the master-slave dialectic 
by showing how women are more conscious of themselves as objects before men, given 
the fact that the avenues of recognition are restricted due to their historical situation.  
Citing Sidonie-Gabrielle Colette’s Vagabond and the poet Cecile Sauvage’s 
reflections on her early married life, Beauvoir describes woman’s project, to become a 
desirable object, in more detail in the passages below: 
I must confess that, in allowing this man to return tomorrow, I was giving 
way to my desire to keep, not an admirer, not a friend, but an eager 
spectator of my life and my person. “One has to get terribly old,” said 
Margot to me one day, “before one can give up the vanity of living in the 
presence of someone else.245 
 
When you are not there, it seems not even worthwhile to greet the day; 
everything that happens to me seems lifeless, I am no more than a little 
empty dress thrown on a chair.246 
 
Here Beauvoir describes women’s need for “a spectator”; her identity and her actions 
only attain importance when they are observed by male eyes. While Beauvoir’s focus is 
woman’s relation to the male gaze, it is worth noting that she also cites passages that 
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confirm that man’s self-relation is also colored by the gaze of the Other. She points to 
Montherlant’s autobiographical novel, Le Songe: 
Alban repelling Dominique because he sees a fool in the mirror illustrates 
this enslavement: it is in the eyes of others that one is a fool. The arrogant 
Alban subjects his heart to this collective consciousness that he 
despises.247 (Le Songe) 
 
The pull that the Other has over the self and the extent to which this power is internalized 
is exemplified in this passage. However, while Alban sees himself through the eyes of 
Others in this passage, there is no mention of him surrendering his subjectivity by 
devoting himself to a project of seeking recognition of himself as an object.  
 For Hegel, one can’t achieve self-certainty, nor can one feel that one is an 
“essential,” i.e. free, without the recognition of the Other’s consciousness. As we have 
seen above, for Beauvoir, discourses prompt us – especially woman, given that the 
discourses prize her passivity and appearance rather than her acts – to seek recognition of 
static self-concepts rather than our transcendence. This doesn’t mean that the individuals 
that Beauvoir describe don’t seek recognition of their own autonomy in a disguised way 
through trying to force the Other to affirm them for a self-concept of their own choosing. 
In my view, the deeper point that Beauvoir makes is that social-historical discourses and 
individual freedom can’t be neatly unraveled. While  Hegel makes this point in his own 
way by showing that the subject seeks recognition of the modern notion of individuality 
(Selbstandigkeit), Beauvoir claims that fulfillment lies in uniting the life that one has 
chosen with the discourses that one has internalized since childhood. While Hegel 
doesn’t address the role of gendered discourses, Beauvoir shows how recognition differs 
according to which gendered discourses one has been subjected to. In Beauvoir’s view, 
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the self unequivocally needs others to accomplish itself; others incite us to realize and 
fulfill our humanity through our own projects. However, Beauvoir also gives us the 
resources to think about how our “own projects” are not entirely our own. The weight of 
our historical, gendered situation cannot be denied.  
 
Conclusion 
I have sought to show how Beauvoir’s original theory of the self in relation can be 
clearly grasped when her own project is teased out from Hegel’s in the master-slave 
dialectic. Following Green and Roffey, I agree that Hegel’s dialectic depicts two 
masculine subjects who seek recognition of themselves as Selbstandigkeit.248 Beauvoir 
takes Hegel’s structure of the struggle for recognition and applies it to male-female 
relations; she shows how women often seek recognition of themselves as objects due to 
the influence of discourses of femininity. However, Beauvoir thinks that men, too, desire 
to be recognized for fixed self-concepts due to the role that masculine discourses play in 
their life. According to Green and Roffey, Beauvoir locates woman as the dependent 
consciousness, or bondsman, who only affirms and man as the independent 
consciousness who experiences his own autonomy through the dependent consciousness’ 
recognition. However, if we look to the recurring notion of alienation in Beauvoir’s 
corpus, we will see that both men and women exercise their freedom by seeking to flee it 
and alienating themselves into fixed self-concepts. As Bauer points out, woman by no 
means lives only to affirm man; she doesn’t fit the structure of Hegel’s dependent 
consciousness because woman doesn’t purely recognize. She, too, demands to be 
recognized. However, her demand is to be recognized as an object of desire. While Bauer 
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locates anguish before one’s freedom as the key motivation for seeking recognition of 
oneself as an object, I think Beauvoir’s transformation of Hegel’s master-slave dialectic 
lies more in the fact that the weight of the “situated” aspect of one’s identity is the 
motivating factor in the search for recognition. 
Furthermore, while Hegel’s master-slave dialectic moves toward the goal of 
becoming certain of one’s autonomy, Beauvoir suggests that recognition pertains more to 
our inescapable need to be validated in our interactions with others.  Recalling the 
passages about infancy, human beings are set up to desire the Mitsein. The goal for 
Beauvoir is to relate authentically to the Mitsein by maintaining that one is also 
“separation.” As quoted above: 
We need others in order for our existence to become founded and 
necessary. It is not a matter of making recognized in us the pure abstract 
form of the self [moi] as Hegel believes. I intend to save my being in the 
world, such as it is realized in my actions, my works, my life. Only 
through these objects that I make exist in the world can I communicate 
with others. If I make nothing exist, there is neither communication nor 
justification.249 
 
Recognition is not about gaining an inner feeling of certainty from another that one does 
in fact possess freedom. For Beauvoir, one’s self-relation remains in an intersubjective 
space of action and communication. However, the fact that the self is vulnerable through 
existing utterly outside itself, as a being in the world, leaves open the possibility that one 
can enter into relationships with Others that justify one’s existence. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
THE OTHER WITHIN: 
THE RELATIONAL SELF IN NISHIDA’S CORPUS  
 
The dialectical process may be conceived from the self determination of this world of 
reality which is both one qua many and many qua one. It may therefore be seen from the 
world of the I and the Thou. The self is the affirmation of the self negation of this world of 
reality.250 
 
I think that the notion of the individual’s being an individual only in relation to other 
individuals has been neglected. As I have often said, the unity of the person is not a mere 
continuity but a continuity of discontinuity.251 
 
At first glance, the relational self does not appear to be a recurrent subject within 
Nishida’s corpus. From his first work, An Inquiry into the Good, to his last essay, “The 
Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview,” Nishida is concerned with presenting a 
non-dualistic logic that captures experience. Wary of dualisms like subject and object and 
idealism and materialism, Nishida describes experience as that which unfolds through 
action, expression, and perception in the place between consciousness and matter.252 
However, for Nishida, true reality must be understood from both the side of the subject 
and from the side of the objective world. He highlights the agency and force of the world 
which determines the subject. “The real…does not entirely transcend the person, for it 
always retains the meaning of determining us. True reality is that which fully determines 
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252 Nishida calls originary experience “pure” because drawing the line between subject and object occurs 
after the original unity of “just perceiving.” For example, before reflection, there is just a rose. Only after 
the initial perception do I add onto experience the concepts, “rose” and “self” as well as the abstraction “I 
perceive the rose.” See Nishida, “Pure Experience” in An Inquiry into the Good, trans. by Masao Abe and 
Christopher Ives (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 3-10 (NKZ 1: 9-18). 
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us – indeed, which determines us from our very depths.”253 Ultimately, there is no inside 
or outside to experience for Nishida; the world and the self are mutually self-determining. 
Nishida describes reality through his logic of absolutely contradictory self-identity (Jpn. 
zettai mujunteki jiko dôitsu絶対矛盾的自己同一), which holds that all beings are empty 
of intrinsic essence and formed through their relations to other beings. Thus, speaking of 
the “world” and the “self” as distinct entities is misleading; rather, there is only a single, 
interdependent reality. 
Given Nishida’s interest in logic and ontology, coupled with the fact that he 
includes few examples from everyday human experience in his voluminous writings, we 
may be surprised that intersubjectivity is a point of focus for Nishida. However, 
following Steve Odin,254 I argue that the relational self is an important and recurrent 
theme in Nishida’s project. Indeed, the “I-Thou” dimension of selfhood is examined in 
numerous works throughout the different phases of his thought, including Inquiry into the 
Good (1911), Fundamental Problems of Philosophy (1933-4), “The Standpoint of Active 
Intuition” (1935) “Human Being” (1938), “I and Thou,” (1932) “Love of Self-Love of 
Other and the Dialectic” (1932), and “The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview” 
(1945). 
In this chapter I will seek to show how the intersubjective self is an important 
motif within Nishida’s overall philosophical project, as it broadens the reader of 
Nishida’s understanding of key aspects of his thought, including the self and its basis in 
nothingness, place, and the historical world (with reference to his notions of expression 
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and creative activity). Aside from what the relational self can tell us about other themes 
in Nishida’s philosophical project, Nishida’s view offers insight into a vision of the self 
that is a confluence of relations. The implications of Nishida’s view is that the self is 
always tied to an intersubjective space. The deepest reality of the self is Other. Nishida 
maintains that the self is expressive and free, yet he simultaneously implies that the self 
does not possess itself. First, I will provide a brief background of key concepts within 
Nishida’s thought, namely, his view of the self, place, and expressive activity within the 
historical world. Secondly, I will examine Nishida’s discussion of the self in relation by 
investigating three aspects of this discussion: 1) living-qua-dying, 2) recognition, and 3) 
expression. In this section I will tease out Hegel’s influence on Nishida’s view of 
recognition. I will also point to Watsuji Tetsuro’s view of the human person as 
“betweenness” in order to clarify Nishida’s view of the intersubjective space of selfhood. 
Lastly, I will discuss the implications of Nishida’s view of the self in relation with 
reference to vulnerability, possession, and agency.  
Additionally, as mentioned in the introduction, concentrating on the “Thou 
structure” will help rectify the overemphasis, in American Nishida scholarship, on the 
self as pure experience and absolute nothingness and the avoidance of his discussion of 
the social self.255 Nishida’s descriptions of the self as absolute nothingness are persistent 
throughout his philosophical project. However, his way of capturing the self that is an 
expression of absolute nothingness, or emptiness, is distinct in the texts and essays listed 
above. In these works, he concretizes what it means to say that the self is a conduit for the 
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as something individual. However, in his later essays Nishida clarifies that the self is always social. See 
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world’s expression by calling attention to the way that social-historical self-other 
relations are constitutive of individuality. 
While Nishida doesn’t often cite Hegel directly when he discusses recognition 
and I-Thou relations, Hegel’s influence on his thought seems evident in statements like: 
“The I becomes an I through recognition by a Thou, just as a Thou becomes a Thou only 
through recognition by an I.”256 This vein of thought runs throughout Nishida’s entire 
philosophical project in his repetition of “affirmation-qua-negation” and “continuity of 
discontinuity,” which echo the idea that individuality emerges through a field of 
relation.257 Nishida also prompts the reader to realize the mutual dependence of self and 
Other, but instead of taking this idea directly from Hegel, he draws on the Buddhist 
teaching of self-realization through emptiness. Hegel was clearly on Nishida’s mind as he 
considered the question of intersubjectivity due to the fact that he published “Hegel’s 
Dialectic from my Point of View” one year prior to his essay “I and Thou.”  
According to Peter Suares, Hegel’s main influence on Nishida’s work can be 
glimpsed in the allusions to Hegel’s concrete logic in his own efforts to outline logic that 
captures a unified reality that overcomes the division between subject and object. Here, 
Hegel’s influence on Nishida’s thought with reference to the unity between thought and 
being is evident. For example, concerning his maiden work, Nishida writes “From the 
beginning, the idea of the spontaneous self-development of pure experience in An Inquiry 
into the Good contained in a fundamental way also Hegel’s idea of the development of 
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the concrete concept.”258 Nishida’s later works on the historical world259 stem from the 
same desire for unity; he intends to portray worldly interactions without recourse to a 
separation between world, self, and the Other. For example, he attempts to show how 
“expression” (hyōgen) transcends the dichotomies that the abstract concepts of matter or 
mind posit:  
The world of expression is the world of the I and Thou…it is neither the 
world of objectivity, the world of objects, nor the world of subjectivity, 
consciousness. Again, the world of expression is neither the world of the I 
nor the world of the Thou, but the world of the I and Thou.260 
 
While the subject of Nishida’s engagement with Hegel is vast, given my focus on the 
relational self, I will only examine how the notion of recognition that emerges in the 
master-slave section of the Phenomenology of Spirit influenced Nishida’s discussion of 
the relational selfhood.  
 I will now turn to examining three key aspects of Nishida’s thought which will 
help us to understand his overall vision of the self: the nothingness at the base of the self, 
place, and the historical world. 
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Nishida’s Model of the Self 
 
 
Transcendence and Absolutely Self-Contradictory Identity 
 
In “Human Being” (1938), Nishida writes of the self, “it is not within the self 
itself that it possesses self identity.”261 Nishida’s logic is tied to the Buddhist doctrine of 
emptiness and interdependent co-origination (pratītyasamutpāda). These doctrines 
signify that the self does not produce its own identity because it is empty of intrinsic 
essence. While we may posit the existence of a self through the workings of the 
conceptual mind, the self itself is ontologically fictitious. However, although the self does 
not exist as an unchanging core entity, human beings do possess distinct identities. The 
self – and in the Buddhist worldview, all things – gains its identity through its relations to 
other things. Using the example of a tree, the doctrine of interdependent co-origination 
claims that the tree does not have an individual essence; its identity is formed through the 
sun, water, and soil that make it what it is. Nishida describes his own way of conceiving 
of identity through the term “predicate logic.” While “object logic” views a being as a 
reified entity or substance, “predicate logic” assumes that identity is not something 
“interior,” self-generating, or self-sustaining. 262  
Nishida’s way of envisioning the self may relate to our common sense 
understanding of our own identities. For instance, when we reflect on our identities, we 
do not discover a reified essence. Instead, we find a world that we are engaged in, i.e. we 
understand ourselves through an environment, a family, a workplace, etc. The self that 
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one is and the self that one knows emerges from what is not self. Nishida writes, “If an 
object is considered as merely that which opposes the self spatially, the self is no more 
than a thing, and a relationship of this sort is a relationship of things.”263 For Nishida, 
identity is permeable; it issues from the thorough interaction of beings. Nishida thus 
characterizes human actions as having the character of a contradictory identity.264 We see 
here that all of reality follows the pattern of absolutely contradictory self-identity (Jpn. 
zettai mujunteki jiko dôitsu絶対矛盾的自己同一); all beings are groundless and gain 
their identity through self-negation. Here, “self-negation” means that the self is a worldly 
being both in its consciousness and in its actions; it isn’t self-contained. Our 
consciousness is always of something just as our actions involve acting on the historical, 
material world. Both entail moving outside of oneself and having our being in that which 
transcends us.    
While all selfhood originates from what is “other,” in his last essay, Nishida 
focuses on the absolute other at the base of the self:  
We are contradictory existence. We reflect the world within ourselves and 
yet have our selfhood in the absolute other.”265  
 
At the bottom of the self there is something that utterly transcends us and 
this something is neither foreign nor external to us.266  
 
If something is empty of intrinsic essence, then at its base it is empty. Nishida uses the 
term “absolute nothingness” to refer to the true reality of the self. While we often act 
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from a place that believes in its individuality and volition, Nishida asserts that this is not 
the only way of conceiving of ourselves. Religious-ethical reality originates from a space 
where absolute nothingness is affirmed and becomes the basis of one’s actions. It cannot 
rest upon believing in the power of one’s individual will. Here it is important to note that 
Nishida’s project goes further than offering a model of selfhood. Rather, he encourages 
the reader to realize that she or he is not a self-sustaining individual. He attempts to 
invoke a fundamental transformation where the self discovers that it is truly itself only 
through its own self-negation; it has its being in that which transcends it. Thus, it is 
important to note that Nishida’s use of the term self often reflects both the self as absolute 
nothingness and the self as a particular existence. 
 
Basho and the Historical World 
Nishida expands his philosophical vision of the absolute interpenetration of self 
and world through his notion of place (basho 場所 ) in the mid-1920s. The metaphor of 
basho provides a “logical foundation” for his earlier work by replacing language of the 
“subject” with the new notion of a “field” of consciousness.267 In this account, 
consciousness is not the property of an independent, self-sustaining individual. In order to 
capture this sentiment, and to articulate action without neglecting it, Nishida describes 
experience as a place or field.  
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John Maraldo suggests that, within Nishida’s project, basho “functions as the 
field that is the opening [or non-dualism] of world and self.”268 In Nishida’s words, “The 
individual determines itself only in relation to other individuals. The idea of a unique 
self-determining individual has no meaning. In order for the individual to determine itself 
there must first be what I have called the determination of a place “basho”, i.e. a unity of 
absolute contradictories.”269 Any remnant of the identity of a being as closed off or self-
directing is eradicated by the concept of basho. Nishida’s insight is that such a way of 
conceiving of reality shifts the focus away from a notion of agency that is tied to an 
individual subject.  
[The] self-determination of absolute space…does not signify a place in 
which things exist. It must rather signify a place in which things are 
mutually determining, which is, as it were, a physical space of personal 
action. The mutual determination of things also implies that the place is 
self-determining.270 
 
Nishida’s notion of “expression” (hyōgen), as that which takes place between two human 
beings and cannot be reduced to the will of merely one, helps to illustrate what he means 
by basho’s “self-determination.” Agency doesn’t issue from a subject; rather, basho 
becomes its site. The reader’s understanding of agency is thus radically transformed; the 
subject does not merely stand against and act upon nature. Nishida’s ontology consists of 
the mutual determination of self and world. 
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Expressive Activity and the Historical World 
Nishida’s later works are guided by the desire to further develop his theories of 
basho and absolutely self-contradictory identity by affirming the agency of the historical 
world, i.e. how social structures and past events act on the self. In particular, Nishida 
draws attention to human beings as acting beings. Human beings are engaged in 
production (e.g. making food, books, art, buildings, and children). What is produced then 
becomes a “public” or “historical thing,” and is thus capable of acting on its producer and 
the wider community.271 Modes of production throughout time construct our identities. 
Our bodies are produced by our parents, and the institutions and man-made buildings and 
objects that surround us make up our world. Thus, if we want to speak of the identity of a 
person, we must locate it between the ideal and the material realms. We act on the world 
by transforming our ideas into actions and physical objects that become public. The 
world of things, made by other subjects, acts on us as well. Therefore, we are “made” by 
our own “making” and the “making” of others. John Maraldo writes: “Similarly, we 
conceptualize the historical world sometimes as produced out of nature by human work 
and activity, sometimes as producing the individuals who interact in it, but we [according 
to Nishida] should think of it primarily as the mediating place of interactive creation.”272 
Here we see directly how Nishida’s discussion of the historical world represents his 
desire to concretize his earlier theory of place by including action and production. 
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Nishida often uses the example of an artist and her work to illustrate the 
connection between “made” and “making.”273 An artist is born into a particular time 
frame which determines the techniques she is taught. This long history of style acts on 
her. Yet she can also transform the traditional forms through the creation of a new work. 
This work in turn shapes her identity; in other words, the work is integrated into her 
identity. Nishida emphasizes that the human being is homo faber; production is an 
integral part of human existence.274 However, creativity doesn’t emerge from the will of 
the self alone. Rather, the world expresses itself through the self: “The individual self is a 
singularity…it is a point of production.”275 
Nishida uses “expression” (hyōgen) to refer to the non-dual relation between I and 
Thou in particular as well as the historical world in general. Driven towards presenting a 
unified view of reality that avoids dichotomies like subject and object, idealism and 
materialism, Nishida uses the word expression to refer to the self’s creative activity that 
occurs in a basho of relation. Expression doesn’t merely refer to the existence of 
interrelated activity, however; Gereon Kopf highlights how expression entails the 
“unself-conscious encounter” between the self and the Other.276 Therefore, expressive 
activity is intersubjective. Recalling the earlier quotation, "The world of expression is 
neither the world of objectivity, the world of objects, nor the world of subjectivity, 
consciousness. Again, the world of expression is neither the world of the I nor the world 
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of the Thou, but the world of the I and Thou."277 Therefore, the “thoroughly self-
expressive” self necessarily entails an intersubjective field of meaning and influence. As 
we saw in the last chapter, Beauvoir echoed these sentiments as well as provided an 
analysis of the intersubjective life world. 
 Now that I have provided background for key aspects within Nishida’s thought I 
will turn to Nishida’s discussion of the I-Thou dimension of selfhood. My discussion will 
approach this topic through three aspects of this concept: 1) living-qua-dying, 2) 
recognition, and 3) expression. In the first section, I will focus on one text, Fundamental 
Problems of Philosophy, as it lays the groundwork for understanding Nishida’s ontology 
together with his view of the relational self. 
 
The Relational Self: Living-qua-dying, Recognition, and Expressive Activity 
 
 
Living-qua-dying in Fundamental Problems of Philosophy: The Anxiety of Nothingness, 
Risk, and Vulnerability 
 
Before I begin my investigation into the concept “living-qua-dying” in 
Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, I will provide a very brief orientation to the text. 
Nishida begins Chapter One of the second half of Fundamental Problems of Philosophy 
by considering what reality is. He affirms that it must include the subject; the actual 
world is phenomenological in that one cannot step outside of it. It entails both 
consciousness and matter. Nishida’s route to understanding reality is through the 
formulation of a concrete logic. He writes “True Dialektik must be a path by which 
reality explains itself. This can be truly called the science of truth.” While he argues that 
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only Hegel was aware of this orientation towards logic, ultimately he sees Hegel as 
falling short in this attempt. Kant and modern phenomenology also fail to provide a 
picture of actuality because they consider reality always from the standpoint of the 
subject. However, for Nishida, true reality must be understood from both the side of the 
subject and from the side of the world. He highlights the agency and force of the world 
which determines the subject. “The real…does not entirely transcend the person, for it 
always retains the meaning of determining us.”278  
Nishida emphasizes how the body is the site of the coming together of the ideal 
and material realms because we move between the two in action. Action occurs as 
physical and temporal movement. In order to account for an identity that moves, and 
hence, changes, Nishida proposes that we consider individual beings to be “continuities 
of discontinuity.” This means that they hold negation within themselves. One way of 
describing the negation within an identity is to say that it reflects a “world of coming into 
being and passing away.”279 
The universal which determines the individual determines itself by taking 
absolute negation as mediation. That which exists in it ‘lives by dying’, 
i.e. it is the continuity of discontinuity. As the determination of such a 
universal, it is both determined by the universal, but it is at the same time, 
the true individual, i.e. an acting thing, which determines the universal 
through its own self-determination.280 
 
“Determined by the individual,” here, means determined by nothingness. Nothingness 
allows for personal action. Later on Nishida brings together nothingness, the continuity of 
discontinuity, and interactions between individuals: “The determination of the continuity 
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of discontinuity which is mediated by absolute negation is to be conceived from the 
mutual determination of individuals, i.e. from the idea of action. The logic of true being, 
i.e. of concrete reality, has this form. In these terms, I think I can clarify the logical 
structure of what I call an acting being.”281 While the mediation of nothingness is the 
necessary condition for action, “determination” issues from “the mutual determination of 
individuals.” The implication of this view is that the self isn’t individuated based on an 
individual core, or anything that belongs to it alone. Rather, the self is mediated by 
nothingness and other human beings. Nishida goes on to include other living and non-
living entities (plants, animals, and objects and ideas from the historical-cultural world) 
as possible “Thou’s.”282 Hegel’s Antigone could be used as an example of Nishida’s 
notion of mutual determination. Antigone is determined by the social-historical 
discourses of divine and human law; yet, she is not fully determined by them. She also 
acts upon them. In Nishida’s view, Antigone’s identity arises out of emptiness because it 
is a confluence of interacting forces (discourses, practices, and other human beings). 
Nishida uses the oppositional structure between life and death to characterize the 
opposition between self and other. Frequently, when he writes about the I-Thou relation, 
he describes it by alluding to the phrase “living by dying.” For instance, he writes “In 
absolute negation qua affirmation, individuals are determined and mutually active. The I 
and the Thou mutually oppose and determine one another in the absolute aspect of being-
qua-non-being, or death-qua-life.”283 
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 Recalling Nishida’s description of the self as a continuity of individual “points” 
that are independent, he also uses the term “living by dying” to capture this aspect of the 
self. If there is no substance or hypokeimenon that is unchanging, than each moment of 
self-experience is a determination of absolute nothingness. More specifically, the self in 
each moment is a new determination; this means that the self lives through dying. In 
practical terms, all human beings move towards death; however, Nishida uses the term 
death to indicate how human reality is constituted by impermanence and non-persistence. 
However, despite the fading away of each self in each moment, there is continuity within 
one’s self-experience. Significantly, the ability to regard each dying self as a “Thou” 
allows one to experience unity or continuity.  
The personal unity of the individual self is established as the ‘I’ of the 
present regards the ‘I’ of yesterday as a ‘Thou’ and also the ‘I’ of the 
tomorrow as a ‘Thou’ – indeed, by the ‘I’ of the past instant and future 
instant thus mutually regarding each other.284 
 
Nishida’s vision of the self is that which contains something Other at its base. The fact 
that each moment contains negation means that the self is disjointed. Unity is restored to 
self-experience when a relation between the disjointed moments is achieved; this relation 
is spoken of in personal terms. Within the self itself, the structure of self and Other is at 
work. But what does this mean in concrete terms? Nishida writes “The free individual 
negates both the determinations of the past and the demands of the future at each and 
every moment. For we not only determine the future, but change the meaning of the 
past.”285 At this point, we can consider how it is common to say “I was a different person 
five years ago” or “I will surely be a different person two years from now.” In this sense, 
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we regard the person that we were in the past or the person we anticipate that we will 
become as separate, independent existences. Nishida’s point is that even within the self 
itself there is tremendous alterity. 
 Nishida devotes space to the psychological responses that human beings exhibit 
as a result of “living by dying” in “The Dialectical World” section of Fundamental 
Problems of Philosophy. 
As the individual determination of the dialectically self-determining 
world, the self faces absolute negation, absolute nothingness. Therefore, 
this world is a world of infinite anxiety. Our every step is a danger, with 
the infinite depths at its foundation. Moreover, these depths are not 
physical matter, but an infinite darkness, an infinite negation. We are self-
determining in individual forms as the individual determinations of such a 
world. For the self exists in it. It is the life urge. In order to live, man must 
struggle. Moreover, the foundation itself of that life urge is a darkness. We 
do not know for what we are struggling. Life itself is a fate.286 
 
Here Nishida describes how the absolute nothingness that is part of every being’s identity 
provokes anxiety in the human being. If every moment is radically new and “other,” than 
we are always confronting the fact that the future is unknowable. Moreover, even more 
significant is the idea that the depths of the self are hidden, i.e., in the depths of the self 
there is an unbridgeable alterity that cannot be known. However, the self’s unknowable 
foundation incites us to act and “struggle.” The self undergoes anxiety before its very 
ontology, i.e. due to the fact that it is “determined by non-being.” In two essays written 
after Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, “Logic and Life” (1936/7) and “The Logic of 
Topos and the Religious Worldview” (1944), Nishida describes how our consciousness of 
death sets us apart from other creatures:  
While we look at ourselves through and through as objects, we are at the 
same time always transcending the world of objects. Therein lies the 
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existence of us humans. Only humans are aware of death, only humans 
commit suicide.287 
 
To know our eternal death is the fundamental reason of our existence. For 
only one who knows his own eternal death truly knows that he is an 
individual…What does not die is not singular existence…only by facing 
the eternal negation, do we truly realize the singularity of our existence. It 
is not through self-reflection but by facing our eternal death that we 
become truly self-conscious…What lives dies. This is indeed a 
contradiction, but such is the mode of our existence.288  
 
In the first passage, we see that Nishida’s view of human reality bears a likeness to 
existential-phenomenological perspectives like those of Heidegger, Beauvoir, and Sartre, 
where one exists outside oneself by transcending toward the future in action. While we 
may habitually consider ourselves as “objects” in that the mind and body possess 
boundaries, Nishida suggests that we are constituted by our ability to transcend these 
boundaries. In this instance, our ability to see ahead to our own death and to grasp 
ourselves as living through negation, or “living by dying” defines our humanity. In the 
second passage, we see that beyond being that which differentiates us from other 
creatures, our awareness of our death is that through which we become individuated. 
Against Descartes, and in line with Hegel’s discussion of the bondsman, Nishida writes 
that becoming aware of our own mortality is that which incites self-consciousness. We 
see how Nishida’s ontology always includes oppositions and unity. Death is that which 
opposes, but it is also the means through which I realize my singularity. Here we could 
interpret singularity as my awareness of myself as a unity.  
 Nishida’s description “living-by-dying” is one lens through which we can 
understand the more all-encompassing claim that being includes a dimension of otherness 
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within itself. The alterity of death that we house within us helps us to understand the 
alterity of the concrete Other. Now I will move to his explicit discussion of I-Thou 
relations by focusing on his notion of recognition. 
 
The Relational Self: Recognition and the Influence of the Master-Slave Dialectic in 
Nishida’s Philosophical Project 
 
 Nishida dedicates two essays to the subject of the intersubjectivity of the self: 
“Love of Self-Love of Other and the Dialectic” and “I and Thou,” both of which were 
written in 1932. However, in addition to these pieces, Nishida describes the role that the 
Other plays in the constitution of the self in numerous other essays and books. Just as the 
identity of the self issues from a determination of absolute nothingness, Nishida’s intent 
in discussions of self-other relations is to show how the self does not produce itself; it is, 
most basically, something that forms itself through relation. Nishida directly asserts that 
intersubjectivity is an important aspect of the self: “I think that the notion of the 
individual’s being an individual only in relation to other individuals has been neglected. 
As I have often said, the unity of the person is not a mere continuity but a continuity of 
discontinuity.”289 Consistent with the first example on absolutely contradictory self-
identity that Nishida uses in An Inquiry into the Good, we see that identity results from 
holding oppositions within itself; Using the color red as an example, in order for red to 
have an identity, there must be other colors that oppose red.290 Red’s identity is created 
through its difference from other colors. Therefore, its very identity is tied to the 
existence of the opposing colors. In other words, the other colors are somehow contained 
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within the definition of the color red. Here the example of something determining itself 
only in relation to something else is extended to the realm of selfhood. Not only does the 
self emerge out of relations with concrete others and thus reflect a continuity amidst 
discontinuities; it also contains discontinuity within itself as the self is born and dies in 
each passing moment. 
Nishida writes near the beginning of Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, in a 
paragraph following one where he references Hegel:  
The individual determines itself only in relation to other individuals. The 
idea of a unique self-determining individual has no meaning. In order for 
the individual to determine itself there must first be what I have called the 
determination of a place “basho”, i.e. a unity of absolute contradictories. 
But the principle of particularization means the continuity of 
discontinuity.291  
 
And, a few pages later, he writes:  
 
The self becomes a personality only by recognizing the personality of 
others, such as in Kant’s statement that ethical action must regard the 
other as an end in himself.292 
 
Firstly, we see Nishida repeating his idea that individuality forms itself, but not through 
its individual will or individual notions. The individual contains “non-individual 
elements,” i.e., others, cultural objects and discourses, its physical environment, etc. that 
are formative. Rather than lapse into “object logic,” Nishida refers to the self and 
consciousness as a field or place of interacting forces. Here, he adds the idea that the 
individual is an individual only through its relation to others. Given the fact that this first 
passage occurs directly after Nishida discusses Hegel, it seems likely that Nishida is 
influenced here – in part – by Hegelian recognition in the master-slave dialectic. 
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Consistent with the numerous mentions of the German philosopher in his works, letters, 
and diaries, Nishida explicitly states in a 1931 essay, “Hegel’s Dialectic from My Point 
of View,” “There is much in my present thought that I have learned from Hegel, and I 
feel closer to Hegel than to anyone else.”293 
Just as Hegel claims that self-consciousness and one’s self-relation depend upon 
encountering an Other who is my double and who sees me, Nishida debunks the idea that 
the self is self-originating and that which understands itself solely based on its inner 
resources. In the following passage and other places, Nishida actually uses the word 
“recognize” or “acknowledge” when describing the effect individuals have on each 
other’s self-relations. Even in the second passage when Nishida references Kant, we see 
that the self forms itself through facing and responding to another. Nishida implies that 
an “individual” is merely a continuity or point that selectively draws together 
oppositional forces outside of itself. “The self must in essence be personal. Such terms as 
consciousness, thinking, willing, or acting cannot adequately describe the self…The self 
becomes a self by recognizing a Thou as a Thou.”294 
 As stated earlier, the self does not merely regard other human beings as others. It 
also relates to itself as a “Thou.” 
The personal unity of the self can only be established by the self of 
yesterday regarding the self of today as a Thou, and vice versa…There is 
no solitary individual personality. There is no I without a Thou, no 
individual person without society. There must be a Thou which makes the 
I an I…the self of yesterday and the self of today must be in dialogue.295 
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Nishida’s overall intention when writing of I-Thou relations is to demonstrate how the 
alterity of the other symbolizes the alterity of the self when it seeks to relate to itself. Just 
as an individual depends upon having a society from which to differentiate itself, at each 
moment the self itself enters into relation to the self of the past and the self of the future. 
If the relationship between opposing forces is the true picture of reality, than it follows 
that identity is established based on individuals recognizing each other. The unity of the 
self would crumble if one were unable to understand or relate to the person one was in 
the past or the future. While we sometimes express a lack of understanding when it 
comes to why we made certain decisions in the past, only in pathology is the break 
between our former selves and our current self complete. Here we may recall Hearst’s 
statements about her former self “slipping away.” During her imprisonment, Hearst’s 
experience became less and less unified; she underwent a profound break between the 
self that she was in the past and the self, “Tania,” that she came to inhabit. 
Nishida’s concept of the “social” is also important when understanding what 
Nishida means when he says that even one’s inner world contains intersubjective 
elements: 
Even in saying that we stand independent in the form of internal 
perception, the idea of a mere individual man has no meaning. For the I is 
the I by standing over against the Thou, and the individual is the 
individual relative to other individuals. The self is social. The self may 
only be conceived as the self determination of the medium between 
individuals.296 
 
Nishida implies that our individuality is always experienced amidst the background of a 
realm of others. The very uniqueness of the self depends upon the medium of the social. 
Steve Odin points out how Nishida is influenced by James’ notion of the social as a 
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background against which the self forms itself.297 The implication of this view is that the 
interior world is not a private space where one could stoically retreat from the world of 
others. Hearst can be used as an example again here. If identity is tied to a medium of 
others, than it is unsurprising that her identity was radically transformed when held 
captive by the SLA.  
One could interpret what Nishida is saying here in terms of the structure of the 
self, wherein the self is a thoroughly relational being. However, one might also interpret 
it in terms of the experience of introspection. For instance, our interior world is often 
filled with imaginary situations and dialogues between ourselves and others. We may 
spend a large portion of our time recalling past interactions with Others and imagining 
them differently or envisioning future encounters. Here it is helpful to recall the earlier 
quotation, “The free individual negates both the determinations of the past and the 
demands of the future at each and every moment. For we not only determine the future, 
but change the meaning of the past.”298 For Nishida, the self is constantly dying and 
being reborn in each moment; it changes its relationship to its history and future 
continually. However, the preceding quotation doesn’t just pertain to the discontinuous 
nature of the self and its experience of its temporality. For example, “chang[ing] the 
meaning of the past” implies that I imaginatively reflect on the meaning of past events; 
these past events very likely involve others. Even when one interprets a past feeling or 
situation that didn’t out-rightly involve others, the weight of social discourses that 
determine values as well as relationships that took on the role of examples of possible 
ways of being structure the way that we engage with our past. In sum, Nishida points out 
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the inextricable role that the “social” plays in our inner life; one’s interior space is not 
free of the reach of the “social.” 
While the notion of the social as a background or “fringe” of relationships is 
justified in passages like the ones above, Nishida also intends to reveal the agency of the 
social realm: 
Usually the social is taken to mean the abstract relationship between men, 
but here it refers to that which determines the personal action of the I and 
the Thou as the self-identity of absolute contradictories. It is the 
determination of subject qua predicate. That which exists in it must be 
both subjectively and objectively at the same time. Thus, I and Thou 
mediate one another. The Thou which stands in opposition to the I must be 
both internal and external. It is neither merely physical nor merely 
spiritual, but both. The world which is social in such a sense determines 
itself dialectically as the unity of absolute contradictories. It is 
metaphysical and historical. This means that the world of truly concrete 
reality is social in essence and determines itself historically. Even the 
natural world can be conceived in the ultimate point of the subjective 
aspect of such determination.299  
 
While we may think of the self as the center of an individual will, Nishida is interested in 
the idea that what is “outside” of us also determines our individuality. For example, later 
on in the text he writes, “Such terms as consciousness, thinking, willing, or acting cannot 
adequately describe the self. The self becomes a self by recognizing a Thou as a 
Thou.”300 However, the self does possess a subjective reality, i.e. it does experience its 
consciousness, thought, intentions, and acts. Nishida’s point is that one’s self-experience 
and one’s agency continually reflect both subjective and objective influences. 
While we have devoted time to unpacking how basho is social, it is still unclear 
what Nishida means when he says that there is no I without a Thou. What exactly does he 
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mean by this? I think that this is best interpreted by remembering his recurrent interest in 
unity because unity allows for relationship. In “I and Thou” he writes, 
A self must include the absolute other in itself. It is not that a self becomes 
other and the other becomes the self through a medium. But the self 
becomes the other through the bottom of itself. Because there is the other 
at the bottom of the self’s existence and there is the self at the bottom of 
the other’s existence. I and Thou are absolute others. There is no general 
thing which includes I and Thou. But I am I by acknowledging Thou, and 
Thou are Thou by acknowledging me. There is a Thou at my bottom and 
my I at Thy bottom. I unite with you through my bottom, and the Thou 
unites with me through Thy bottom. Because they are absolute others, they 
unite with each other inside of themselves.301  
 
The absolute other within the self is what Nishida means in his last essay when he writes 
“At the bottom of the self there is something that utterly transcends us and this something 
is neither foreign nor external to us.”302 Succinctly, the absolute other is absolute 
nothingness. As we contain that which is absolutely other at our core, we become 
ourselves by recognizing this part of ourselves. In this sense, the Other’s alterity incites 
one to see oneself clearly. While initially this may sound as if the self instrumentalizes 
the Other, I think there is more going on here. While the Other’s alterity prompts us to 
grasp our own alterity, it also reveals that our selfhood cannot be neatly enclosed within 
our own consciousness and experience. Most basically, the self becomes itself through 
recognizing the Other. This is another way of reformulating Hegel’s premise in the 
master-slave dialectic that self-consciousness depends upon the encounter with the Other. 
For Nishida, the deepest part of oneself is not a core, but something like an opening 
which allows us to unite with the Other. Relation is possible based on the fact that our 
identities issue from nothing (i.e., that which is the base of the self). Later on in 
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Fundamental Problems of Philosophy Nishida explains the radicality of his notion of 
intersubjectivity: 
But the I and thou do not come into being merely through mutual 
opposition and mutual understanding. I do not mean to imply this when I 
say that the I becomes the I by recognizing the Thou and (vice versa). I 
rather mean that the Thou is the prerequisite for the existence of the I,  
and the I is the prerequisite for the existence of the Thou. .. that the I and 
the Thou become themselves by recognizing each other means that the I 
and the thou become what we are by mutual self-negation.303  
 
Like Hegel, Nishida claims that the Other is a necessary condition for selfhood. The 
recognition that constitutes the self can be understood as self-negation. Given Nishida’s 
ontology of absolute nothingness, it makes sense that he would be drawn to Hegel’s 
premise that the Other is a prerequisite of the self and interpret it through the lens of self-
negation. Recognition, for Nishida is a movement toward another in that it requires one to 
deny one’s purely individual needs and desires and affirm that another being has the same 
needs and desires, i.e. that the other is a free being. Therefore, I believe that Nishida 
interprets Hegel’s idea of two subjects mutually recognizing each other’s freedom in 
terms of his structure of “affirmation-qua-negation.” Affirmation, or recognition, co-
exists with negation of oneself, which in this context entails negating one’s own freedom. 
Negating oneself means that one allows for another dimension of being, i.e., absolute 
nothingness to emerge. This is what Nishida means when he says that we “become what 
we are by mutual self-negation.” The concrete Other and the absolute nothingness at the 
base of the self both represent self-negation; when they are acknowledged, reality is seen 
clearly and affirmed. 
 We have seen Nishida define the thou in two main ways thus far. First, the 
“Thou” is defined as any human Other that the self is faced with. Secondly, Nishida 
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details how the self contains an internal Thou or a series of Thou’s. The internal absolute 
Thou is the absolute nothingness at the base of our consciousness and self-experience. 
The series of Thou’s are the individual selves that arise and fall away in each moment 
that “recognize” each Other and thus form a continuity of discontinuities. Nishida goes 
on to expand the meaning of “Thou” even further: 
In the concrete world there must be the relation of I and Thou between 
thing and thing. That which stands over against the I must always be a 
Thou. But the I-Thou relationship is not a mere opposition between 
individuals. When there is a mutual experiencing separated by absolute 
negation in which the self exists in the state of absolute negation qua 
affirmation, everything which stands opposed to the self – even the 
mountains, rivers, trees, and stones – is a Thou. In such a sense, the 
concrete world becomes a metaphysical society.304 
 
Here it is important to note that Nishida doesn’t simply state that plants and material 
entities are Thou’s in the same way that human beings are. He begins by including the 
qualification “When there is a mutual experiencing separated by absolute negation,” these 
beings are “Thou’s.” The state that the self must appear in, in order to effect this, is one 
in which it perceives and relates to the world from a place of its own nothingness. Here 
we could think of Nishida’s allusion to the medieval Zen Buddhist Dogen Kigen in his 
last essay, “To pursue Buddha’s path is to pursue oneself. To pursue oneself is to forget 
oneself.”305 The significance behind this statement is that reality is experienced more 
completely when the ego has been shed. Part of seeing the world from the place of 
nothingness, the standpoint without a standpoint, is that it allows one to admit to oneself 
that one is fundamentally related to other beings; one is a place of interacting beings.  
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Watsuji on Recognition: The Self as Betweenness 
At this point, Nishida’s view of the fundamental intersubjectivity of the self can 
be clarified if we look to Watsuji Tetsuro’s notion of the self as “betweenness.” While 
Nishida and Watsuji present very similar ontological visions of the self, Watsuji uses a 
wealth of everyday experiences to illustrate his points; such examples are notoriously 
absent from Nishida’s works. While not a part of the Kyoto School, Watsuji Tetsuro’s 
(1889–1960) philosophical project was similar to Nishida’s in that he was also a 
comparative thinker who examined the themes of absolute nothingness and dialectical 
logic.306 Like Nishida, Watsuji seeks to overcome all one-sided worldviews by taking up 
a phenomenological orientation of the mutual interpenetration of self and world. 
However, Watsuji radicalizes this notion by moving the focus even farther away from 
consciousness as something individual: 
…we take our departure not from the intentional consciousness of ‘I’ but 
from ‘betweenness.’ The essential feature of betweenness lies in this, that 
the intentionality of I is from the outset prescribed by its counterpart, 
which is also conversely prescribed by the former.307 
 
Watsuji’s study of the self begins with careful attention to etymology. For him, words 
like anthropos, homo sapiens, man, and Mensch indicate that the self is individual and 
self-sustaining. Furthermore, the Christian idea of a human being as made up of body and 
soul, the notion that the human being is a rational animal (homo sapien), and the idea that 
human beings are primarily productive (homo faber) all give credence to this picture of 
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the self as individual. In contrast, the Japanese word for human being is ningen.308 The 
character nin indicates 2 men supporting one another; gen means “between.”309 While the 
original Chinese meaning of the character for ningen  was “public,” in Japanese the word 
came to be used to signify human being as well. Watsuji contends that the fact that the 
word “public” so easily came to mean “human being” mirrors the “dialectical unity” of 
the two opposing parts of the human: the individual and the community.310 Ningen, or 
“betweenness,” thus implies that the self appears in a space “between” others.  
Watsuji’s emphasis on the Thou when speaking of the identity of the self 
demonstrates an affinity with Nishida’s recurring phrase, “The self becomes a self by 
recognizing a Thou as a Thou.”311 Here we see how Watsuji’s analysis of the self is 
similar to Nishida’s concept of a field of beings who respond to each other. The self 
doesn’t exist in a field; it occurs in the space of relation.  
 Watsuji offers a distinct model for how consciousness is directed toward Thou. 
When reflecting on the notion of “person,” Watsuji writes that oftentimes “persons” are 
defined as such on the basis of the separateness of the individual body or the mind (ego 
consciousness). While such a statement appears reasonable in the realm of speculation, it 
neglects our everyday experience. For Watsuji, daily existence is permeated by I-Thou 
interactions. He writes:  
Consciousness of ‘I’ cannot be isolated from its ‘objects of 
consciousness.’… we must describe the intentionality of consciousness as 
‘I am conscious of something.’ However, in our daily lives we look at, 
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doubt, or love, a Thou. That is to say, ‘I become conscious of Thou.’ My 
seeing Thou is already determined by your seeing me, and the activity of 
my loving Thou is already determined by your loving me. Hence, my 
becoming conscious of Thou is inextricably interconnected with your 
becoming conscious of me… Activity inherent in the consciousness of ‘I’ 
is never determined by this ‘I’ alone but is also determined by others.312 
 
Human beings are fundamentally attuned to the presence of others. Watsuji uses this 
basic fact to challenge the idea that there is a separate self that then feels, judges, and 
responds to the external world. He contends that the self becomes itself through its 
“becoming conscious” of worldly events and others. As with Nishida, here again the 
divisions “internal” and “external” are challenged. Awareness and self-reflection issue 
from what is not self. This means that selfhood unfolds “between” what is individual and 
what is worldly.  
Returning to Watsuji’s emphasis on the Other, while interaction with a material 
object provides a space for the self, the arrival of another human being even more 
radically affects one’s self-awareness (for a Western counterpart, consider Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s famous “keyhole” or “park bench” examples of the experience of being an object 
of another’s consciousness). While it is evident that one’s self is colored by relations with 
loved ones, Watsuji points out that even the mundane event of riding a bus reveals how 
one’s subjective experience is shaped by the presence of others. Watsuji illustrates how 
consciousness is always already structured by the Other’s consciousness. When he 
writes, “My seeing Thou is already determined by your seeing me,” we get a clear vision 
of what Nishida certainly means when he says that reality is a place of ongoing mutual 
determination. 
 
                                               
312 Watsuji, 69 (Rinrigaku 1: 106-107).  
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Expression 
Now I will deepen my investigation of the intersubjective realm of selfhood by 
unpacking what Nishida means when he describes I-Thou relations as fundamentally 
“expressive.” Delving into what this signifies in the context of I-Thou relations will shed 
light on Nishida’s use of the term throughout his other works. In Fundamental Problems 
of Philosophy, Nishida writes:  
…individuals who thus face one another separated by absolute negation 
are an immediate mutual determination of negation qua affirmation, i.e. 
they are mutual negation through action. Individuals oppose each other 
expressively, and determine one another through action.313 
 
Nishida describes action as that which is always self-negating and transcending. Action is 
directed toward the Other; it is expressive, i.e., it appeals to the Other in its drive to 
communicate. In “I and Thou” Nishida writes that expression is neither the result of our 
subjective intention nor something that can be grasped only as an objective act that 
neglects the subject’s intention: “The world of expression is the world of the I and 
Thou…it is neither the world of objectivity, the world of objects, nor the world of 
subjectivity, consciousness. Again, the world of expression is neither the world of the I 
nor the world of the Thou, but the world of the I and Thou.314 Expression symbolizes the 
mutual determination of self and Other because it takes place in between the two. With 
this last passage, we see what Nishida means when he writes that action is mutually self-
negating and affirming. Expression and action require that we move outside ourselves 
toward the Other; it also means that we must affirm the Other’s individuality. We can see 
what Nishida means by recalling a common experience in which one wants to relate a 
                                               
313 Nishida, Fundamental Problems, 29 (NKZ 7: 59). 
 
314 As quoted by Kopf, 119. 
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story to a friend. The act of telling the story cannot be reduced to my own intention alone. 
I am telling the story to an audience who possesses the power of judgment. In order to tell 
the story I take for granted that the Other has autonomy. In a sense, the Other represents 
the power of negation. Ultimately, we see that all things are expressive because all beings 
are – ontologically speaking – naturally self-negating. 
True life, as the unity of absolute contradictories implies an I-Thou 
relationship for that which stands in opposition to the I must possess 
expression. In fact, the mountains and the rivers must also be 
expressive.315 
 
Just like the self, mountains and rivers are also baseless; their identities are based in 
absolute nothingness. This means that their identities are “expressions” of relation. 
Nishida states repeatedly that individuals are mediated; they are constituted through their 
relations to others.316  
 While expression is a term that Nishida uses to convey his ontological theory of 
absolute self-contradictory identity, by referencing action and the historical place of 
selfhood, his discussion of intersubjectivity enhances our understanding of the way that 
he uses the term throughout his corpus. Recalling that expression is the “world of the I 
and the Thou,” rather than that which is merely subjective or objective, it is helpful to 
turn to his description of a “true personal relation”: 
The usual concept of personal relations is an abstraction. The abstract 
relation between mere rational persons is not a true personal relation. 
However, true personal relation does not consist in the abstract relation 
between rational persons. The I-Thou relationship is a mutual seeing 
separated by absolute negation. For the I and Thou are always separated 
by the physical world…Therefore the actual world, in which individuals 
are mutually determining, is neither simply spiritual nor simply physical. 
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Rather it is metaphysical and social in the sense of including the I and the 
Thou. Usually the social is taken to mean the abstract relationship between 
men, but here it refers to that which determines the personal action of the I 
and the Thou as the self-identity of absolute contradictories…the world of 
truly concrete reality is social in essence and determines itself 
historically.317  
 
What does Nishida mean here when he says that the “I-Thou relationship is a mutual 
seeing separated by absolute negation”? An intersubjective encounter, for Nishida, cannot 
be described by “object logic” or any way of interpreting the two human beings as 
completely separate and self-enclosed entities. However, each stands opposed to the 
Other because it inhabits a body that does have boundaries. In this sense, we can think of 
Hegel’s description of how what opposes the self in the “Truth of Self-Certainty” chapter 
is experienced by the self as fundamentally “not me.” True reality includes “mutual 
seeing” and mutual determination; this is what Nishida means when he says that 
individuals are self-expressive points of the world. Reality is a unity of oppositions or a 
continuity of discontinuity. 
 
The Relational Self and Key Aspects of Nishida’s Philosophical Project: The Self and 
 
Absolute Nothingness, Basho, and the Historical World 
 
In the foregoing, I have outlined key aspects of Nishida’s thought, including his 
view of the self, place, and expressive activity within the historical world. Then, I moved 
on to unpacking the intersubjective dimension of selfhood that is interspersed throughout 
his works. Now I will examine the two together and explicitly show what the latter can 
do to broaden the reader’s understanding of the former.  
                                               
317 Ibid., 35-36 (NKZ 7: 71-72). 
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Firstly, Nishida’s discussion of the I-Thou relation deepens our understanding of 
his view of the self. Nishida repeatedly claims that the self is absolutely contradictory 
identity. He writes that we have our selfhood in the absolute Other, and that our deepest 
reality is something transcendent. While absolute nothingness is of central importance to 
Nishida’s philosophical project, pointing to the way that it is realized through 
intersubjectivity not only clarifies the confrontation with the Other, as a being that is 
fundamentally “other” to us, it also prompts us to realize ourselves in the Other. On one 
hand, this way of understanding the self and other human and non-human others is best 
explained through the result of Buddhist self-emptying practices like meditation and 
chanting, which Nishida references in his works from time to time.318 Through focused 
attention, rigid boundaries between the self and other beings relax and one begins to 
perceive the world outside of the lens of the ego. In more concrete terms, when one stills 
one’s thoughts and practices viewing them with non-attachment, then one begins to 
realize oneness between one’s own reality and that of other beings. We can see this 
clearly when we recall this passage, quoted earlier: 
A self must include the absolute other in itself. It is not that a self becomes 
other and other becomes the self through a medium. But the self becomes 
the other through the bottom of itself. Because there is the other at the 
bottom of the self’s existence and there is the self at the bottom of the 
other’s existence. I and Thou are absolute others. There is no general thing 
which includes I and Thou. But I am I by acknowledging Thou, and Thou 
are Thou by acknowledging me. There is a Thou at my bottom and my I at 
Thy bottom. I unite with you through my bottom, and the Thou unites with 
me through Thy bottom. Because they are absolute others, they unite with 
each other inside of themselves.319  
 
                                               
318 See Nishida, “The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview” and Dennis Hirota, “Nishida’s 
‘Gutoku Shinran,’” The Eastern Buddhist 28, no. 2 (Fall 1995). 
 
319 As quoted by Odin, 88. 
 150 
 
In the Buddhist worldview, self-realization depends on recognizing that ultimately, self 
and other are non-dual. While Buddhism is often viewed as individualistic through its 
insistence that there is no self, i.e. beings are empty of intrinsic essence, in actuality self-
realization depends upon grasping the fact that one is intimately connected to other 
beings. Nishida’s allusion to the necessity of acknowledging a “Thou,” clarifies that his 
notion of the self is thoroughly relational. The Other plays a key role in self-realization 
because self-realization hinges on the recognition of one’s relatedness.   
 Nishida’s account of intersubjectivity clarifies his view of the self in another way 
as well. As discussed above, the self contains alterity within itself not only due to the lack 
of rigid boundaries between self and Other but through the fact that it is always other to 
itself. Albert Camus writes “forever I shall be a stranger to myself”320; indeed, at times, 
we experience surprise in reaction to our own actions. Nishida’s discussion of the self as 
a continuity of discontinuity, i.e. a series of selves that arise and fall away clarifies this 
experience of distance. Here, we see another meaning of his repeated phrase “we have 
our selfhood in the absolute other.” Recalling Nishida’s caution that intersubjectivity is 
neglected when philosophers consider the self and that the self is a “continuity of 
discontinuity,” we see that he seeks to expose how the intersubjective realm clearly 
illustrates his notions of absolutely self-contradictory identity and creative activity. The 
fact that our experience is structured by the social reveals that the self contains 
oppositions within itself; it is an acting being that is both “making and made.” Other 
individuals shape the context out of which the self acts. The self is “made” as a result of 
the oppositions of others, yet it also “makes,” i.e. by being an individual “self-expressing 
                                               
320 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus And Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955), 19. 
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point of the world.” Ultimately, Nishida’s discussion of the relational self aims to reveal 
how the alterity of the Other symbolizes the alterity of the self itself.  
Nishida’s account of the relational self also enhances our understanding of his 
notion of basho, or place. Through lines like “the individual only determines itself in 
relation to other individuals” and “the self becomes a personality only by recognizing the 
personality of others” we see that when Nishida describes basho, which is the site of 
mutual determination, he means to include human beings. Additionally, such references 
give us a better idea of what Nishida means when he says that basho does not mean “a 
place in which things exist.” Rather, it means “a physical space of personal action” and 
“mutual determination.” Therefore, putting all of these statements together, mutual 
determination implies intersubjective recognition and the actions of human beings. 
Nishida goes on to state that place is “self-determining.” 
The dialectical process may be conceived from the self determination of 
this world of reality which is both one qua many and many qua one. It 
may therefore be seen from the world of the I and the Thou. The self is the 
affirmation of the self negation of this world of reality.321 
 
When Nishida speaks of the “self-determination” of place, he means to highlight how 
action is typically attributed to an agent with conscious intent. However, his ontology of 
absolutely contradictory self-identity contests any purely interior or external, ideal or 
material notion of thought or action. The self cannot be reduced to consciousness, the 
will, or actions. In his view, the self cannot be a locus of autonomy; place is the site of 
autonomy. Moreover, Nishida’s discussion of I-Thou relations reveal that basho is an 
intersubjective space that is “self-determining.” We can make sense of this statement if 
we think of how the self contains “non-individual elements.” If the self is truly empty of 
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intrinsic essence, than its agency issues from the confluence of a variety of forces within 
the field that it inhabits. Furthermore, it also continually shapes other beings. With 
reference to the last line of the passage above, the self is fundamentally that which 
affirms self-negation. This is shown most clearly in the I-Thou relation when one 
acknowledges non-dualism between self and other. The world is self-negating through 
the fact that it expresses itself through the singularity of the self. Furthermore, the self 
must always affirm the ways that it is determined by the world. Its existence encloses 
much more than its own intention; even its intention is produced through mutual 
determination.  
 Nishida’s use of the term “social” helps the reader see that basho is not a field of 
separate “thing-like” existences that interact. Recalling the earlier passage, “I and Thou 
mediate one another. The Thou which stands in opposition to the I must be both internal 
and external,” the extent to which our own identities are bound up by the mediation of 
others provides a way of envisioning basho as a site of interweaving relations rather than 
a place that “things” inhabit. Here we can see why Nishida was most likely attracted to 
Hegel’s notion of recognition; we may recall paragraph 179, “Self-consciousness is faced 
by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself. This has a twofold significance: 
first, it has lost itself, for it finds itself as an other being; secondly, in the other sees its 
own self.”322 The encounter between two human beings is one where two freedoms 
mutually determine, or recognize each other. The same thorough interdependence that 
symbolizes an intersubjective meeting helps us envision what Nishida meant by a place 
of absolute self-contradictory identity. 
                                               
322 Hegel, § 179. 
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 Lastly, Nishida’s account of I-Thou relations sheds light on what he means by 
creation, expression, and the historical world. 
Our self as a creative element in the creative world, while confronting that 
which thoroughly expresses itself as object, also always confronts a 
creative element in the depths of its own life, the thou. An individual thing 
confronts an individual thing. Needless to say, we can further think of this 
in various terms, such as of the relationship in facing the creator. In any 
case, a creative element in the creative world is made from a combination 
of other creative elements and must also be what makes other creative 
elements. This is why I say that in the depths of the historical world, there 
is the opposition between the I and the thou, and that otherwise there 
would be no such thing as a historical world. Here lies the ground of the 
historical reality of society. The I does not confront the thou in the region 
of things. That the I confronts the thing and that the I confronts the thou, 
are confrontations in two opposing regions. Even in biological life, while 
we confront the nutritional environment in the region of things, we 
confront the parent or the child in the region of life. But the world of 
living things is not creative; it is not the world that lives on its own. That 
which confronts [us] as object is merely nutritional and not the expression 
of life. In the world of historical reality, while we confront expressions in 
the region of things, persons encounter persons as creative elements. We 
accordingly intermingle through the medium of expression. Although 
biological life determines itself merely morphologically, historical life 
goes on forming itself expressively.323  
 
Here, Nishida clearly states that his concept of the historical world can be understood if 
we think of the absolutely self-contradictory identity of I and Thou. The human being is 
“the expression of life” and “a creative element.” Nishida’s allusion to the parent and the 
child are helpful to the reader because most of his discussions of creation and expression 
contain very few examples; furthermore, when he does give an example, it is almost 
always of artistic creation. Human beings are not things for Nishida; they are 
characterized by the fact that they determine each other and create each other. Nishida 
repeats here the phrase “The self is not a thing.” Alluding to the I-Thou relation and 
expression is helpful in understanding this point. A thing is self-contained, while human 
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beings go beyond themselves through expression. As in the example above, when one 
tells a story to a friend, the experience is one of Watsuji’s sense of “betweenness.” Just as 
the artist may have had an intention when he began creating, while the friend telling the 
story also has an intention, both the work of art and the story are directed outside of 
themselves. Expression, for Nishida, includes the qualification “to another.” If we take 
his discussion of expression within intersubjective encounters and apply it to statements 
where he writes that basho is expressive and the individual is fundamentally self-
expressive, than we see that beings are always directed outside of themselves to other 
beings. This concept also clarifies my assertion above that self-realization for Nishida 
includes the realization of one’s own otherness through one’s fundamental belonging to a 
world of others.  
In conclusion, I have sought to demonstrate that the intersubjective self is a 
crucial concept within Nishida’s overall philosophical project as it broadens the reader of 
Nishida’s understanding of key aspects of his thought, including the self and its basis in 
nothingness, place, and the historical world. By examining the following aspects of his 
theory of the relational self, i.e. living-qua-dying, recognition, and expression, I brought 
out key characteristics of his view. For example, the self is fundamentally discontinuous 
based on its interior and exterior relations to Others as well as its relation to the various 
selves that arise and fall away in its own interior temporal experience. Secondly, the self 
relates to the fact that it is other to itself with anxiety. Thirdly, despite the discontinuity, 
the self still experiences itself as a temporal whole. Furthermore, human beings 
experience a type of belonging based on the fact that they gain their identity through a 
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shared intersubjective field; human beings share a commonality through the fact that they 
are all “expressions of life.”  
The implication of Nishida’s notion of selfhood is that individual agency and 
possession are displaced. Nishida’s “self” does not create itself, it does not fully direct its 
own movements, and even its interior life is not its own, at least not in the merely 
particularistic sense of self. The self does possess free will, but this freedom originates 
from a social-historical world that determines it, one that is ultimately an expression of 
the universal, or of the all-embracing basho, that is, an absolute nothingness that 
encompasses and works through/as the historical world including the particular self, but 
that is ultimately beyond discursive conception. As Nishida prefers to speak of basho as 
self-determining instead of the self as determining itself, the autonomy of the self is put 
into question. According to the picture that Nishida puts forth, selfhood is marked by 
vulnerability. If it is fundamentally tied to an intersubjective space and social-historical 
discourses and modes of production, then it is indeed other to itself. Its very being is 
“toward another”; it does not fully possess or direct itself. Ultimately, we have seen that 
the self doesn’t exist in a field; it occurs in the space of relation. In Nishida’s words, we 
could say that the field of historical relations, itself, is expressive.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
BEAUVOIR AND NISHIDA: THE EXPRESSIVE SELF, AGENCY, AND THE 
HISTORICAL WORLD  
 
 
We saw in the previous two chapters that Nishida and Beauvoir maintain that the 
self is thoroughly mediated; i.e., there is no self experience outside of the world of 
relation. For both, the self emerges through its directedness toward the Other: Beauvoir 
describes the self as a “project toward the Other,” while Nishida emphasizes that the self 
“determines itself only in relation to other individuals.”324 Beyond their discussions of the 
intersubjective aspect of the relational self, Beauvoir and Nishida point to the way that 
the self is continually relating to its social-historical situation or environment.325 While 
the self’s individuality is tied to the Other, the form of the relation between the self and 
the Other is shaped by social-historical practices and discourses. Both authors stress the 
way that the self’s identity issues from a space outside itself; however, both declare that 
the self still possesses freedom and agency. As the authors discount the notion that 
intention is completely self-originating, what are we to make of the fact that they 
maintain that the self possesses freedom and agency? This chapter examines their claims 
that the self is fundamentally mediated by social-historical self-other relations with 
particular reference to how this impacts human agency.  
I place Nishida and Beauvoir into conversation, not because they are the only 
philosophers who endorse models of the relational self, but because they present nuanced 
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325 Here, it is important to recall that Nishida’s use of the term “self” at times refers to the individual alone 
and at other times includes the self as absolute nothingness.  
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accounts that succeed in concretizing it. Specifically, Nishida does this by introducing an 
ontology of the self as expressive action that is always both subjectively and objectively 
determined. Beauvoir, on the other hand, achieves this end by bringing to light the 
historically-bound narratives (including an attention to power relations) that shape the 
psychological patterns of interaction between self and Other. While Nishida’s discussion 
of expression continually references the agency of historical space, he uses few examples 
to illustrate the determinacy of the historical field of relations. On the other hand, 
Beauvoir’s The Second Sex is full of such descriptions. When read alongside Nishida’s 
discussion of the relational self and the historical world, The Second Sex offers the reader 
of Nishida an illustration of the historical world that includes dimensions of constituted 
and constituting forces.  
Nishida’s metaphor of the self as a place of interaction, or basho, in turn, is useful 
to the reader of Beauvoir who attempts to picture a self that is ambiguous. As we saw in 
Chapter 3, Beauvoir describes selfhood as a tension between undergoing forces that we 
are subject to (e.g., the way that our bodies are determined, the fact that we are subject to 
social-historical discourses, and the way that we are subject to the Other’s power to give 
or withhold recognition) and being subjects, or centers of decision, judgment, and 
creation ourselves (e.g., we possess the power to engage in projects of our own choosing 
and we cannot escape from our responsibility to choose when faced with moral 
dilemmas). As our existence is comprised of both immanence and transcendence, 
Nishida’s discussion of the agency of place, which is the site of mutual determination of 
world and self, provides a clear non-dual illustration of Beauvoir’s notion of situated 
freedom that allows for individuality and determination. At times, Beauvoir privileges the 
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subject in a way that neglects the agency of one’s situation. Nishida’s account provides 
the reader of Beauvoir with a way of envisioning ambiguous existence. 
 Examining the authors together provides two accounts of agency that converge 
with respect to the idea that the Other is a condition of selfhood. However, their 
discussions of agency are weighted toward the perspective of the self in the case of 
Beauvoir and toward the side of the world for Nishida. Their slightly different foci 
present the reader with two ways of visualizing the acting self that is a product of worldly 
relations. Both authors describe the ways in which the historical world and Others give 
shape to our identities. However, the readers of both Beauvoir and Nishida are left with 
the question stated earlier: If the self is reliant on that which is outside itself to be itself 
then what becomes of the agency that seems necessary in order to make ethical 
decisions?  
While it is fruitful to compare Nishida and Beauvoir’s models of selfhood, it is 
also important to note the limits of the comparison. For instance, aside from offering 
phenomenological reflections and ontological and ethical theories of human experience, 
Beauvoir possesses a social political agenda. A large part of her project in The Second 
Sex is to critique concrete gender inequalities and oppressive social historical discourses 
of femininity. She aims to incite reflection which will lead to the actual change of social-
political structures. Her work is thus descriptive and prescriptive. Nishida, on the other 
hand, is primarily concerned with offering a non-dualistic logic of experience. Amidst 
criticism from his colleagues’ (Tanabe Hajime and students Tosaka Jun and Miki 
Kiyoshi), his later works are meant to address the impact of the social historical world on 
the self. However, his interest in the latter never addresses concrete injustices. Rather, he 
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discusses the impact of history on the structure of self-identity. Nevertheless, Nishida’s 
work is not solely descriptive. He intends to incite an ethical-religious transformation in 
the reader wherein she will discover that the base of her self is absolute nothingness.  
While this dissertation examines the models of selfhood that Beauvoir and 
Nishida put forward, and thus avoids making Beauvoir’s social critique central, it is 
important to note the different methods that each employ. Despite Nishida’s lack of 
discussion of situations of oppression, the descriptive model of the self that he proposes 
is useful to the reader of Beauvoir for the reasons outlined above and further discussed 
later on in the chapter.  
I will begin by describing how Nishida locates agency in a space of relation rather 
than a solitary subject. Then I will show how turning to Beauvoir’s descriptions of self-
other interactions within The Second Sex allows us to both visualize Nishida’s model of 
the relational self as well as consider the implications of his view. Next, I will show how 
Nishida’s view of agency is tied to his ethics of place. Then, I will move to Beauvoir’s 
ethics, which oscillate between privileging the subject and privileging a notion of situated 
freedom. We will see that ethics and ontology are intertwined in both Nishida and 
Beauvoir’s philosophical projects due to the fact that the vulnerability of the relational 
self leads to ideal forms of action that embrace this vulnerability rather than flee it. 
 
The Agency of Place 
 As we saw in the last chapter, Nishida attempts to philosophize from a non-
dualistic standpoint. Instead of employing object logic, which reifies living beings, he 
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aims to capture experience by beginning with action, which includes an environment 
wherein the action takes place.  
We consider our selves or our consciousness to be separated from the 
world…we consider self and thing to be counterposed. The philosophy of 
modern subjectivism takes the self, or something called consciousness, as 
its point of departure and tries to view the world from the self, tries to 
think from interiority to the transcendental; but never is the self itself, as 
such, problematized in any profound way. But it is what is called the self 
or consciousness that is thought as the singular determination of the world 
that itself determines itself.326   
 
While “viewing the world from the self” means that the philosopher operates from the 
assumption that there is a hard division between interior and exterior reality, Nishida 
wants to draw into focus the fact that the world is always acting on the self. Instead of 
thinking that the self acts on the world from a stoic, private sphere of volition, Nishida 
calls into question this unilateral notion of agency: “To act is of necessity always at the 
same time to be acted upon.”327 Our very intentions depend upon and are tied to a world 
of experience that we didn’t produce. The world is the locus of agency, or determination, 
for Nishida; the self is only an expression of the world. However, Nishida is careful to 
say that this does not mean that we do not possess free will. Like Beauvoir, he implies 
that there is a difference between unconditioned freedom and freedom which emerges out 
of situation:  
While individual and universal are mutually determining, the individual 
can neither determine the universal nor vice versa. Moreover, such a world 
of reality should be regarded as the self determination of place....This is 
because it is always the intersection of subjectivity and objectivity. The 
self determination of the active self is the affirmation of the self negation 
of such a world. If we define the self determination of the world as an 
organic development and define the activity of the self from such a 
determination, the freedom of the individual is lost. But the dialectical 
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world advances by taking self-negation as medium. It is the self 
determination of the world which is both one qua many and many qua one. 
We touch the absolute at each and every step.328  
 
Here Nishida notes that by highlighting the agency of the world, he does not mean to 
imply that the world shapes the self in a unilateral manner. However, if it is incorrect to 
claim that the world determines the self, and the self determines the world, than how can 
they be “mutually determining”? The answer lies in Nishida’s statement that agency 
issues from basho, or place. We can grasp Nishida’s point in this passage if we recall his 
notion of absolute nothingness. As absolute nothingness signifies that all beings are 
empty of intrinsic essence, there is no easily identifiable locus that houses a being’s 
intention. It is important to take note of the fact that absolute nothingness is not an entity, 
for Nishida. It is a concept that stands for the fact that identity does not contain purely 
individual elements; rather, individuality issues from relations between many things. 
Therefore, the root of identity is baseless; Nishida’s way of describing baselessness is to 
use the term “absolute nothingness.” For example, if we want to speak of the identity of a 
riverbank, there is nothing about the riverbank that is wholly individual. It’s identity is 
composed entirely of “non-individual elements”: the river, soil, rocks, plants, minerals, 
air, etc. While even if we agree that beings don’t have essences, we may still believe that 
we can point to the bodies of beings as the locus of agency. However, as we saw above, 
the concept of absolute nothingness discounts the idea that anything is purely individual. 
Even bodies depend upon natural elements, sustenance, the existence of other bodies, etc. 
Therefore, one can’t easily point to a body and describe it as an individual agent without 
allowing other forces and entities that it relies upon to also be called agents. Thus, we can 
conclude that “mutual determination” cannot signify two purely self-determining entities 
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influencing each other. By stating that the “medium” of the dialectical world is self-
negation, Nishida is again referencing the underlying reality of absolute nothingness. 
However, self-negation is also an ethical ideal for Nishida. By refuting the perspective of 
object logic and singular determination, one allows one’s action to issue from a place 
beyond egocentrism. We will see in the section on Nishida’s ethics that the ideal form of 
action requires self-negation. Self-negation involves surrendering to the fact that one 
cannot will oneself to act ethically. 
 Nishida’s works repeatedly undermine the idea of a solitary, self-originating and 
self-sustaining individual. Creation originates from a field. He expresses this notion 
through the phrase “the self determination of the dialectical universal.”329 As we saw in 
the last chapter, Nishida embraces the Buddhist view that all beings are empty of intrinsic 
essence; identity emerges through a confluence of relations, including Others, social-
historical discourses, the material world, etc. Here, “dialectical universal” expresses this 
view that beings don’t gain their identities through distinct essences. However, agency 
must be located in this place, which is itself groundless, because viewing the world as a 
collection of distinct “objects” is mistaken. Additionally, in his last essay, he writes “That 
the universal has its existence without any ground of its own in its self-determination 
means that it has its existence in its particularization and ultimately in its 
individuation.”330 Here, Nishida means that the agency of the place itself owes its 
existence to that through which it expresses itself, i.e., beings: “The mutual relationship 
between absolutely opposing things is expressive. Absolute Being does not transcend the 
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relative, but it has its existence and sees itself through its absolute self-negation.”331 
Nishida’s descriptions of the dynamic between self and world mirrors that of the creation 
of the world through interpenetration in Huayen Buddhism.332 The basic idea is that the 
individual is a point of the world rather than being a distinct entity. The world expresses 
itself through the individual point of the self while the self expresses itself in the space of 
the world.  
As we saw in the last chapter, Nishida’s later works are guided by the desire to 
further develop his theories of basho and absolutely contradictory self-identity by 
affirming the agency of the historical world, i.e. how social structures and past events act 
on the self. In this phase of his thought, Nishida focuses on action and production. 
Created objects become “public” and go on to act on their producers and the wider 
community.333 The self acts on the world by transforming ideas into actions and physical 
objects that become public. The world of created objects, made by others, acts on the self 
as well. Nishida concludes that the self is “made” by its own “making” and the “making” 
of others. The individual is a “self-expressing point of the world.” 
 For my purposes, I am interested in Nishida’s discussion of how this place of 
expression is described as intersubjective. Therefore, we will return to Nishida’s notion 
of basho as “the social.”  
The self-identity of absolute contradictories can be conceived from the 
experience of the personal self which exists in an I-Thou relation. 
Therefore, social and historical determination may be said to lie at the 
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very ground of reality. For the idea of the personal world as merely 
subjective or as form doesn’t escape being the idea of an immanent unity 
which fails to see that the person can be considered only as the affirmation 
of absolute negation. The true person must see the absolute other within 
himself and his self within the absolute other.334 
 
Here Nishida connects self-negation to the I-Thou relation. The Other as a negating 
presence is integral to the self’s very identity. The self lacks an essence or an interior 
space of agency; it is not an “immanent unity.” Nishida refers to the self as “the 
affirmation of absolute negation” because it forms itself out of emptiness, or negation. 
The ideal self, for Nishida, confronts its own baselessness; part of this confrontation 
involves realizing its lack of intrinsic essence and subsequent connection to others.  
If absolutely self-contradictory identity can be likened to the way that identity is 
formed out of a confluence of relations then it makes sense to liken it to intersubjective 
relations in which human beings mutually determine each other. We can understand this 
point concretely if we agree that we learn about who we are when we are called on to 
express our likes and dislikes, ambitions and fears, etc. to another. I believe that 
Nishida’s point when he says that “social and historical determination” is the foundation 
of reality is that self-other relations are historical. As Nishida is always concerned with 
unity, each individual moment must be tied together by continuity. I believe that 
“historical” in this context means that our relations possess a temporal unity. However, it 
also refers to the already formed world, which is the site of interacting forces. While 
Nishida’s own examples of interacting forces within a social-historical place are scant in 
number, Beauvoir’s The Second Sex provides a wealth of such examples in the form of 
phenomenological descriptions and excerpts from literature.  
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Nishida describes “social determination” again by pointing to the formative power 
of myth: 
What I call social determination is not, as is usually thought, something 
like the constitutive principle of society abstracted from its historical 
basis. It is the activity of self-determination of the world of the affirmation 
of absolute negation. Even what we call myth is not merely subjective but 
the constitutive principle of such a world…Thus it is in the direction of the 
absolute negation of such a world that the world of material substance can 
be conceived; its affirmation qua negation can be thought to be reflecting 
consciousness; contrariwise, in the direction of its absolute affirmation, 
the personal world can be conceived. Even what is called the world of 
“personality” is established according to social determinations. When the 
world is seen merely as perceptual or epistemological object, then the 
world of material substance is conceived to be the most universal, the 
primary world, and something like the biological world or society is 
conceived to be merely a particular, secondary world.335  
 
Intersubjective influence is grounded in a historical world. By stating that myth is not 
“merely subjective,” we see that Nishida aims to highlight the creative power that ideas, 
or cultural discourses, wield in the formation of a society. He also aims to refute the idea 
that material reality is more basic of fundamental than ideal reality. Nishida wants the 
reader to take seriously the notion that the world is determined by historically-grounded 
myths. By following this with a statement that “personality” is formed through social 
determinations, Nishida once again points to an intersubjective realm that gives rise to 
identity. The term social is an effective example of what Nishida means by dialectic 
because it is a realm of mutually interacting forces. Furthermore, we see that the 
historical world exerts a formative influence through myths. This point gives support to 
the idea that when Nishida writes of the influence of the historical world on the subject, 
he includes “myths.” I believe that myths could be considered to include social historical 
discourses. If this is the case, then Nishida’s writings on the historical world’s “making” 
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of the self resonate with Beauvoir’s. Such a commonality lends weight to my comparison 
of the two authors and to my discussion of how Beauvoir’s narratives can act as fitting 
illustrations of Nishida’s claims about the self and the historical world.  
 
What Beauvoir Offers Nishida’s Notion of the Agency of Place 
While Nishida maintains that the self is born in a historical world of relations that 
determines it, he gives few real world examples of this model of selfhood in his writings. 
Turning to Beauvoir’s descriptions of self-other relations in The Second Sex allows us to 
both picture real world examples of how the social-historical place determines the self as 
well as consider the implications of Nishida’s model of selfhood. The narratives in 
Beauvoir’s text demonstrate the ways that the individuality and agency of the self are 
products of historical discourses and events. The self is an agent through its 
determinations, just like the self that acts is the self that is born out of the historical 
world, for Nishida. Such descriptions help us envision what Nishida means when he says 
that the self is something that is made.336  
First we will look to a passage that clarifies what Nishida means by the “historical 
world”; then, we will examine passages from The Second Sex. 
Historical reality is not something that we can just conceive by means of 
the logic of objectification. The active self is unable to enter the world of 
objects postulated by the logic of objectification. Our self exists in the 
historical world as a contradictory existence. Having said this, however, I 
do not intend to ignore the logic of objectification. The world of historical 
reality is not the appearance of what already exists. Instead it must be 
creative. That which is must be such that its essence is generation itself, 
and its generation is essence itself.337  
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The individuality and agency of the self is both affirmed and negated by the agency of 
social-historical discourses, institutions, and created and natural objects. The self is both 
created, that is born, and also creative in that it produces new human beings, objects, 
ideas, etc. The self is thus a contradictory identity in that its identity emerges as a result 
of being differentiated and differentiating itself from a sphere of others. Given the 
abstractness of this passage and the many others that reference the historical world, is 
there a way that Beauvoir can shed light on the self that is a “contradictory existence” in 
the “historical world” that is fundamentally creative? 
Given Beauvoir’s view that the Other’s recognition is integral to the self’s 
existence and self-conception, The Second Sex can be read as concretizing this claim. She 
does this by showing how the patterns of self-other interactions, especially those between 
men and women, are grounded in historical situations. One’s situation, for Beauvoir, is 
comprised of one’s social roles within public and private realms, material opportunities, 
political rights, and cultural discourses. Broadly, The Second Sex demonstrates the ways 
in which human existence, in particular female existence, is mediated by these 
variables.338 While Beauvoir’s guiding concern throughout the text is how woman’s 
historical situation led her to occupy the role of Other to man, the text also provides a 
model of the ways that social discourses and concrete historical positions deeply 
determine the situation out of which identity emerges.  
More specifically, Beauvoir’s analysis of the psychological ties between men and 
women in this work can be used to illustrate the ways in which self-other relations 
determine the self. Beauvoir describes the way that a woman’s self-relation is structured 
by her relation to men and historical discourses of femininity: 
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She cannot have arrogant pride in her body as long as male approval has 
not confirmed her young vanity. And this is just what frightens her; the 
lover is even more terrifying than a gaze: he is a judge; he is going to 
reveal her to herself in her truth…now the [man’s] eyes are really there; 
impossible to cheat; impossible to fight: a mysterious freedom decides, 
and this decision is final.339 
 
She does not separate man’s desire from love of her own self.340  
[Woman] wants to feel like a woman for her own personal satisfaction. 
She only succeeds in accepting herself from the perspective of both the 
present and the past by combining the life she has made for herself with 
the destiny prepared for her by her mother, her childhood games, and her 
adolescent fantasies.341 
 
While these passages illustrate how men and women possess the deep-seated desire to be 
recognized by each other, they also illustrate that the way that each wants to be 
recognized depends upon the social discourses of his or her situation. At first glance, 
these quotations describe individuals who act in bad faith by searching for affirmation of 
a fixed image of themselves from the Other. But the deeper point is that the weight of 
one’s situation compels one to relate to oneself by seeking recognition of these discourses 
from the Other. The first two passages reference the social discourse that woman’s worth 
is determined by a man’s judgment of whether or not she is found attractive and sexually 
appealing. This myth is woven into the basic structure of self-other relations in which the 
self seeks recognition from the Other. The woman seeks confirmation of the social 
discourse; she wants to be recognized for filling out this discourse. As we saw in Chapter 
3, the third passage references competing drives within women. We see this clearly in 
this passage when fulfillment is described as hinging upon woman’s free projects as well 
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as the degree to which she lives out her role as “woman.” If we think of the way that the 
self “gets itself back from the Other,” in the scenario that Beauvoir presents, than woman 
doesn’t just seek recognition of “the life she has prepared for herself”; she seeks 
recognition on the basis of discourses of femininity. The implication of such a view when 
put into relation with the two preceding passages is her projects are not entirely of her 
own making; the projects themselves are influenced by these same discourses. Moreover, 
we saw above that one’s projects are only made meaningful when they are affirmed by 
others. Therefore, regardless of whether we speak of an authentic form of existence or 
one that seeks to affirm a fixed image of oneself, identity emerges in relation to the 
discourses and practices of one’s situation and is radically dependent upon the whims of 
the Other. 
These passages are fitting illustrations of Nishida’s concepts of self-contradictory 
identity, I-Thou relations, and the historical world. Here the self is self-contradictory 
identity by existing as a unique reflection of interacting forces within a social-historical 
situation. Nishida writes 
Our self-consciousness does not take place in a merely closed up, 
windowless self. It consists in the fact that the self, by transcending itself, 
faces and expresses the world. When we are self-conscious, we are already 
self-transcending. But such an evident truth has no place in a philosophy 
that substantializes the self and the act through some dogmatism based on 
object logic.”342 
 
Nishida’s point is that we don’t understand ourselves from within ourselves. Self-
consciousness means consciousness of that which is “outside” the boundaries of a 
narrowly conceived object-like self. Our self-understanding occurs through the world 
expressing itself within us. The Beauvoir passages above fit this way of describing the 
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self. The cultural myths of femininity express themselves through the self. When Nishida 
discusses the historical world’s “self-determination” and expression through the self, we 
can look to such passages from Beauvoir that demonstrate the force of self-other relations 
within the historical world in the constitution of the self. These passages also fit what I 
think Nishida means when he writes that the self is both “made” and “making.” The self 
is “made” through the traditions,343 or social discourses, within its historical world and 
also that which “makes” or creates itself out of these discourses. While Nishida’s 
discussion of making typically refers to the creation of physical objects, I think that the 
fact that he alludes to tradition means that we can extend his discussion of “making” to 
personal identity. When Nishida says that the self is “made,” he means that agency comes 
from outside of oneself from an intersubjective, historical space. Here, we see from these 
Beauvoir passages how the self’s freedom emerges out of a situation. Nishida wants to 
eradicate dualisms like matter and consciousness, world and self, etc. Beauvoir’s 
discussion of the interweaving of woman’s freedom, what she wants, and the force of 
worldly determinations (social-historical discourses) follows in line with Nishida’s 
abstract statements against dualistic notions of self-determination and a determining 
world.  
 The problem with Nishida’s logical structures of self-other and self-world mutual 
determination is that the reader has difficulty visualizing how such structures play out in 
real life experience. Beauvoir allows us to really see how agency can’t be conceived of 
dualistically because social-historical discourses, in her case those concerning gender, are 
not completely distinct from our transcendence, or ability to choose and desire freely. 
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This is clearly evident in the line “[Woman] wants to feel like a woman for her own 
personal satisfaction.”344 I believe that this is a real-life illustration of Nishida’s notion 
that the individual is a “self-expressing point of the world.” Furthermore, Nishida’s 
emphasis on the creativity of the historical world (the idea that historical reality is not 
simply that which is “already made”) can be understood by looking to Beauvoir’s 
description that one’s experience is the combination of transcendence (freedom) and 
immanence (a social-historical situation which includes discourses and practices).  
While Nishida speaks of the artist whose creation emerges out of the interplay of 
an artistic tradition that preceded him and his own particular expression of his situation, 
Beauvoir reminds the reader of the darker side of the interplay of one’s historical 
situation and self-expression. She uses examples of slaves and women who live in 
societies where they are not allowed to enter into free, reciprocal relationships with 
others. She reveals how the discourses and practices that mediate their own self-
understanding restrict their avenues for expression, thus denying the possibility that the 
Other will listen. Nishida writes that what is “made” undoubtedly affects the maker, but 
we see that there is more at stake in the vision of self-other interactions that Beauvoir 
gives. While Beauvoir’s narrative descriptions can be utilized as illustrations of Nishida’s 
own model of the self, Beauvoir’s own project has a distinct social political agenda, as 
mentioned earlier. While her own aim is to incite reflection on sexual oppression, the 
passages discussed earlier nevertheless demonstrate the interweaving of individuality and 
the social-historical world. Moreover, pairing her works with Nishida’s is beneficial to 
the reader of Nishida because they show how the world’s expression through the self 
could refer to the expression of oppressive discourses. The few examples that Nishida 
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gives do not touch on the negative implications of his ontological vision. As Nishida 
himself was accused of supporting Japanese militarism and fascism during the Pacific 
War when his highly abstract wartime writings made startlingly concrete references to the 
Japanese state, I believe that an examination of how his logical structures of self-other 
and self-world interactions might reflect actual social issues is sorely needed.345 As 
Beauvoir’s writings seldom stray from real life instances of oppression, they push the 
reader of Nishida to examine the implications of the relational self. 
 
Nishida’s Ethics of Place 
 Now that we have examined Nishida’s theory of the agency of place and seen 
how The Second Sex can aid in concretizing Nishida’s claims, we will turn to the 
implications of his view. Thus, the question posed earlier remains: If the self is reliant on 
that which is outside itself to be itself then what becomes of the individual agency that 
seems necessary in order to make ethical decisions? Answering this question requires an 
investigation of Nishida’s own view of the ethics of place. As mentioned before, we will 
see that Nishida’s discussion of the ethical agent is weighted towards the side of the 
world, which contrasts with Beauvoir’s, which emphasizes the self. I will turn now to 
Nishida’s discussion of the ethical agent; I will focus on his last essay here, as it deals 
directly with ethics. 
  Understanding Nishida’s view of morality requires understanding the influence of 
Mahayana Buddhism, especially the Zen and Shin traditions, on his thought. In the 
Mahayana Buddhist teaching, the two core virtues are wisdom (Skt. prajna) and 
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compassion (karuna). In brief, wisdom rests upon a non-conceptual, bodily realization of 
interdependent co-arising, i.e., the ultimate non-duality of beings due to their lack of 
intrinsic essences. Another way to formulate this insight is to refer to the doctrine of 
anatman, or no-self. If all beings depend on other beings for their existence and identity, 
than “self,” when it refers to an unchanging, reified core, is solely a conventional way of 
understanding the self. Ultimate reality is characterized by impermanence and non-
duality between self and world. Realizing non-duality leads to spontaneous compassion 
for others. Before the realization, one’s interactions with others are colored by attachment 
to the self and one’s own interests. The compassion is “spontaneous” because it does not 
originate from the individual’s will. When belief in one’s capacity as a center of self-
directed moral agency is shed, than the space of nothingness becomes the birthplace of 
spontaneous compassion.  
In Buddhist ethics there is a curious entangling of ontology and ethics. Thus, 
while all beings are fully relational, the ideal person is she who affirms what is. However, 
if this is the case, we might wonder why all individuals are not automatically ethical. The 
answer lies in the fact that while the deeper reality of the self is emptiness, egocentric 
desires often prevent the self from realizing emptiness.  
 One can glimpse these notions in Nishida’s last essay, which is concerned with 
the awakening of religious consciousness:   
Religious questions are not concerned with what we ought to be as that 
which acts, or how we should act. Rather, they deal with the nature and 
the mode of existence of the self…One often tries to give a foundation to 
our religious need based on the imperfection of the erring, deluded 
self…so long as there is an implicit faith in one’s own moral capacity, it is 
not the religious mind.346 
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Developing religious consciousness is the path to moral action for Nishida. Religious 
consciousness only comes about when individual agency is displaced. As we saw in the 
last chapter, our finitude with respect to our own mortality and our ability to know the 
future or what the end of life entails provokes intense anxiety. Loss and trauma bring us 
face to face with how little control we have over our own bodies. However, when we 
realize our lack of control, this opens up the possibility for ethical action that originates 
from a space of no-self. Nishida writes, “One embraces faith only having completely 
exhausted one’s resources.”347 Here we see that realizing the self’s vulnerability is 
actually the route to moral action. 
We see the direct coupling of wisdom and compassion in Nishida’s reflections on 
the Medieval Shin Buddhist master, Shinran: 
Wisdom in religion lies in knowing wisdom itself. Virtue in religion lies in 
enacting virtue itself. Every person, no matter who he is, must return to the 
original body of his own naked self; he must once let go from the cliff’s 
ledge and come back to life after perishing, or he cannot know them. In 
other words, only the person who has been able to experience deeply what 
it is to be “foolish/stubble-haired” can know wisdom and virtue…348 
 
True agency for Nishida is free of conscious intent. Nishida embraces Shinran’s view of 
the ultimate foolishness of human beings. According to Shinran, try as we might, we are 
unable to will ourselves to consistently perform moral actions. Understanding the end of 
Nishida’s thought, if we can make such a statement by considering his final summative 
essay, allows us to understand his protests against object logic. In the “Historical Body” 
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Nishida calls philosophers to return to everyday experience, which is characterized by 
“acting and making.”349 However, Nishida’s turn to the historical world is motivated by 
criticism that his philosophy is excessively focused on the internal world of the self 
without outlining the influence of the social-historical world on the self. In an effort to 
demonstrate that his philosophy is concerned with ethical action, Nishida cites the 
Chinese Zen Master Lin-chi Lu’s saying, “he is master of himself wherever he goes” in 
order to describe the religiously self-aware person. Once the grasping ego is shed, 
“infinite compassion wells forth. Love is something objective.”350 Nishida’s point is that 
religious self-realization is more than “individual peace of mind.”  
 
Beauvoir’s Notion of Agency 
Now that we have investigated Nishida’s notion of the agency and ethics of 
basho, we will turn to Beauvoir’s theory of human agency and her “ethics of ambiguity.” 
While both authors describe agency as issuing from a place of constituted and 
constituting forces, we will see how her account differs from Nishida’s, as she 
emphasizes the agency of the individual more than one’s historical situation. Beauvoir’s 
language of “assuming one’s freedom” leads the reader to think in terms of an individual 
ego making decisions rather than a being that is truly empty of an individual essence.  
As we saw in Chapter 3, Beauvoir uses the term ambiguity to capture the fact that 
human existence is comprised of being an object, or facticity, before others (i.e. 
constituted in ways that are out of our control) and a subject, or transcendence, (i.e. 
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possessing the capacity to constitute ourselves). Our immanence reflects how we are 
historically situated bodies that are subject to biological processes, social discourses, and 
the judgments of others. On the other hand, regarding the subjective dimension, we are 
also freedoms that separate themselves from the passivity of the situated body through 
thought and projects.351   
While the reader may interpret facticity as having a constraining effect on our 
freedom, her notion of the self is that freedom arises out of a concrete situation. The 
deeper idea here is that identity does not issue from an inner individual will; rather, it 
forms itself out of a complex network of social and historical relations, practices, and 
discourses. Therefore, even when Beauvoir speaks of transcendence as the birthplace of 
our action and projects, it seems that transcendence cannot be completely extricated from 
immanence.   
While I do not contest the fact that freedom is situated for Beauvoir, I believe 
Beauvoir’s Existentialist leaning leads her to subtly privilege transcendence, or our 
ability to exercise our individual freedom. We can see from the passages below that the 
self becomes truly human by assuming its freedom.  
Only that in which I recognize my being is mine, and I can only recognize 
it where it is engaged. In order for an object to belong to me, it must have 
been founded by me. It is totally mine only if I founded it in its totality. 
The only reality that belongs entirely to me is, therefore, my act.352 
 
Indeed, cut off from his transcendence, reduced to the facticity of his 
presence, an individual is nothing; it is by his project that he fulfills 
himself, by the end at which he aims that he justifies himself; thus, this 
justification is always to come.353  
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It is through inventive, future-directed projects that the individual fulfills herself. 
Furthermore, it is through action that one is an individual and receives validation for 
one’s individuality. It is even clearer in this next passage that while human existence is 
comprised of both transcendence and immanence, transcendence is prized: 
One cannot save a man by showing him that that dimension of his being 
by which he is a stranger to himself and an object for others is conserved. 
Undoubtedly man is present to the entire universe as a given. At each 
instant, I have the entire past of humanity behind me, before me its entire 
future; I am situated in one spot on the earth, in the solar system, among 
the nebulae. Each of the objects that I handle refers me to all the objects 
that constitute the world, and my existence refers me to that of all men, but 
this is not sufficient for the universe to be mine. What is mine is what I 
have founded; it is the accomplishment of my own project.354 
 
In the first part of this quotation, Beauvoir refers to the historically situated part of our 
existence. The passage is oriented around the possibility of “salvation”; the situated 
dimension of our existence is determined to be incapable of saving us. Putting our 
individual mark on the world, i.e., employing our transcendence, is the route to salvation. 
It is in passages like these, taken from her earliest essay, “Pyrrhus and Cineas,” as well as 
the later  Ethics of Ambiguity, that we see a disentangling of transcendence and 
immanence. While it is one thing to say, as Beauvoir does at the beginning of The Ethics 
of Ambiguity that man is comprised of two distinct dimensions (transcendence and 
immanence), it is quite another to describe how one bleeds into the other. While The 
Second Sex provides countless narrative descriptions where myths of femininity color the 
way that women understand their individual identities as well as inform their projects, the 
vision of transcendence that we get from the passages above is that it is the individual’s 
way of breaking free of immanence. This leads me to assert that Beauvoir’s discussion of 
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agency subtly privileges the subject. From her descriptions, it seems possible to separate 
oneself from the weight of situation and create a project that is entirely one’s own.  
 
Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity 
 Beauvoir’s view of ethics rests upon the individual who decides without appeal to 
systems of ethics when faced with ethical dilemmas. For example, she writes, “Ethics is a 
triumph of freedom over facticity, and the sub-man feels only the facticity of his 
existence.”355 She warns that confining oneself to “ready-made values” shuts off the 
possibility that we can introduce new values. Furthermore, refusing to exercise one’s 
freedom leaves one open to being coerced by others. Much of Beauvoir’s ethical project 
is concerned with meaning and justifying one’s existence. She is worried that without 
justification and the creation of values, nihilism will set in. It is our capacity to be future-
directed that saves us, for Beauvoir. The human being is not constituted to live in the 
present without continually orienting herself toward the future. Part of this projecting 
toward the future is also an appeal to the Other for justification. Beauvoir describes the 
“sub-man” as he who is trapped in facticity; this means that he never establishes a “bond 
with the universe.” He doesn’t seek to move beyond facticity by engaging in projects that 
would tie him to the world and give him reasons to act. 
No project has meaning in the world disclosed by such an existence. Man 
is defined as a wild flight. The world about him is bare and incoherent. 
Nothing ever happens; nothing merits desire or effort. The sub-man makes 
his way across a world deprived of meaning toward a death which merely 
confirms his long negation of himself. The only thing revealed in this 
experience is the absurd facticity of an existence which remains forever 
unjustified if it has not known how to justify itself.356 
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However, as ethical dilemmas often involve social relationships, beyond her interest in 
individual projects, Beauvoir is also committed to an ethics which authentically relates to 
the freedom of the Other. By examining the “adventurer” character type, we see that 
assuming one’s freedom and mutual recognition do not necessarily go hand in hand.  
The adventurer devises a sort of moral behavior because he assumes his 
subjectivity positively. But if he dishonestly refuses to recognize that this 
subjectivity necessarily transcends itself toward others [he depends on 
others] he will enclose himself in a false independence which will indeed 
be servitude. To the free man he will be only a chance ally in whom one 
can have no confidence; he will easily become an enemy. His fault is 
believing that one can do something for oneself without others and even 
against him.357  
 
Here Beauvoir reveals that one cannot actually assume one’s transcendence alone. 
Assuming one’s transcendence means that one takes up the fact that one is a “lack” and 
applies the future-directed aspect of existence to the creation of projects. However, 
authentic moral behavior doesn’t mean that one simply commits oneself to a project; it 
signifies that one’s project is taken up “towards others.” Assuming one’s freedom 
includes the desire that one’s projects be recognized. As we saw in Chapter 3, the 
overarching theme within Beauvoir is discussion of self-other relations is justification. 
The self is in need of justification of its existence from the Other. Instead of championing 
individual values, Beauvoir describes existentialist ethics as a “surpassing of 
subjectivity”: 
Thus, it can be seen to what an extent those people are mistaken – or are 
lying – who try to make of existentialism a solipsism, like Nietzsche, who 
would exalt the bare will to power. According to this interpretation, as 
widespread as it is erroneous, the individual, knowing himself and 
choosing himself as the creator of his own values, would seek to impose 
them on others. The result would be a conflict of opposed wills enclosed 
in their solitude. But we have seen that on the contrary, to the extent that 
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passion, pride lead to this tyranny and its conflicts, existentialist ethics 
condemns them, if it is true that every project emanates from subjectivity, 
it is also true that this subjective movement establishes by itself a 
surpassing of subjectivity. Man can find a justification of his own 
existence only in the existence of other men.358 
 
Here, too, Beauvoir links morality with the human quest for meaning. We see that 
individually created values are not the end of morality. One’s values are directed at an 
intersubjective space and must be recognized by others.  
 We saw in Chapter 3 that one’s self understanding, given the fact that selfhood is 
based on a “project toward the other,” is a battle between the temptation to coerce the 
Other into affirming a static self-concept of one’s own choosing and the opposing 
possibility of living without static justification from the Other. Moral behavior is based 
upon assuming one’s transcendence, but the accompanying attitude must include 
surrendering to the fact that the Other is free to judge one’s project as he wishes; he is 
free to give or deny recognition. Our own freedom and the freedom of others is 
experienced with anxiety, but it is through relating to the Other without denying her 
otherness or coercing her that one is moral. Assuming one’s freedom involves a 
conversion, which entails a re-orientation with respect to one’s relation to the other: 
A conversion can start within passion itself. The cause of the passionate 
man’s torment is his distance from the object; but he must accept it instead 
of trying to eliminate it. It is the condition within which the object is 
disclosed. The individual will then find his joy in the very wrench which 
separates him from the being of which he makes himself a lack. It is only 
as something strange, forbidden, as something free that the other is 
revealed as an other. And to love him genuinely is to love him in his 
otherness and in that freedom by which he escapes. Passion is converted to 
genuine freedom only if one destines his existence to other existences 
through the being – whether thing or man – at which he aims, without 
hoping to entrap it in the destiny of the in-itself. We see that no existence 
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can be validly fulfilled if it is limited to itself. It appeals to the existence of 
others.359  
 
While our examination of cases of traumatic bonding in the introduction focused on the 
victim’s loss of selfhood, it may be fruitful to consider the oppression itself. The root of 
coercive tactics that aim to isolate and dismantle an individual’s agency is a genuine 
denial of the individual’s freedom. As Hegel’s dialectic demonstrates, human beings 
possess the capacity to enslave the Other’s consciousness. Beauvoir’s injunction to relate 
to the Other by respecting “that freedom by which he escapes” is more compelling when 
we are faced with the consequences of entrapping another’s freedom modeled by the 
examples in the introduction.  
Now that we have examined Beauvoir’s discussion of agency and ethics, we are 
in a position to turn how Nishida’s basho may be useful to the reader of Beauvoir.  
 
What Basho Offers Beauvoir’s Ambiguity 
 
While Beauvoir emphasizes that the self at times alienates itself into a fixed 
image of itself, e.g. a social role, and at other times authentically assumes its situation, 
Nishida focuses on the agency of the historical world rather than the subject’s drive to 
“posit itself” or become a project toward the Other. The historical world that shapes the 
human being is actually the condition for individuality; this allows Nishida to say that the 
world expresses itself through the self. Beauvoir’s idea that social discourses play a large 
part in constructing our subjectivity is more in line with Nishida’s interest in the 
determining forces within the historical world. However, Beauvoir’s language of 
“assuming one’s freedom” leads the reader to think in terms of an individual ego making 
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decisions rather than a being that is truly empty of an individual essence. Given her 
commitment to social activism and existentialist ethics, it is not surprising that Beauvoir 
seems to suggest that transcendence is more truly “human” than one’s facticity. 
According to Beauvoir, to be at home in the world and to allow for humanist ethics, one 
must realize that transcendence is a defining dimension of one’s being.360 Despite this 
leaning, Beauvoir states that human existence is ambiguous: we are always both subjects 
and objects (determining and determined). Here, Nishida’s concept of basho, or a field of 
relations, offers to the reader of Beauvoir a singular, non-dual metaphor of human 
existence that includes within it the agency of the historical world as well as the 
individual’s distinct actions that flow out of her situation.  
Recalling the earlier tension in Beauvoir’s work, i.e. statements within The Ethics 
of Ambiguity that depict transcendence and immanence as separable versus passages from 
The Second Sex, which demonstrate the intertwining of the two, basho offers the reader 
of Beauvoir a way of thinking about these aspects of experience as completely mutually 
determining without losing individual freedom. As we saw in Chapter 3, the struggle for 
recognition is a defining part of selfhood; the self is set up to seek affirmation from the 
Other. Beauvoir emphasizes that immanence, or one’s situatedness, structures and 
motivates the recognition that the self seeks. Behind this historically-influenced manner 
of searching for recognition is the self’s deep-seated desire to have its existence justified 
by another. The justification sought is often in the form of discourses.  
Basho provides a metaphor for how the self is a unique conduit for social-
historical discourses. However, instead of only reflecting the one-way determination of 
world to self, Nishida describes historical place as fundamentally creative; this means 
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that the self transforms those same discourses. It is not as if there is a fully formed self 
that acts on the world though. Both self and world, consciousness and materiality, 
intersect with each other fluidly. As a place of mutually interacting and determining 
forces, basho shifts the weight away from the subject. This image is helpful when 
thinking about Beauvoir’s notion of the relational self, which is a worldly entity that is 
always directed outside itself. Furthermore, while basho shifts the weight away from the 
subject, this does not mean that individuality and the impulse to make ethical decisions is 
lost. Rather, this term describes how our individuality is shot through with worldly, non-
individual elements. Instead of existing as atomistic entities with rigid borders, we are 
individual “self-expressing points of the world.” Nishida’s point is that individuality 
cannot be separated out from materiality and history. Given Beauvoir’s commitment to 
situated freedom and the fundamental impulse to seek recognition from the Other, which 
structures our agency in a manner that is not clear-cut and unilateral, basho is a useful 
non-dual metaphor. 
 
Conclusion: Two Accounts of Agency and Ethics: Self-Negation and Self-Surpassing 
Examining Nishida and Beauvoir together is mutually illuminating. They provide 
us with two notions of agency, which end in different conceptions of the route to ethical 
action. Nishida’s vision of ethical action holds up self-negation as an ideal. Relying on 
our own intentions actually thwarts our ability to act ethically. “Trying to be good” is 
bound up with our desire to appear good, which is ultimately more about how we seek to 
appear good before others than the action itself.361 The ground of reality for Nishida is 
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our absolute finitude, which issues from the fact that reality is absolute nothingness. 
While we act and think in ways that cover over this emptiness and finitude, confronting it 
allows us to face our own deepest reality.  
In an essay on Shinran, Nishida references the central Shin Buddhist practice of 
chanting the name of the Buddha: 
Chanting the name of Amida Buddha may be the seed of our rebirth into 
the Pure Land or our descent into hell. We have no way of knowing which 
way it will turn up…In this kind of realization we touch life eternal. 362 
 
While this religious practice is meant to assure the practitioner’s rebirth in a heavenly 
realm, the “Pure Land,” Shinran conveys his radical uncertainty about the efficacy of any 
religious practice. The deeper significance of this statement is that one never knows the 
end of one’s actions. Coming to grips with our radical uncertainty allows us to see our 
own nature – and its connection to the nature of all reality – clearly. Emptiness is at the 
heart of the self and our actions. Here we see how Nishida’s account of the agency of 
place is also active in his ethical theory. Curiously, our own vulnerability is the route to 
ethical action. Nishida’s concern with ethics hinges on absolute nothingness. While he 
references the importance of coming to see that the Other exists in the bottom of the self, 
absolute nothingness is always central. 
 Beauvoir presents an idea similar to Nishida’s discussion of self-negation when 
she references the “surpassing of subjectivity.” However, for Beauvoir, subjectivity is 
surpassed somewhat naturally because human beings are from the beginning, 
fundamentally oriented toward the Other. This directedness toward the Other issues from 
the human need for justification from the Other. Orienting action “toward an Other,” 
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however, is quite different than Nishida’s allusions to self-emptying practices aimed at 
self-negation; Beauvoir doesn’t encourage transcendence of the ego or individual will. 
Beauvoir’s emphasis on the importance of mutual recognition of freedom, the ideal of 
free men, and more specifically, her ideal of opening oneself to the Other’s judgment 
without seeking static justification from him are posited as morally exemplary behaviors 
and attitudes without much discussion of how to concretely achieve these ideals other 
than to will oneself to develop them.  
 Nishida and Beauvoir’s accounts are similar in that they each hold up human 
vulnerability as the path to ethical action. Both describe our avoidance – through fear – of 
our own finitude and encourage the reader to confront this finitude. For Beauvoir, this 
means being open to the Other’s capacity to justify one or refuse justification without 
attempting to coerce her. For Nishida, moments of loss or trauma open the self to its total 
inability to control fate. In this moment of helplessness, one can make a turnaround 
wherein one’s actions issue from absolute nothingness rather than the strivings of the ego. 
Beauvoir’s injunctions do not reference transcendence of the ego nor do they offer the 
reader specific practices that develop one’s ability to recognize the Other freely. Her 
vision of morality seems to rest upon whether or not one can will oneself to treat the 
Other as a free being. In his last essay and in “Gutoku Shinran,” Nishida states that one 
cannot rely upon one’s individual will to act ethically. This falls in line with his 
discussion of the agency of place. While not often discussed explicitly, Zen and Shin 
Buddhist practices like meditation and chanting are held up as paths to self-negation and 
self-emptying. While Beauvoir emphasizes the ways in which our freedom is situated, 
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she seems to still rely upon the efficacy of the individual will to introduce values into the 
world and to treat the Other as a free agent.    
In conclusion, examining Beauvoir and Nishida together yields two accounts of 
agency that converge on the idea that the Other is a condition of selfhood. Their 
discussions of agency are weighted towards the perspective of the self in the case of 
Beauvoir and towards the side of the world in Nishida. Their slightly different foci 
present the reader with two ways of visualizing the acting self that is a product of worldly 
relations. As Beauvoir acknowledges that human existence is ambiguous, Nishida’s term 
basho is useful to the reader of Beauvoir who tries to envision a self that is always both 
determining and determined. Again, I believe basho is an effective metaphor because it is 
non-dualistic and resists the idea that there can be a wholly individual, self-sustaining 
self. Beauvoir’s descriptions of self-other relations in The Second Sex, in turn, allow the 
reader of Nishida to picture concrete ways that the historical world acts on the self. 
Examining their ethics together provides us with two notions of self-surpassing. 
For both authors, when the Other is encountered, she or he, “negates” the self’s total 
freedom. The self is always oriented toward the Other through its self-determination or 
through its seeking of recognition. However, the surpassing of one’s individuality for 
Beauvoir relates to how self-other relations are transformed through the mutual 
recognition of freedom while Nishida’s self-surpassing entails seeking a new locus of 
ethical action, i.e. absolute nothingness. 
While their versions of ethical action are distinct, both offer us ways of thinking 
about how the end of the self’s action is blocked from view. Coming to terms with our 
uncertainty is the way to morality for both. For Nishida the realization stems from loss or 
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trauma. For Beauvoir, we never know whether or not others will recognize our projects. 
The fact that our identities are through and through relational leaves us utterly vulnerable. 
Nishida and Beauvoir present the uncertainty and vulnerability that issues from their 
concepts of the relational self in slightly different ways that expand the reader’s 
understanding of relational models of selfhood.   
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In the introduction, we saw how cases of traumatic bonding illustrated the human 
being’s fundamental need to form intersubjective bonds. We saw that in extreme 
circumstances of captivity, when separated from friends, family, and colleagues, 
individuals succumbed to forming relationships with their oppressors. Or, in the case of 
certain prisoners, if they managed to distance themselves from their captors, it was due to 
visualizing their connections to loved ones. Isolated from her peers and the significant 
people in her life, Hearst reported that her old self gradually “slipped away” in captivity. 
363 Concurrently, the agency tied to her old self faltered. These examples reveal that we 
are inherently social creatures. Knowledge of the world isn’t housed in the lone 
individual; it is shared. Our sense of reality issues from relationships with Others who 
look out onto the same world and give us feedback.  
While our intersubjective bonds sustain our identities and our sense of reality, 
they also leave us vulnerable to fracture and disintegration. After she was persistently 
mis-recognized, Hearst took on a new identity, “Tania,” and came to sympathize and 
collaborate with a rebel group’s illegal tactics. Cases of traumatic bonding are compelling 
because it is difficult to answer the question, what could the victim have done differently 
to prevent the loss of his or her self? Philosophies that address self-betterment seem to 
make the individual self central. While cliché, often repeated American cultural tropes 
like “you can only change yourself” and “Be yourself; it doesn’t matter what others think 
of you” hold a place in the cultural imaginary. Hegel, Beauvoir, and Nishida critique 
ontological and ethical standpoints that make the individual central. As we saw, these 
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authors revealed the extent to which self-understanding and ethical actions depend upon 
intersubjective recognition.  
While Hearst’s story is a dramatic example of the extent to which our agency is 
shaped by others, especially with regard to oppression, it presents a challenge to our 
ability to forsee how someone could act as an agent within such a context. In the last 
chapter, we saw how both Beauvoir and Nishida grapple with the relation between 
agency and intersubjectivity. Indeed, within these authors we find an articulation of the 
self’s dependence on the Other, but also a way to take up this dependence in a way that 
leads to self transformation. While Hegel only hints at the possibility of equal self-other 
relations in the master-slave section of the Phenomenology, Beauvoir and Nishida 
provide normative accounts of self transformation. Their discussions of agency can be 
understood more fully if we apply them imaginatively to how Patty Hearst may have 
experienced her sense of self after her release from captivity. I will lead the reader 
through a thought experiment after reviewing the main contributions of the authors in 
terms of their views of the relational self.   
Hegel shows us that despite 21st century American cultural tropes that idealize 
providing one’s own validation, our access to ourselves occurs only through the Other’s 
perception of us: “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it 
so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.” 364 When the self 
becomes aware of this, it experiences a feeling of loss. The self is no longer perceived as 
the “essential.” Hegel asserts that in the encounter with the Other, the self has “come out of 
itself.” This means that the self not only loses itself, but also sees itself in the Other. We 
saw that the self is fully relational for Hegel. It is a being that exists “for” another. It is 
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only through being for another that self-consciousness understands “the unity of itself in 
its otherness.” The self is fundamentally split between its individual desires and its 
existence for others: “A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much ‘I’ as 
‘object.’”  
Hegel tells us that the self does not possess itself because it relates to itself 
through the existence of that which is outside itself. This reality at first provokes 
antagonism; self-consciousness tends to cope with the continual loss of itself by trying to 
control and coerce the Other. We saw the extent to which Hegel’s account of the 
antagonistic attitude of consciousness toward the Other influenced Beauvoir’s thought. 
Both Hegel and Beauvoir recount how the self seeks to control the Other in order to 
reinforce a self-concept of its own choosing. As Hegel writes with reference to the 
commitments of his own time, Selbstandigkeit emerges as the ideal – albeit flawed –  
model of the self in the Phenomenology. Beauvoir, on the other hand, both challenges this 
ideal as being too abstract and also suggests that women are encouraged by social-historical 
discourses to seek recognition of themselves as pleasing, passive sexual objects rather than 
autonomous and independent subjects.  
The master-slave dialectic illustrates how attempting to dominate the Other in order 
to receive recognition fails. In the Phenomenology, the reader is able to infer that the 
recognition is powerful precisely because it is freely given. Hegel thus introduces the 
notion of mutual recognition, in which the self and the Other view each other as equals, 
both endowed with free choice. Beauvoir takes Hegel’s claim wherein the self is both 
object and I and recasts it by proposing a model of the self that is both immanent and 
transcendent. Just like the vision that we get in the first part of the chapter on self-
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consciousness of the self that exists in conflict with the object of desire and then the Other, 
Beauvoir suggests that the self undergoes a constant struggle to receive justification from 
the Other. The self is torn between two possible ways of seeking recognition: 1) the 
temptation to reify its self-concept and persuade the Other to affirm this self-concept, and 
2) the resignation to the Other’s freedom wherein the self resolves to live without coercing 
the Other to provide static justification.  
In The Second Sex, Beauvoir details the ways in which female subjectivity is 
heavily mediated by social-historical discourses and practices. While authentic existence 
opens itself to the Other’s judgment, this work highlights how women are encouraged to 
seek recognition of particular traits and attitudes described as “feminine.” In The Ethics of 
Ambiguity and The Second Sex, Beauvoir outlines the dangers of non-mutual recognition. 
Ethics is found to rest upon more than the individual’s freely-chosen projects; ethics 
depends upon the existence of other free human beings. Beauvoir argues, “We need others 
in order for our existence to become founded and necessary.” While we require 
intersubjective validation, we cannot ensure that others will recognize our projects. Thus, 
the picture of human experience that Beauvoir paints is one marked by risk and 
uncertainty. The self exists at the mercy of those who might affirm it.   
While Beauvoir describes selfhood as a “project toward the Other,” Nishida 
advances a similar notion in his often repeated phrase, “The individual determines itself 
only in relation to other individuals.” For Nishida, the self is fundamentally empty of 
intrinsic essence. However, instead of canceling out the possibility of an individual 
identity, this merely means that identity emerges through the interaction of many beings. 
Like Hegel, Nishida suggests that the self is not wholly self-determining. The self houses 
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both otherness and unity. Nishida’s concepts of the “continuity of discontinuity” and 
“living-qua-dying” demonstrate how the particular self issues from absolute nothingness. 
While the self arises and passes away in every new moment, we still experience unity. 
These concepts allow us to grasp the broader claim that all being includes a dimension of 
otherness within itself. The alterity of absolute nothingness within the particular self 
helps us to understand the alterity of the concrete Other. 
If we take seriously the idea that the individual cannot be self-producing, self-
determining, nor self-sustaining, we have to account for the ways that others and social-
historical discourses shape identity. Nishida’s notion of basho allows us to substitute a 
picture of the self as self-contained and atomistic with the metaphor of a field of 
interacting forces. Basho reveals how the self can be an individual that doesn’t determine 
itself within itself; instead, selfhood originates from what is “other,” i.e. absolute 
nothingness.  
While I have summarized key aspects of Hegel, Beauvoir, and Nishida’s models 
of the relational self, the reader may be left wondering how this knowledge is useful in 
real life experience. What is gained in concrete terms from this knowledge? And, how 
does it help us live better lives?  
While most of my dissertation concerns how selfhood is constituted through 
intersubjective recognition, we also saw how the authors made claims, in places, about 
how our intersubjective constitution impacts how we relate to others. If the self needs the 
Other in order to get itself back, then what are the implications for the ways in which the 
self treats the Other? One implication of this structure of the self is the adoption of an 
instrumentalizing attitude toward others. For example, above, I recalled Hegel’s 
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description of the self’s initial antagonism towards the Other and Beauvoir‘s account of 
the “fundamental hostility” between self and Other. The self’s desire for the Other’s 
recognition often ends up obscuring the fact that the Other always escapes the self’s 
ability to foresee or control his or her responses. Instrumentalizing attitudes, when taken 
to the extreme, are the cause of much evil in the world. When the Other’s freedom is 
forcefully ignored or denied then he or she is reduced to a mere thing that the self can do 
with as he or she wishes. The implications of such attitudes can include discrimination, 
subordination within an intimate relationship or within a society, genocide, enslavement, 
torture, and physical, emotional, and sexual abuse. Both Beauvoir and Hegel highlight 
how our humanity is tied to the exercise of our freedom when we dedicate ourselves to 
certain projects or ideals – even at the risk of death. When our ability to choose to follow 
our own ends is denied by another who desires to serve his or her own ends, we lose an 
integral aspect of our humanity.  
I think Beauvoir brings out the “fundamental hostility of consciousness” because 
it is a common response to the self’s lack of footing in a world wherein it can only get to 
itself through another. While the self is completely indebted to the Other, this reality is 
frightening because the Other is free to refuse recognition. It is only through force or 
coercion that the self can ensure that the Other will affirm him or her in the manner of his 
or her choosing, as we saw in the Hearst story. The reality is that we are always 
vulnerable to the Other’s freedom. Our task is to resist the tendency to objectify the 
Other. 
Hearst’s case makes Beauvoir’s ideal of mutual recognition all the more 
compelling. Beauvoir describes ethical comportment as choosing to remain open to the 
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Other’s judgments about oneself without trying to control the way that one gets oneself 
back from the Other.365 While Hearst was denied a voice due to persistent mis-
recognition, when the self enters into relationships of mutual recognition, it gains the 
ability to give an account of itself and envision new possible ways of being in the world 
through the Other’s affirmation. As we saw in the introduction, Mackenzie believes that 
we come to know what we want and believe in our own agency when we are listened to 
by others who treat us as equals. The prisoners who were able to resist their captors’ 
efforts at brainwashing, were able to do so through picturing past relationships that had 
afforded them with the ability to have faith in their own agency. 
Hegel, Beauvoir, and Nishida give us an original way of thinking about ethical 
action that originates from a space that is non-dualistic. As mentioned above, when we 
think of self-actualization and self-betterment, it is common to idealize acting from a 
place that emphasizes one’s own locus of control. One may even be able to glimpse the 
influence of Stoicism in this tendency, i.e. the belief that one cannot control a chaotic and 
impermanent world so one must retreat into an inner space that one can control. 
However, as both phenomenology and Buddhist philosophy have demonstrated, the 
world cannot be conceived of dualistically. Both Beauvoir and Nishida make this 
realization an integral component to their ethics. Beauvoir writes, “If it is true that every 
project emanates from subjectivity, it is also true that this subjective movement 
establishes by itself a surpassing of subjectivity. Man can find a justification of his own 
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existence only in the existence of other men.”366 If every project always already entails 
directedness toward another, then it seems that our actions are never wholly individual.  
Within a non-dualistic world, if our subjectivity is shot through with others and 
our historical place, how are we to act ethically as individuals? Hegel, Beauvoir, and 
Nishida provide different answers to this question, which revolve around their distinct 
views of history. While I focused on a small portion of the Phenomenology only, Hegel’s 
view throughout the text is that throughout human history, we come to understand the 
one-sidedness of our convictions. The limits of our views are revealed in time. With 
regard to self-other interactions, while he doesn’t provide normative claims in the master-
slave dialectic, self-consciousness comes to understand that the self is not Selbstandigkeit 
and that non-reciprocal self-other relations fail to provide it with stable recognition.  
Beauvoir’s approach to history, on the other hand, encourages continual 
transcendence in the form of the contestation of social inequality and the creation of new 
possibilities of self-understanding and action. In The Second Sex, she examines the 
situation of women throughout many different historical moments. While social-historical 
practices and discourses shape women’s self-understanding, she emphasizes that there is 
room for resistance. Beginning with her first work, “Pyrrhus and Cineas,” she describes 
human existence as comprised of both immanence and transcendence. She advocates for 
political changes to correct inequalities between the sexes as well as individual and 
societal changes in the discourses and one’s relation to these discourses that surround 
femininity. Due to her view of human experience, transcendence can never be fully 
eradicated, but it is not granted full expression in oppressive historical situations. 
Arguably, one could reduce her ethical ideal to “assuming” one’s transcendence and the 
                                               
366 Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 72 
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“essential need” to be “faced with free men.”367 Within the context of The Second Sex, 
this entails changing one’s relation to oppressive discourses and inventing new 
possibilities of existence.  
In contrast to Hegel and Beauvoir, Nishida doesn’t advocate a view of history that 
involves progress with regard to knowledge or social-political change. Instead, he is 
concerned with what underlies history, i.e. absolute nothingness. While ethical action 
stems from resisting historical discourses for Beauvoir, for Nishida, ethical action 
requires a turnaround wherein the self realizes that it cannot will itself to act ethically. 
Traumatic events involving death or loss lead the individual to realize she is at the mercy 
of forces outside her control. The resulting loss of her faith in her own efforts to control 
life can lead to the experience of the force of great compassion, i.e., absolute nothingness. 
True freedom, then, issues from her realization that she cannot control life; it stems from 
the negation of her will. Nishida’s perspective is at odds with Beauvoir’s social-political 
agenda within The Second Sex because for him, self-transformation is tied to that which 
is more fundamental than human history and beyond the scope of the individual ego. 
What do Beauvoir and Nishida have to say about human agency in response to the 
story of Patty Hearst? I contend that the authors’ different approaches to history will help 
us make sense of their views of agency, especially when we apply their views 
imaginatively to how Patty Hearst would have ideally experienced her sense of self after 
her release from captivity.  
                                               
367 Beauvoir, Philosophical Writings, 129. 
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As we saw in Chapters III and V, Beauvoir holds that our projects are not only 
directed toward others, they only become worthwhile when they are validated externally. 
In a sense, human experience is defined as a continual openness to the Other’s power to 
judge or affirm who one takes oneself to be. Hearst’s experience was one in which she 
was objectified by the Other. Her alterity and freedom was not seen or allowed full 
expression. I believe that Beauvoir would hope that Hearst would come to identify and 
deeply reflect on oppressive social discourses. I think Beauvoir would also say that 
Hearst’s experience gave her special insight into how dependent we are upon others to 
allow us to speak in our own voices, or employ our transcendence. This would surely 
instill in Hearst a deep respect for the Other’s freedom. Beauvoir would surely hope that 
her experience would make her more likely to maintain relationships of mutual 
recognition in the future because she directly experienced the trauma that results when 
relationships are not based on mutual recognition. Since being isolated from such 
relationships opens one up to the loss of one’s self, Beauvoir would hope that Hearst 
would realize that her “essential need is to be faced with free men.” Lastly, I think 
Beauvoir would claim that the oppression that Hearst endured would lead her to respond 
actively and creatively, perhaps in the form of some type of social activism. Ultimately, 
Beauvoir would hope that Hearst would emerge from her captivity with a renewed 
respect for the Other’s freedom and a passion to move beyond her oppressive situation by 
creating new projects.  
If Nishida were to assess how Hearst would ideally respond to her release, he 
would say that the experience would have completely transformed her sense of self in a 
way that would lead to her adopting an ethical-religious standpoint. As stated earlier, in 
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his view, situations of extreme trauma or loss open the self to what is our human 
condition all along, i.e. being subject to forces beyond our control. Here it is helpful to 
recall that Nishida proposes that the self is a field of relation. As human beings, we 
experience the loss of people who we love and we are subject to violence, natural 
disasters, disease, and death. Furthermore, as Nishida is concerned with questions of 
existential and religious meaning, he writes that we cannot be sure that what we think 
will bring us salvation – for example a certain religious practice – actually will. In 
Nishida’s view, the trauma that Hearst underwent would have opened her eyes to our 
actual human condition: vulnerability. However, as soon as she understood the 
powerlessness of her own individual will, she would simultaneously undergo a feeling of 
great compassion. In this moment of helplessness, one can make a turnaround wherein 
one’s actions issue from absolute nothingness rather than the strivings of the ego. 
Nishida’s notion of the way that loss or trauma can lead to self transformation can be 
grasped if we think of the way that people who have experienced hardship or tragedy at 
one point may undergo a profound shift in the way that they relate to this past. This new 
understanding injects light and energy into their lives. However, the transformation was 
not willed; rather, it came from without when they “hit rock bottom” or gave up all hope.  
In this imaginative exercise, we see that both Beauvoir and Nishida suggest that a 
relational model of the self implies that the human condition is comprised by 
vulnerability. However, both believe that we are not totally subject to the relations out of 
which we emerge. Beauvoir argues that humans always possess the capacity to resist 
historical situations and invent new ways of being by employing their transcendence. 
However, as her philosophical concept of ambiguity suggests, her vision of the human 
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condition is not fully settled; the self is always both Mitsein and separation. For her, we 
cannot give up our need for recognition, but, significantly, given her project of social-
political resistance, neither can we fully lose our freedom. While the Hearst story didn’t 
present successful resistance to oppression, Beauvoir would surely believe that in the 
aftermath of such a situation Hearst would rediscover and employ her transcendence.  
As we saw above, Nishida’s notion of individuality is closely tied to the 
realization of one’s vulnerability. In his view, when we see our own vulnerability, we are 
embraced by the all-embracing reality of emptiness. Emptiness, or absolute nothingness, 
is actually our true individuality and the basis from which we act. While the fact that all 
beings share a common basis (emptiness or absolute nothingness) may seem to preclude 
individual freedom, the Buddhist two-fold truth of form and emptiness states that all 
beings are individuals, even though they simultaneously share a unity. All beings appear 
in distinct forms, but this form emerges out of emptiness. We can think about the form as 
the individual being’s unique expression of emptiness. For example, no two roses are 
completely alike, but their individuality is dependent upon many of the same forces (e.g., 
water, soil, air, etc.). In Nishida’s view roses don’t have individual essences; they emerge 
out of emptiness, but this doesn’t mean that they aren’t individuals. So, even though the 
self is a “self-expressing point of the world,” the expression is unique. If we relate this to 
the Hearst story, then Nishida would say that Hearst’s self was an expression of a field of 
relation, but the particular expression was unique. I believe that this perspective allows 
for the possibility that Hearst’s individuality wasn’t fully eclipsed by the oppressive 
situation. 
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Broadly, Beauvoir and Nishida’s accounts of self transformation operate on 
different levels. Beauvoir idealizes social-political changes; for example, she hopes to 
transform society so that it includes citizens who are capable of mutual recognition. 
Nishida, on the other hand, doesn’t outline or advocate for social-political changes. 
Instead, he upholds the importance of an inward turn which enables the self to make 
peace with the vulnerability of being human and find new strength.   
Let us return now to further exploring the implications for ethical action given 
this dependency. Beyond the threat of bodily harm, isolation is one of the greatest risk to 
the self’s ability to act ethically. If we return to Hearst’s story, I think our subjectivist 
tendency is to ask ourselves how she could have avoided the loss of her identity. If 
ethical action depends upon the recognition of others, in an oppressive situation, the 
implication is that the self often fails to resist the Other’s coercion. The failure does, 
however, elicit a profound awareness of our place in the world as vulnerable creatures. 
Despite the risk of failure, however, there are cases of extraordinary individuals, like 
those prisoners mentioned in the introduction, who successfully resist their captors’ 
attempt at total domination and coercion within situations of isolation. However, these 
prisoners were able to preserve their agency, and thus the possibility for ethical action, 
through imagining their connection to loved ones. If the maintenance of one’s identity 
and the possibility of ethical action are both dependent on intersubjective recognition, 
then is resistance within oppression possible, even when it is not recognized? I believe 
that this question is best answered through empirical studies. However, I think that it is 
likely that most of the time these individuals are receiving real or imagined recognition, 
because Beauvoir’s point that self-awareness requires externalization is compelling.  
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As I made strong claims throughout the dissertation about the centrality of the 
Other in the constitution of the self, the reader may still wonder, is the self constituted 
exclusively through its relations to others? Our in-depth investigation of Nishida and 
Beauvoir’s work revealed that identity arises from a place or situation that includes 
social-historical discourses, practices, and imaginaries, as well as our gender, race, 
ethnicity, family history, and the natural environment in which we live. While these 
factors play a role in the formation of our identities, the authors highlight how our lives 
are fundamentally oriented “toward” others. In Chapter 4, we saw how Watsuji described 
human consciousness as always already relational. The world is never perceived by the 
self alone, because the self is attuned to the presence of others as it looks out onto the 
world. The self is not formed exclusively through its relations to others, but, as others 
frame the experience of the self, they cannot be ever easily separated out from the self’s 
identity.  
In conclusion, while our personal identity is something individual, the discussions 
of the relational self that we examined demonstrate the extent to which it is dependent 
upon the feedback that we get from our relationships with others. We grasp who we are 
through the version of ourselves that we present to others in the form of life stories, 
actions, or even our virtual social media profiles. While the Other is absolutely 
fundamental to our own process of self-discovery and understanding, his or her freedom 
causes him or her to be an unpredictable source of recognition. A self that must rely upon 
unstable Others can never be fully settled. Therefore, our self-understanding must be in 
process and variable. In their own ways, all three authors encourage us to remain open to 
the Other’s power to confer recognition, even though we are incapable of ensuring that 
 202 
 
we will receive the recognition that we desire. As we are all incapable of sustaining our 
identities without feedback from others, we must hope that our shared vulnerability will 
incite us to affirm, rather than flee from, the alterity through which the Other escapes.   
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